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Zul'lDEC\9 PH3:l6 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT or 
THE STATE OF mABo, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON· 
BR.OWN, Husbml and Wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
AUGUSTA SAYOKO MJMOTO 
ORBBNHEAR.T, an individual, 
CASE NO. CV 2012-353 
DEFENDANT'S DISCLOSURE 
or EXPERT WITNESSES 
Defendant, Aupsta Sayoko Mimoto Oreenheart (hereinafter "Oreenheartj, by and 
through her attorneys of record, Borton-Lakey Law Ofttces. hereby provides purauam to Rule 
26(bX4) of the Idabo Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court's Order Settlna Proceedinp and 
Trial, Dffendant '1 Dllclonn of &pm Wltnu1u. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENr 
Because all witneaaa in this action have not been deposed and beca:me documentary 
subjects on which the expert will testify, the complete substance of experts' opiniona , 
DBPENDANT'S DISCLOSt1RE OF BXPER.T WITNESSES· 1 
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provide a fbll report of tb.oae opiniou. Accordins11, Defendant reaervea the right to aupplemem 
thi1 dilcloame. Defendant f\Jrther reserves the rlaht to present rebuttal and/or surrebuttll expert 
opJn1on testimony In respome to evldae presented by Plaintitfl that ounot. at th1s time. be 
reuonably anticipated. 
Defendm al~ reserves the rlabt to call any individuals appropriately disclosed by 
PlaJntlffil u elq)ertl In this cue to dilCUtl Ill)' matter for which they aro c:ompctent to teatify, 
includtq any matter within the acope of their experdM bued upon. their 1rafnlna, eduedon 
end/or experlence. 
Defendant fUrther points out that a number of person1 identified by tbe partiel who are 
employees of tbe Idaho Department of Water Resources and the Blmore County Al1e110t'1 and 
Treasurer'• oftlces while not a retained expert witneas, may offer testimony baled on the apecifio 
expertise and Jmowledp pined while pert'ormina their job that may include opinions and 
lnfenm.cel rationally based on their knowledae, experience, and education conaiatent with Rule 
702 and 703 of the Idaho Rula of Evidence. 
Insofar 11 discovery In this matter II onaoina. Defendant reserves the rlaht to amend or 
supplement this lilt to include the cleaipiton of additional expert witnellel 11 may be 
necessitated by iuther discovery. 
Any export witnellCS Defendant electa not to call at trial are declared to bo consultfns 
witneuea only, pursuant to Rule 26(bX4)(B). No other party may call such consultina expert 
without counsel'• express permiaion. 
By dilcloliq bee experts and the substance of their test!mony, Defendant reserves the 
right to ohallqe the PltlntUf1' uae of extrimic evidence to add or wry the terms of the 
W!f!Dty Deed md/or Purchase and Sale Asre=mt In this cue. 
DBPENDANT'S DISCLOSURE OP BXPER.T WITNBSSBS • 2 
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PQENDANT'S DISCLOSURE 01' UPEBT WITNESS 
1. Kenneth Brush 
Kenneth BNSh Appralsa1a 
19724 Dixie River Road 
Caldwell, Idaho 83607 
208-454-9090 
A. Idcmtlflcatlcm Md Swpmery of OpaUfigetigp•. Mr. Brush is a real eatate appraiser 
lice.med in Idaho. Qreaon and Nevada. He i1 the owner of Kmmeth Bruah Apprailllt an.cl deall 
exclusively with appn.iling rural and qrleultural flrma an.cl ranches. A detailed list of Mr. 
Brush'• q1111lflcad.ons ere Ht forth In. hll resume attached hereto u Exhibit A end incorporated 
here .. if tull)' ut forth herein. 
B. SvllJoct Matter md S»Mtango ofoprlona. By virtue ofhls training a a certified 
real estate apprai• and his experience in appiaisins real property in Blmore County, Idaho Mr. 
Brush bu expertise on the valuation of aarlcultural and farm property in that area with and 
without water riahtt durini 2007. Mr. Brush is expected to rebut the testimony of Pl&intlft"1 
expert u well u teltify t.hai the purcbue price Defendant paid fot the proport)" is commensurate 
with property with an appurtenant water riaht 
C. Fact apd Data Bllicd Upon. Mr. Bn1lh will rely on the cummtly avellable 
documentary evidence lncludlna. but not limited to. the exhibits to the Complaint, documents 
produced by the pm.ties in diseovery and documents on ftlo with the Idaho Department of Water 
resources (available to the public online). 
D. pµblicatioJll: Mr. Bruah bu not published any publications 
E. Cogmgtlm to be gaid: Mr. Brush charps Sl.200 per day plus expenses to 
testify. 
DEFENDANT'S DISCl.OSURB OF BXPBllT WITNBSSBS • 3 
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P. Preyloya wet tgtifviu lA either depojtipp or 1rla1 ydtNp tour (4) yem: Mr. 
Brulh bu tnti1iad in a deposition in Caldw1ll v. De la Cont:1pt:lon. Canyon County Idaho lA 
2010. 
2. Andy Emlco 
Andy Enrico and Company Real Batate 
2183 Roclaidge Way 
Bahe, Idaho 83712 
208-336-8880 
A. Idmf.iftcation an4 SummatY of OuatlftcatioDt. Mr. Bmlco la a real estate broker 
licensed in Idaho and is the owner/broker Andy Enrico and Company R.eal Estate.~. Mr. Bmico 
cummtly serves as a Real Estate Commlalonor for the State of Idaho. Mr. Bm1co ls 111 
accredited real atate instructor accredited by tba Idaho Real Eltate Commiuion teachina 
conthwlna education classes IUCh as teachlna aaents how to use and :tll1 out various Realtoie 
fonns. Mr. Enrico '1 quaHflcationa are llt forth in his resume attached hereto u Exhibit B ad 
~here u if t\Uly Mt forth herein. 
B. subitct Matter and Suhatange of Opiniona. By virtue of his trainJna and 
experience u a real estate broker, aeoredited real estate lnatructor and other experiencea lilted. in 
his resume. Mr. Enrico bu expertise lA how real estate forms developed by the Idaho 
Aaaociation of R.ealtont> are to be filled out. Mr. Enrico will teeti.fy that if water rishts wa 
Intended to be excluded from the sale lA this cue. then the RE-24 Vacant Land Real Estate 
Purchase and Sale Aareement or 111 Addendum. to the RB-24 would have identi:fted the water 
rlaht belna excluded. Mr. Enrico may also be called to rebut the testimony of Pbdntlft's expert 
u to the value of the Oreenheart Property at the time of purchase u well aa testify that tba 
pun:hue price Defendant paid for the property ls commensurate with ·property with an 
appurtenant water riaht. 
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C. Foct an4 Data Belied Upon. Mr. Bmlco will rely on tba curromly available 
documentary evidence lncludlna. but not limited to, the exhibits to the Complaint, documema 
produced by the parties in dilcovery and dooumenta on file with the Idaho Departm.mt of Water 
reaourcea (availabJAt tD the public onllno). 
D. py'bUsmtona: Mt. Bmlco bu not published any publicatlou. 
B. Compenatlon to be - Mr. Bnrico c1mps S200 per hour for reviewlna 
docnmumta and for teeiffylna. 
P. Pmious CUii tntiMna In eltb• depotitiqn or trial within four C4l yem: Mr. 
Emlco ha teltUled in a deposition in MM lnw1tm1nt1 lno. and Mont1go Ba, Inc., v. Candy 
Mmmtalll, I.LC 1t al, CV OC 0821965, Ada County. Idaho in 2011. 
DATED this 1911t day of December, 2012. 
BORTON LAKEY LAW OFFICES 
By 
CQTDICAD or SERVICE 
I HBREBY CERTIFY that on tbla 19• day otDecember, 2012, a true and correct copy of 
tm foregoinl document WU le&'Vtd by flnt.olul ail, poltqe prepaid, and addtel8ed to; by fax 
tnmsmillion to; by overnight delivery to; or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person 
m cbatp of the office u indicated below: 
Miebll1 c. Creamer 
Thomu B. Dvonk 
OIVINI P'UULIY LLP 
P.O. Box. 2720 
Bou., m 13101-2120 
Telephone: (208) 388·1200 
Facshnlle: (201)388-1300 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[X] Fax 
[ l Overnilbt Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
~~ Victor Villega 
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EDUCATION 
us ma 
KENNITH L Bll1JSB, AJl.A. 
1972' DIXIE RIVlll llOAD 
CALDWELL. mABO 83"7 
208/4,...,.,. 
JAX 20l/45W890 
BS ApioultmalBqmoeriq. UnivenityofCalifomiat Davia, Dooembet 1975. CourHwork 
distributed throuPout practioal eqlDeer1q prineiplea. mimll science, and bUlineu manapment. 
WORK IXPDIENCE 
lne 1981-Preleat: Selt-emplo,ed; IC.en Brush Appniaala. 
Aootedited Jlural Appraiser (ARA) AppniaiDa rural and qrioultural tarm., ranchet, and 
tpeOialty qricultural propertiel luoh .. feedlotl, potatO .. oDioll i; boa Wll'tbouM,eto.; 
qricultural IDd eoonomio comultiq. Certlfie4 Appraiser in Idaho. Otep ad Nevada. 
1'7Wne 1'81t Doane-Weatem. Caldwell. Idaho. 
Apicultunl louccmapondem and field ot11ccr for AEtna~ and CUUalty wt Mutual of 
New York for real e11ait mortppa. !telpouibWtlea mclwle tlnanclal and maagement IDllyt1I, 
credit review, appraiea1 of security, loan oriafDatlon and aubmfalon, loan serviciq and collection. 
Otherrespoulbilltiel included management comultlns, real estate appniaala, economic tmibility, 
and. real lltltl Illes. 
AFFDJA.TIONS 
Certified Appraiser in Idaho, ()rep ad Nevada 
Accredftod member- Am.erlcan Socfet)' of Farm Manaaon and R.ma1 Appraiaera, Idaho 
State Chapter and Treuure Valley Local Group 
Member-Various Commlue. for the A.8FMRA 
Put Prelldent, ISPMRA 
Director-Pioneer Dixie Ditch Company, Upper Center Point Ditch Company 
Member- Lower Boise River Watershed Aclviamy Group 
Member- Caldwell United Motbodiat Church 
Eaale Soout-Boy Scouts of Amari.ca 
PERSONAL INFORMATION 
Ap: 59, married. 36 ymt, OU dauabter 
Own and operate a 375+ held cow/oalf oporatlon tn Idaho i: ()rep 
Buy 100-300 oalvetlyearlfnp ammally; feed a: anze these yearlinp in Idaho & Oreaon 
Have 20CMOO head of steon & he1fen ouatom fed to •Jauabter amwally 
Hobbies hlolude campiaa. filhtna. and woodwotkiq 
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st Carlton Ave 
QUALDICATIONS 
or 
KENNITH BR.USB, A.a.A. 
lleal Batato Appralaer 
ldlho Stm Certified Appralaer tU2 
Oieaoa Cerdt1ed Appralaer #C000287 
Ntwda Ceztiftecl Oeam1 Appralaer #00540 
No. 4985 P. 8/9 
2. ADDUSSIPBONB 19724 Dixie River load, Clldwe11, Idaho 83601 208/45+9090 
3. COLLIG& 
FAX: 208/455-9890 
Bachelor of Science in Alliculture. 1975 Unlvaity of Clllfornla. Davia 
Self employed .,. 1915 
Jolatd WeatnPum Mina..- Compuy in 1976 
Wlltlal Farm Manqement Compa.y and Dolnel Aarlcu1tunl Sa'Ylcel. 
Jno .. aqccl!n 1981 
Completed American Society of Farm Manapn and 1lmal ApJnilerl 
Co'unll-Far.m AppraiM1, Advanood Far.m Apprailal. Ranch AppraiM1, 
numtrOUI Mmiun 
AccreditedlutalAppniser(ARA) of American Scciety of PumM&napl'I 
and Ilmal Apprailll'land Mombcrofldlho Society of Fann Mln&prl and 
1lmal Appra!Hrt Certified II cuaent OD CODtlnuiaa educatf.cm with 
.ASFMRA 
SPECIAl. ASSIGNMENTS 
Ptepll'ld appraiuJ.a on rural IDd qribusinm pt0perd11 in Idaho, Orep. 
Wllbiqtol, Utah, Nevada. Montana, and Califhmia fbr corpontlom, 
aovemmem apnciea, lendera, a mdMduaJJ 
CLIENTS INCLUDE InlermouDt&in Comrmmity Bank (a divilion of Pmmandle State Bank) 
IP Morpn CblM (fmmcrly Wubfqtoa Mutual Bank .t WlltlrD. Bank) 
Bank of the Cucldes (formerly Pamen .t M.._ State Baa1r.) 
US Bank (fotmedy West One .t Idabo Pint Natlo.aal BIDk) 
Wolll PllJO Bmk A Wells F1110 Al Credit (t'armaly Fint Intentate .t 
Pint Seourit)' BIDkl) 
BIDDlrBank 
Ctdr.om Buaincu Bak 
Key But of ldlho 
D. L. BVl.DI Bak 
USDA-Farm Service A.lfJ1Jl1'i (formerly FmHA.) 
Farm Credit sem. 
H&rvtlt Capital O>mpany 
Amcrlolll Pam Moltpp ComplD.)' 
Norwat Aarf.cu1tum1 Ctedit Inc. 
Ziont Apica1tmal ,._. Zloa Bank 
R.abo-~ (formedy Lmd Leuo Asri·Bumcn) 
Tri-Sta111 UvtltaCk Credit Cotponttcm 
:&mt.I Wff .._ea.,., efNtiw'Y-edl 
The Church of Iesu Chrlai of Lauer-Day Salim 
Vlrioua IlM!fvlduals, Accoumanu it Attorneys 
284 
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Vtetor Villqu [ISB No. 5860) 
BORTON LADY LAW OFPICBS 
1-41 S. Carlton Ave. 
Meridlan, ID 83642 
BoiJe. Idabo 83702 
Oft!oe: (208) 908-4415 
Fax: (208) 493-4610 
Bmail: victor@borton-laby.com 
.4ttornq1 for Dl/indant 
;=fLED 
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LU1L Lit.C 2' AH 9: ~ 9 
CLERK OF TH ORT 
BARBA~A S~ELE 
DEPUT 
IN THE DJSTRIC? COURT OJTD JOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OJ 
THI STATE or mABO, IN AND JOR THI COUNTY or ELMORE 
JAY BROWN and CHR.ISTINB HOPSON· 
BROWN, Husband and Wife, 
Platntifti, 
v. 
AUGUSTA SA YOKO MIMOTO 
OR.EBNHBAR.T, an individual, 
/ 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CV 2012-353 
. MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPO&mONTO 
PLAINTIJ'JS' MO'l10N FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendant. Aupta Sayoko Mlmoto Oreenheart. by and tbrouah her attorney of record, 
Victor Villegu and Borton Lakey Law Offices, aubmitti this Memorandum. in Opposition to 
Plahmffi' Motton for Summary Judsment 
INTRODUCTION 
This case involves a quiet title and declaratory action ftlcd by P1alntlfti Jay and Christine 
Brown (hereinafter collectively referred to u "Browns.,) aeeldng a declaration that Defendant 
Aupta Oreenheart ("Grecnheart") ~ no right. title or interest to certain around water rights 
286 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSmON TO PLAINTIFFS• MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT· 1 
' r 
Dec. 21. 2012 9:39AM st Carlton Ave 
No. 5005 P. 2 l 
that are appurtenant to approxhnately aJxty (60) acres of real propert)' that Chwnheart purchased 
in January 2007. 
STANDARDOPDVIEW 
Summary judamcni tba1l be granted to the movtna party when it shows tbat there it no 
pnuine dispute as to any material fac& and the movina party ii l!ltitled to a judgment u a matter . . 
of law. I.lt.C.P. 56(c}. Once the movlna partf establishel the abaenct of any pnulne dlaputea 
of material faot, tbe nomnoviq party must dte to apeclflc evfdenee in the record that creetel a 
dispute or show that the evidence cited by the movina party does not establish the absence of a 
pnuine dispute. The nonmoviq party ommot rely on mere allegations to. defeat l\l11UUf1 
judgment, but must aot forth specfflc facta and probative evidence to show disputed tacts. 
W'attlnbarpr v. A.G. Edwardl & So111, lnc., 246 P.3d 961, 970 (2010), 
ARGUMENT 
· L Th• Groadwater JUshtl Were Appurtenant To The Eadn Ortpal Brown Propertf 
And Tlaenfore The Gneaheart Propert)'. . 
Brown ques that the subject 8f0undwater riahts were not transferred because it WU not 
appurtenant to the Greenheatt Pioperty at the time of sale. Brown' 1 araument it incorrect 
because the p:oundwater automatically became appurtenant to the entire 320 acres upon the 
'Niter rlaht decree& tom the Snake River Basin Adjudication ("SRBA ") court that speciflcally 
described the entire 320 acres u the area of penniuible "Place of Use". &1 SW Dier•• for 
Wat,, Right Nos. 61-71Jland ~J-2188 attachld to &blbJt "i" and Srb.tblt. "C': to Complaint. 
The &et that Brown could choose where within the 320 aeres to irrigate 11 a distinction without 
any lepl slpificance. It did. not change the lepl cft'ect of the SRBA court's determination of 
Place ofUao, WhiCJi iiDU!e me water n_. appnrttn•nt to that mtire specific amount of acteagt. 
287 
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Dec. 21. 2012 9:40AM st Carlton Ave No. 5005 P. 22 
In addition, Brown's araument that there ls no appurtenant water riaht to the Onenheart 
Propert)t because It had net been irripted for yean undersooret the 1ep1 ldpU1cance of Brown's 
conduct placlns the water In the W• Bak. In hi• ddavlt, Mr. Brown admltl that hi applied 
to leue portiom ot the water rlaht to the Idaho Department of WrbJt R.esourcee Board Water 
Supply Bank. SI• Brown A§ldavtt ft 13-15. Mr. Brown a1lo statea that the acret he contrlctcd 
not to bripte included the llltirety or the Orecoheart Property. Id. 7he purpme of placina water 
In the Watet BaDk ii to avoid the penalties far nonuae which include forfeiture reaultfna In 
severwe of the water riaht troSn the property. St• LC. f 42-1764 ("Water rlahta ••• ctedited to 
the water supply bank are not subject to f'orteiturc for noo.use ••• "). The purpose ls not to sever 
the water right from the property u Brown arpes. 
A Memorandum dated Aupst 11. 2003 contained In the records of the Idaho Department 
of Water R.eaoureet reptdlq BroWn•1 appllcation to the Wm Bank i11uatrates thll point 
Tho appllclnt baa chanaod his fmming operation Ind no lonaer ccnthmously 
farms the 320 acres for which he bas water rights His currem pmotlce is to 
farm about 160 lores and allow the remainJq 160 ... to remain tallow. 
Accordms1Y• in order to avoid torreitute of the UllUltd water rlpta. or 
dJmlnutlon of the tlowl he has historically used, He wbhes to place the 
umuecl water in tba water honk. 
Attached are copies ot tax bills lhowlns applicants name and legal 
descrlption.-.and. SRBA records for the water rlpts 61·7151 and 61·2188. 
Plcue let me know if' you need .more intotmation 
See JDWR M1morantlum Exhibit ..4 to Vlllep Ajftdavlt In Oppolftlon To SllmlnQr)' Judgmtmt. 
BIOWl1 bu not poimed tbil Court to any applieable statute or decision that aaya once a 
water rlabt ia placed into the Water Bank. it ii thereafter aevered from the property. Nor has 
Brown pointed to my authority that 1111 pladng a water right in the Wat« Bank modifies the 
SR.BA court's aecree ideiidfylii1 PDCi ot U& rt dDri wa nu appm'tftltlt ...,_.,apt to tbe 60 
acte Oreenheart Property u Brown now arps, Brown would. bav• had no reason to comract 
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with the Idaho Water R.esourcel Board not to lniaate the 60 acrea. Brown could have simply 
applied the water to other parts of the 320 acres. 
Simply put. the around water dshft were appurtenant to the entire 320 IC1'es per the 
SR.BA court'• Place ofUac determination and Brown•• act ot'placina a portion of that water in 
the Water Bank did not chanp the appurtmmt l1atUI of that Wits or mocllff the water riahta 
decree. For thele reuona Oreenheart asks this Court to fin4 u a matter of law there wu lfO\Dld 
water appurteant to the Oreenhelrt Property durina tho trlnlfct by Warranty Deed and that 
tbHe aroum water tlahta currently sit in the Water Bank. 
U. Thia Coart Should Not Coulder Eltrlmlo E'f'kfenee To Explaln The Warrantr Deed. 
Brown argues that under Idaho law, when a deed contains "appurtenance" languap it ia 
amblpoua with reapcot to whether water rlahta are ln1ended to be tnmlferrecL Therefore, B!OWA 
arps the "result is to automatlca11y allow extrluio mdence of the pattiu' intent." Plalntiff 1 
M1morandum In Support of Summary ./udgm•nt PS· 13. Brown's analysis of Idaho law ii 
incorrect and it directly contradicted by the decision in Koon v. Empq, 40 Idaho 6, 231 P. 1091 
(1924) whleh held that the use of .. appurtenance .. languap in a deed it not ambipoua and 
therefore exuinaic evidence is prohibited by the parol evidence rule. 
Elflll'Y involved a lawsuit t.o quiet title over 600 inches of war and to el\foin the delivery 
of that water. Empq at P. 1098. The specific facts and procedural history of the cue are u 
followa: 
The deeds by which Olive conveyed the lands now owned by reapondent dJd not 
speeifically mention any water, but they contain the clause: "Togetbs with all and 
sinaular the tenements. hereditsmenta and IJ)l1Ul1anQOI thereunto belonainl or in 
lll)"Nlse appertainlna, • • *" which respondent contendl effected the transfer of all 
._ ... .,,._._wilie laad 
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Oil tbl contrary, appellanta contend that when the deed.I wore executed and delivered. 
the parties qreed that the water apputteDmt to the land WU to be retamed by 
appellant Olive; and mellanta attempted to utalzlllh Mh rwmtima by a»l. 
The court refuted to permit the introduction of oral evidae tor such puzpose. ad 
the actloa of the court Is Ulianed u error. 
Id. (underllnina added). 
The Empq court helcl that "[it] is an c:1ementmy rule for the conatructlon of deeds. the 
1anpaae of whicb it plain and \IDllmblpout. that. In the ablOllOe of bud or mistake. tht 
~on of the partl• Dl\1lt bo ucertained from. the inrtntment Itself ••• .Parol evidence is not 
admJllible for uh pUrpose." Id. The Empq court recognized that the use of the expreaion 
... together with all and llngular the appurtenances thereto belongina and apperta1nlng,' or ou .of 
idmitar purport ... " in a detd ii effective to transfer an appurtenant water riaht unlees there la a 
specli1c reaervation In tho deed. Id. ai P. 1099. Ultimately, the Empq court aftlnned the trial 
court'• rof'.-1 · to permit extrinsic evidence because the appurtenance lanauage wu 
unamb!pou1. The court belcl "[t]ho 1anpp of the deeds 11 plain and unamhiauoUL From the 
deeda the intent of the arantor to convey the lands, tosethcr with tbo umvttnn• pla1nly 
appears. There wu no allep.tlon of hid or mistake In the execution of the deeds, and no bud 
or mistake ls claimed." Id. (underlinina added). 
In thil cue, the pertinent parts of the Warranty Deed to Ms. Oreenheart from tht Brown• 
reads "TO HA VB AND TO HOLD said premises, with their appurtenances unto the said 
Ormtee .... " S.1 &Mblt D to Complaint,• &hlbU B to ..4jfldavtt 'o.f .A.ugu.rta Gr11nheart In 
Support of Motton For Samtmary Judgm1nt. The deed contains tho typical "appurtenance" 
Ianpae and per the Empq decision it la not ambiauous as a matter of law as Btown arauea. 
More imptantlr. the exception to the perol evidenco nile (fraud or m.iatak.e) that would permit 
0 I 
the introduction of extrinsic evidence has never been pled by Browns. Brawn'• Complaint does 
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not alleae had or milteke and certainly does not meet LR.C.P. 9(b) requirlna that fraud or 
miatab be pled with particularity. Al a result. the extrinaio evidence Brown attempts to 
Introduce (which Ommh.eart cummtJ.y cbaDenps in her motion to strike ft1ed concmrent1y) u 
the foundation for their motion cannot be a buia for pnt1na aumnary judgment. 
JIL Th• Purclwe and Sale Aptement DOtl Not Support SullblW')' Jadpaeat. 
Blown also attempts to arsue that the 1anpap of the Purcbale and Sale Aareement 
unambiguously provfdel that water wu not intended to be part or the sale. These aspnems 
ahould also be dlsreprded and aummary judpient denied for two reasons. 
First. the DootrfDe of Merger dictates that "[w]hen a deed ls delivered and accepted u 
pedorma11co of the contract to convey. the contract is merged in the deed. Though the terms of 
the deed may vary &om thole contafm:d in the contract. the deed alone must be looked to 
determfne the rl;hta of the parties .... " Cap1tar Rlldto Operating Co. v. Lawrlncf, 143 Idaho 704, 
110. 152 P.3d 575, 511 (2007) •. The Wlrtt11t'/ Deed In this cue was executed and delivered 
pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Aareement. Therefore, this Court is left with interpreting the 
Warranty Deed. As explained above. the Warranty Deed bu the typical appurtenant lanpage 
and therefore unless Brown can. show &aud or mistake (which bu never been. uaerted in this 
cue). extrinsic evidence such u the use of the terms of the Pmchase and sale Agreement cammt 
be used to establish the intent of the partiee. 
Second, mm lf this Court were to comider and Interpret the Purchase and Sale 
~ the plain Ianauaae of the Aareement contradict& Brown's argumema. The Purohue 
and Sala Agreement speciftcally reads: 
1~. WATER RIGHTS: Description of water rights. water systems, wells sprlnp, 
water, d1tC&lt attai rlihfit ete. if ii)'. mat are &ppmtlJuant theieto that • new ea er 
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&1 Edltblt A to J,6ldavU of A.up1ta Gr1tnhlatt In SUpport Of DI.fondant '1 Motion For 
SummotyJudgm1nt. Thi• Coun should deny Brown'• motion for summary Judpient on a 
finding 11 a matter of law that the plain 1mauap of the Purchaae and Sale Agreement included 
water u part of the purchase. 
IV. If Tlail Court Coulden Tile Estrbl8c Evidence Offered By Plabatlfti There Are lu•• 
Of Faet Tkat Preelue Smmary Judpent. 
PllhdiffJ rely heavily on post-aa1e writinp that Oreenhearc sent to third parties to 
establish that she knew around water riahtl were excluded from the sale. If' this Court 
dete.rmhie1 that it will comlder those written atatementl, there are iuuel of fact that would 
preclude summary judgment. The 4ffldavtt of Allf"'lta Or11nhlart In Support of Dl/•ndant'1 
Oppollttan to 9""""""1 .Jud,,,..nt ~,,,,,_,., Oppolltlon 4fftdavtt. ") provides speclfto detail 
reprdina what the meant when she wrote those communications and What her underttandfna 
\VU of the words "water right" and "dry". Her undmtanding and intent were very cli!ferent than 
what Brown attempts to portray. 
. Summary judamezit is appropriate only when all of the pleadings. afftdavits and other 
relevant documcnta before the court indicate that there are no genuine issues of material fact for 
a jmy to decide and the movins party ls entitled to a judgment under the applicable law. I.R..C.P. 
S6(c). In each hlatm~ the movma party bean the burden of establishing a lack of pnuine 
luues of material fact. Id. All reasonable inferences and concIUlions are drawn in favor of the 
~-movins party. Id. 
In this case, Oreenheart understood the tonn "water rlahta" meant a situation where 
"water nms acrou the surface of hmd and the owner of thai land bu a right to take that water 
and UIC it for their purpoSll. SO if there ia no watei' t1mnina across tbe !lfid Y!life :ti dc'vlbuslJ HO 
water rlaht" °'''""'art Oppoaltlon Afildavtt ft 6 and 13. Therefore, when she stated sho wu 
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aware she had no water rlshts sbt wu merely refetrlna to her lcnowledp that there was no 
surface water nmnin1 across bar property. Oreeaha.rt•s post sale statement& were not an 
admfpion that lhe knew around wata- rlpta existed and that they were exoluded &om the sale. 
Similarly, Otemheart testlfted in her aft'ldavit that her undentandlns of the wont "dry" 
end her use of that 'WOrd in her tax appeal wu mere17 used conve)' her undentan.dlng that there 
wu no nrtaee water. Grlenhtart Oppo1lt1Dn A,f/ldilvlt, 12. She did not lnteocl her statement to 
. 
mean the knew tbero wu no pound water rlpt. CJreonb.eart in fact believed .U could dig a well 
baled on her conversatiou with ber real estate aaent and the intormatlon. contained In the 
multiple listlns service hando~ G11111Mart Oppo.rttton Ajfldavlt,,. 7-8. She wu never told 
that there WU I pound water right exfatod and that it WU excluded ftom. the sale. Gr1tnh1art 
Oppo1ltlon ~It, 9. 
Based on the discussion above. the testimony provided b7 Orecmheart in her affidavit 
oppo1in1 rummmy judament, viewed in light moat favorable to her, a least ostabllahcs iuues of 
fact. There are i1sues of fact whetUr Greoiiheart knew durina tho sale that a groundwater right 
existed. and whether she Jenn that tho p>undwater riaht was excluded from ~ sale. As such, 
Oreenheart aakl this Court to deny summary judpumt bocauae of the existence of those iactt. 
V. BrowaBll l'alled To Prove The Elements Of lltoppel, Waiver Anet Lichee. 
Brown argues that this ~mt should apply equitable principles of quui and equitable 
ea~l to prevent Oreenheart from assertiq that she did not know 8f0und watoT WU excluded 
from. the sale. However, Brown incorrectly applies those estoppel prlnciplel to the wrong period 
of time. 
Oree.nheart'1 representations to Elm.on County and the fact tbat she wa able to obtain a 
reau.ction Iii hit property taxe• didn't liii'm Brown or cause BNwn m tab a diff'eient petition: 
After the sale and transfer of the Grecnheut Property the water at that point had been tranale.rred 
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via Warranty Deed. Obtalnlq a tax reduction doesn't ohanp the fact fbat the water bad been 
tftmlferred. Thul the conduct to be judged to detennine whether estoppel prinoiplee, waiver or 
1aohel will apply would be to look at the conduot dudna the sale of the Oreenheart Propelt)'. In 
other wmdt, for my of those prlaciplet to apply there must have been conduct by Ortenheart 
cNtlDI the gt, of the Ofelnheert Property that Induced Brown to ohanp poeltlons to their· 
detriment. 
Thia dootrlne oi quasi eatoppel appliel when: (1) the oft'endlna party took a dliterent 
position than bil or her orialnal position and (2) either (a) the offendfng party pined an 
advamap or caused a disadvantap to tho other party; (b) the other party wu Induced to ohanae 
politlons; or (c) lt ~uld be uncoucionable to permit the oftlmdm1 party to ma!ntain an 
incomiatent position ftom one he or she has already derived a benefit or acquiesced In. Atwood v. 
Smlth.143 ldlho 110, 114, 131P.3d310. 314 (2006). 
In thla case, Brown Cannot point to ID)! spodfic facta durlna the sale of the Oreenheart 
Propelt)' that show Ms. Oreenheart did anythin1 to induce Brown to chanp positions to their 
detriment. Greenbeart never met the Browm during the tramaction. 4/Jldavtt of GN1nhlart In 
Support Of Dl/lndant'1 Motion For Summary Judgmlnt, 3. Oreenheart did not prepare tho 
Warramy Deed or the typewrittell lquago in the Purcbue and Sale Agreement. Id 1 6. She 
wu not presem in the room wheD the Bl'O'WDI signed the deed. Id. , 1. · In fact the Pmchue and 
Sale Ap:ement unambipowdy stated that water WU part of the purchase. There is DO evidence 
that Oreenbemt' • conduct tainted tho sale or induced Brown to chanp poslttom to Oreenheart's 
advantage. 
The doctrine of equitable ntoppel is likewise inapplleable in tis case. The elements of 
equltibli estoppel are: (1) a Hilse representiUofi or concea1Tnem ot1 materhd tact with actual oz 
conatructive Jcnowledp of tho truth; (2) the Pl!t1- asll!tina estoppeJ did not know or could not 
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discover the truth. (3) the falte representation or contABlment wu made with the intent that it be 
relied upon and (4) the person to whom tho repnuntat!on wu made or from whom the facts 
weze concealed. relied met acted upcm tho reptelllltation or conculment to his prejudice. 
Thtrlmdt v. A.H. Rob"'6 Co., Inc., 108 Idaho 303. 307, 698 P.2d 365. 369 (1985). 
Here, Brown once again can point tc>110 IYidence that Greenheart made a false atatem.em 
or representation during the sale which would have Induced Brown to lip a Wmanty Deed that 
did not reservt the around water right. Al ltatld above, Oreenhemt did not prepare tho Warranty 
Deed or the typewritten 1anpqe in the PurQhue and Sale Agreement. Id. There la no evldenoe 
that Cltetmheut prevented Brown tiom readlna the Warranty Deed either. The elements for 
equitable estoppel cannot be met in thil.caao and therefore equitable estoppcl does not apply.· 
Brown also attempts to que that waiver and lache1 apply in this case however both are 
not applicable In thi1 case. Waiver ls "a voluntary, intentional rellnquishmint of a known rlaht 
or advantage." Brand S Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731, 734, 639 P.2d 429, 432 (1981). "[T]o 
establish a waiver, it must appear that the adversary party has acted in rellanee upon such a 
waive and altered bis position." Thero is no evidence produced by Brown of Oreenheart's 
conduct durina the sale that would have caused Brown to alter their position. Greenbeart 
reincotporatel the qumema immediately above. 
The doctrine of lach~ is likewise hlappllcable. Like quui .. eatoppel. laches 11 an 
affirmative defense and tho party assertina the defense has the burden of proof. Thomas v. 
Arlr:oolh Producl, Ina., 137 Idaho 352, 359-360, 48 P.3d 1241, 1248 • 1249 (2002). Whether a 
party la auiltf of 1acbes primarily is a question of fact and therefore Its dcterm1natlon is within 
the province of the trial court. Sword v. Sw11t, 140 Idaho 242, 249, 92 P.3d 492, 499 (2004). 
The necessary elements to ma11ifiin a Clirerlii of CiCliii arc: 
295 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUCGMENT • 10 
Dec. 21. 2012 9:41AM st Carlton Ave No. 5005 P. 30 
(l) defendant'• lnvuion of plahrdft'1 riahts; (2) delay in assertina plalntlil'a 
rlabta, the plalndft"bavln1 had notice and en oppommliy to institute • suit; (3) 
laoi of knowledp by the dtfcmdant that plahulif would uaert his rfahts; and 
(4) ~ury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief ii accorded to 
pJalntH! or the nit ii not helcl to be barred. 
Thomar v. hl:oo.rlt Produc1, Inc., 137 Idaho 352. 359-360. 48 P.3d 1241, 1248 • 1249 (2002) 
In this CIR Brown attempts to use an aftlrmativo defenae u a sword nther than a shield. 
Brown IUld Oreenhoart to quiet title not the other way around. Under Idaho law the around 
water wu trafelred with the Oreenheart Property via the Wamnt'/ Deed beeause there wu no 
taerVation of the water riaht that deed. At that point the around water riahta belonpd to 
Ctreenheett and there la lop! no action that she would have to brina to utabllsh ownenhip. 
Lachea does not apply here because there wu no delay by Orcenhean since she dldn't havo to 
brina an action. On the other hand, bad Brown brought this action within the statute of 
limitatiODI (which Brown did not), Gmnheart could use the defense of lacbea to argue that 
Brown waited too Iona to brina the quiet title action. 
Bven it Brown could use J.achot as a direct cause of action there are lssuea of fact that 
would pmclude the application of 1aohel to this summary judpnent action. Oreenheart testified 
that she "dld not know that a pound water rlaht with respect to the Oreenbeart Property existed 
until the Pl~ lay Brown contacted me sometime in February 2012 to tell me that he made a 
mistake when he sold me the ground~ riaht" Gr11nh1art Opposition AJfldavtt, 1 O. She 
wu never informed. during the sale that there wu even a decreed ground water right and that it 
wu excluded itom the sale." Gflenhtart Opposition Alfdavtt , 9. Therefore. Greenheart had 
no notice and opportunity to bring a lawsuit. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the undisputed facts and the arsuments set forth above, Oreenheart 
respectfully requests that the Court din)' Brown'• Motion for Summary 1udgment. 
DATED tbl12d day of December, 2012. 
BORTON LAKBY LA w omCBs 
By y~~ 
VlotorV 
..4no,.,,.,, for IA/lndtmt 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ..2L day of December, 2012, a true and cotreet copy 
Of the foregoing documem WU served by ftrst..clau mall, postap prepaid, and ~- to; by 
fax tramnUuion to: by overnight delivery to; or by persoull)' dellverfna to or leavfna with a 
person in chirp of the office u Indicated below: 
Michael C. Creamer 
Thomas B. Dvorak 
GIV!NI PUasLBY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2720 
Bolte. m 83101-2120 
Telephone: (208) 388-1200 
Fecsfmile: (208) 388·1300 
[)('] U.S. Mall 
[ ] Pax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
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c~ARBARA S l'E:ELE 
ERK OF TH~CfURT 
DEPUT J'' 
IN TD DISTRicr COURT 01' THE l'OURTB JUDICIAL DISTRicr 01' 
THE STATE 01' IDAHO, IN AND roa THE COVNTY 01 ELMORE 
JA. Y BROWN and CHRISTlNB HOPSON .. 
BR.OWN, Husband Ind Wife, 
Plafntift'i. 
v. 
AUGUSTA SAYOK.O MIMOTO 
OREBNHEAR.T, an individual, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CV 2012-353 
DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT 




Defendant, Aupsta Sayoko Mhnoto Oreenbeart. by and throup her attomey of record, 
Victor Vlllepa and Borton Lakey Law Offices, submits thil atatement of material facta that are 
pnUme issuea of material fact and therefore are not in dispute. This atatement ls ofterad 
pursuant to this Court's Schedulina Order and to aasist this Court in its consideration of 
Dlfandant '1 ()ppolltton To Plabttffl' Motion F01 Summary Judgmfnt and other pleadings tlled 
in opposition to said motion filed simultaneously herewith. 
DEPENDANT'S STATBMENT OF MATBIUAL FACIS..IN.OPPOSITION TO PLAINm'PS' MOnON PO:R. 
SUMMARY ruDOMENT • l l ~ 0 
Ow {\c. 21. 2012 9:41AM st Carl ton Ave No. 5005 P. 33 
MATERIAL ISSUES 01' JACfS 
1. On or about Pebmaey S, 1981 Plaintiff Jay Brown acquired approxim•t.el)' 320 
acres otlmd lltuated in the But \4 of Section 24, T4S. R.5!, B.M.. in BJmore County ("Orlafnal 
Btown Property'). S11 Complaint. 
2. The Snake River Bain AcUudlcatlon ("SRBA ") Court in Twhi Falla, Idaho, 
demed Water 1Uahts Noe: 61·2188 and 61-7151 (the •water Rightl") to P1aintlii Jay Brown on 
October 26.2000, authorizlna tbe U1CS of aroundwater to the 320 acres comprlsfna the Oriainal 
Brown Propeity. 811 &hlbtt "B" and &htbtt "c• to Complaint. 
3. 
printed a multiple liatlna 80l'Yioe handout which detailecl that the property had a proposed well. 
A/ftdavlt o/ .A.ugu1ta <Minn.art In ()ppolttlon to Summary Judgm1111 r'Gr11n1Mart Oppoltn1 
.A,ffd. ·~. 
4. I>urlq the purchase of the Oreenheatt Property neither Plaintlfrs or their 
iepresentadvea told Oreeoheart that there wu a decreed around water right or that said water 
riaht wu excluded tom the sale. Gr"nhtart Oppo11nf A,ffd. , 9. 
S. Orconheart did not know of the exilteDco of a decreed aroundwar.r right 
applicable tO the property she purchased until !ho wu contacted by Ptafntiff Jay Brown In 
FebNary 2012. Gn1nltlart Oppoam, 4ffd. ,, 9· l 0. 
6. PJaJntli!' Jay Brown told Orecmbmt durlna that telephone conversation. on 
Felxuary 2012 that he miatlkenly sold the groundwater right to Greenheart. Gre1nhlart 
Oppollng .Affdfl 10-11.; Gr11nlaa11 D1po1ltlon Pl· 143 ll. 7-22. 
7. When GiiihDi1't med BW!lOttce otflX lppeid wtm the !tmote Cumttt lhe w1ote 
that " ... I wu told the land is dry .... " Oree.ahean'• statement was not intended to eonvey a 
DlWENDANT'S 8TATBMBN1' OP MATBIUAL f ACTIIN OPPOSmON TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR. 
SUMMilY JUOOMENT • 2 2 9 9 
•~ - -~c. 21. 2012 9:42AM st Carlton Ave No. 5005 P. 34 
knowledge or belief that the Oreenheart Property bad a around water right or that she knew that 
groundwater rlahtt were specifically excluded trom the ale of the Onenheut Property. 
Gr,,,,,,,., Oppo.rlng Aid, 12. 
8. Slmllarly. when Greenbeart wrote her email to Ms. ICriatina Schindele in reaponae 
to an otter 1iom Elmore County to purchue her property, stattng that a knew that. the 
Gteenhelrt Ploperty " ••• ls dry arazin8 only dua to a lack of lrrlption l)'8tlD1 and no water 
riabts" aba merely meant that a knew her property did not have surt'aco water. Gr11nhlart 
DATED this L day ofDeeember, 2012. 
BORTON LAKEY LAW OFFICES 
By 
DSPBNDANTS STATBMENT OP MATERIAL PACTS IN OPPOSlTION TO PLAJNTJFFS• MOTION FOi. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT· 3 3 0 0 
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gBmJCATE OF SQYJCI 
I HDBBY CERTIFY that on tllll ,JL day of December, 2012. a true and comet cop)' 
of the inPI document wu served by fil'lt-clul mail, postqe pzepald. and addreuecl to; by 
fax trammialcm to; by overniaht dellVC')' to; ot by personally deliverln1 to or leavlna with a 
penon ln d1qc otthe oftice u indicated below: 
MlohMl c. Creamer 
ThomM& Dvorak 
OMMI PUut.8V LLP 
601 Wat Banoek S1net 
P.O.Box2nG 
Bolee. IDG701-2720 
Telephone: (208) 388-1200 
FICl!mile: (208) 388-1300 
[A'] U.S. Mall 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Ovemipt Deliver)' 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
DBF!NDANT'S STATBMENT OP MATBIUAL PACTS IN OPPOSmON TO PLAINTIPFS' MOTION FOR. 
SUMMAR.Y nJDOMENT • 4 ] () · l 
~ec. 21. 2012 9:38AM 14 st Carlton Ave 
Joe Borto1l [ISB No. 5552) 
Victor VU1eps [ISB No. 5860] 
DOR.TON LAKBY LAW OFFICES 
141 B. carlton Aw. 
Meridian, m 83642 
Botse. Idaho 83702 
Oftloe: (208) 908-4415 
Pax: (208) 493-4610 
Email: victor@borto1l·laby.com 
.A.ttomq1for De/-"'nl 
No. 5005 P. 11 
FILED 
2Gl2 DEC 21 AH 9: 49 
BARBAR A S ·7E LE CLERK OF THE RT 
DEPUTY 
JN THI DISTRICI' COURT or THE JOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICl' or 
TBB STATE or IDAHO, IN AND ll'OR THI COUNTY or ILMORB 
JAY BR.OWN ud CHRISTlNB HOPSON· 









CAD NO. CV 2012-353 
ADIDAVIT or AUGUSTA 
SA.YOKO MIMOTO 
GRUNllEART IN S'OPPORT 
or DEJ'ENDANT'S 
OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
AUGUSTA SA YOKO MJMOTO OR.BENHBAR.T, being duly awom upon oath deposes 
and says u follows: 
1. That I am an adult over tho 11e of eighteen (18) years, that I am a resident of Lu 
Vepa, Clark County, Nevada, and that I am the named Defendant in this matter - I have 
personal knowledae of the facts set forth in this Affidavit. 
APPIDA VlT OF AUGUSTA SA YOKO MIMOTO OREBNHSAR.T lN SUPPOR.T OF DEPENDANT'S 
OPPOSmON TO SUMMARY ruDOM'SNT • 1 J O 2 
Oec. 21. 2012 9:38AM st Carlton Ave 
No. 5005 P. 12 
2. 1bat while I have a dootorate In. education and a muten in ieachina, I have never 
taken a law reJated coune and have no lepl tndnlna. 
3. At the time or my purohae ot the Oreenheart Property I wu unf'amiliar with the 
State ofldaho'• Wits law with respect to how a aurtace or around 'Rifer right i• obtained and/or 
how a aurfa or around water riabt ls transferred. 
4. That l submit this atlldavit to explain my UDdentandina of written and verbal 
statemema thll I had made to individuals and aovenunental entities during and after the purchase 
of the Oreenhelrt Property. 
5. Althouah I make this afBdavit in part to explain my statementa, I do not waive 
any of my deten. that my statements 1hould not be used to add or var/ the unambiauoua tenns 
of the Warranty Deed and/or PUIChase and Sale Agreement 
6. My underataDdlna of the words "water rishta" and how I • it in a 1111tence 
meam: to duodbc a situation where water runs across the smiico of land and the owner cf that 
land has a right to take that water and use it for their putpOMI. So if there 11 no water nmning 
across the land there ls obviously no water rlP,t. 
7. . Durina my purchaso of the Oreenhean Property I asked my apnt Daryl· Rheed if 
thtn WU water on the property and I WU told by him that the property W8I "dry", I undentood 
Mr. Rheld.'1 statement to mean that there was no water on the sur:fico of the property I wu 
pun:huJ.na. I never understood Mr. Rhead.'I statement to mean that a decreed around water right 
existed and that such pound water rights were excluded tom the sale cf tbe property. 
8. It was my understanding that I could dfa a well to aet lfOUl1dwater to use on the 
~ Property. This underatandina wu based on my convenatiOlll with Mt. Rhead u 
Will u tfii lht6fmmton ptevided In the nmltipl1 ~'Al fGice fnfmmttfon that I had printed out 
AFFJDAVIT OF AUGUSTA Sit.YOKO MJMOTO OREBNHEART IN SUPPOl.T OF DBFBNDANTS 
OPPOSmON TO SUMMAlY JUOOM!NT • 2 J Q 3 
Dec. 21. 2012 9:38AM st Carlton Ave 
• 
No. 5005 P. 13 
011 January 3, 2007 that said there WU a "Propoted Well." A true and comet copy of tho 
multiple lilting aervfce handout ii attached to this aftldavit 11 2lhiblt A· 
9. Durfna the purchuo of the Oreenheart Property 1 wu never informed by tho 
Plainltffs, Mr. Rhead. or any representatives of Plaindft'a that there wu a decreecl around water 
riaht that exlated or that those deoreed around water riahts were excluded from the la1o of the 
Oreenheart Property. 
10. l did not know that a ground water rlaht with respect to the Oreenheart Property 
existed until the Plainti« Jay Brown contacted me emnedme in. February 2012 to teU me that he 
made a mittab when ho sold me the groundwater rlaht 
11. It wu only after that Pebrulry 2012 telephone call with Jay Brown that I began 
looldna into the existence of a around water risht by contactms the Idaho Department of Water 
Resources. 
12. Attached u IUibit D to this affidavit is a true and correct copy of the tax appeal 
that I filed with Elmore County on lune 10, 2007. In that document I typed: 
I purchased 60 acres ~-Mr. Jay Brown. At the time of purchuc. I WIS told 
tho land 11 dry and that the aras• that arow• ii good tor cattle and that there 1a 
no structure ol any kind; tb.en:tore. the tax would be adnlmal. I wu vary 
autprised when. I received tho year 2007 tu uaeument. I COJ1taCttcl Mr. Jay 
BrowA and he ii now h1 communication with tho Elmore County Assessor's 
Oftlce reprdlng the nature of the lad that I purchased from him. Ploue 
mfew my pateel for tax auessment apin.. Thank you for your time and 
comideratimi. 
When I wrote that parqraph to Blmore County I still did not know that there wu a decreed 
ground water right applicable to my property. In addition I was not expressina that l had 
knowledge that around water right11 were excluded from the Oreenhean Property when I 
means thore i1 no wat.cr runnina across the property and therefore the land ls "dry". 
AFFIDAVIT OP AUGUSTA SAYOICO MlMOTO ORSINHB.UT IN SUPPORT OF D!FBNDANT'S 
OPPOSmON TO SUMMAR.Y JUDGMENT· 3 J Q 4 
·Dec. 21. 2012 9:38AM ut Carlton Ave 
No. 5005 P. 14 
13. AUached u Slhibil C 10 tills aftldavit ii an email that I t)'ped to 1 Ml. Kristina 
SclUndole ID. rospome 10 111 otl'et I received ftrom Btmore Cowlly to purchase the Oteenheart 
Plopeny. Thi relevant portioaa of that emal1a teldl: 
At the time of m7 purchae. I Wll Vff1 aware that my paroel la strictly for 
ftmnina and that I hid no way to 'bull4 a residence. A.pin, at the time of the 
purcbue, I wa alto veq • ._,, that the parool lt dry arazinS only due to a 
lack oltrrlptfoa l)'ltlnl and no water riabtt···· 
All I meent ia my email WU that I bow there WU no auriice water runnina tbrouab the 
Oreenheatt Property, Therefore I had no right to tlke water that obviously wa not rumlin1 
tbrouah my property. In flee, I explained my email and what I meant in that email to Plaintlffl' 
auomey during my deposition. Attached hereto u ixbfblt J) ii a portion from my depolition . 
pqea 131 tbrouah 139 in which I provide my explanldon of that eman . 
• 
SUBsCR.IBBD and SWORN to before me this .n de)' ot'.December, 2012 • 
• 
f4to:1i(lt.. == 
AFFIDA VlT OF AUOUSTA SA YOKO MIMOTO OUBNHBAl\T IN SUPPORT OF DBFENDANf•s 
OPPOSmON TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ·4 
305 
Dec. 21. 2012 9:38AM st Carlton Ave No. 5005 P. 15 
QBtmCA'lJ Ol llBYJQ; 
I Hlm.BBY C!R.TIPY that on 1bia ..AL day of December, 2012, a true and ccmeot copy 
of die foreaofna document wu served by tint-class mall, pottllp prepaid. and addreased to; by 
fax transmiafon to; by ovemiaht delivery to; or by penonally dellverlna to or leaving with a 
person in ohll'p of the oftlce a indicated bolow: 
Michael c. Cremner 
ThomM E. Dvorak 
OMNI PulsLBY W 
601 West Bannook Street 
P.O.Box2720 
Boiee. ID 83701-2720 
TelephoM: (208) 388-1200 
Facsh:nile: (208)388-1300 
[~] U.S. Mall 
[ ] Pax 
[ ] Ovemilht Delivery 
[ l Hand Dtlivery 
APPIDAVJT OP AUGUSTA SA YOKO MIMOTO ORBENHBAJtT IN SUPPORT OF DBFBNDANT'S 
onosmoN ro SUMMA!lY roooM!NT. s 
3 0 6 
.. 
·Dec. 21. 2012 9:39AM 
GINUAL 
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1()7 UHIBIT A --
-0 e c. 21. 20 I 2 9: 39AM st Carlton Ave 
No. 5005 P. t 7 
-7·,~ I UmllO .. Ol"IUUo ~~~~ ;~~-Hll HI .... 111111 IPfl•Olf~,.-··1 
· ,ti·t l « 
_., Before nie Board of EquallzaUon l 
~ . Elmore County, Idaho · 
Appellallt(~N1~(1), t;wlA~' 9.t•~o 0 ~~ar-t-
. Addreu Q'loB~ilWwM~lt 5t c111.9' v'e4l.[ State 1-lV · Z1p "if /J { 
Ch1ckonet 
.App .. I ftJtd_, An lndMdu~ Hwrband and \We_ P•nn•..._ 
A Corporation__ Truat11_ oth1r. __________ _ 
Appellant(•) wril be ,.p~1nted bYI Hert11112' Hlmaelf_ Th1m11IY••-
Company Offloe_r Name and TIU..,."------------
;Atton11< • N~• and Addre .. Jlll.~~ f~$- W. S'Cffi.. ~.f.4.~ 1 fl\t+l-e., JI> 
,,=:;.1 ---~ , • • "'"'9< 
. .. 
• · lB Di°htf" lAN( • ·' 
.11 • 
.. ...  , "t1' 
.~ .. :-· .. 




Appellant(•) 11quaat(a) that th• Board enter ltll Judgment h•Nln d1t1nnlnfna th• Mariclt Value 
of th• abov9 dNCrfb•d property to be no mont than: . . .. -· .... :. 
Lanc1 • au11canas 1 othlr • Tatar•·----
•nd orct.rlng that •uoh valU• be 1ntarecl In ttUI Ala1nm1nt Ron of !lmore County, and 1uah 
other and turthar nH1f u the Soard~ deem 1qulllbla. 
Brief romarb • • ttlng f'crth around• cf thlll appeal: 
Dated: Ju.co, Zoo? App1Han _______ _ 
,,,. ,.... I 
~~ 
11•11a.-~ 
EXHIBIT _fi_ 1 n8 
• D e c. 21. 2 0 12 9 : 3 9 AM st Carlton Ave No. 5005 P. 18 
Print Pap 1 oft 
..,. Rt: °"" letter 




~ rnal'tlml~.oom; ftnn~ t:hebrownoniw4fm1n.oom: 
~oom: rlo~AOSArulce.ntt; 
Sundlv, NMmitr 8. 20C>t 10:24 PM 
D• Ma. Schindele, 
R.e: Elmore Coq Parcel# R.P 04S05B249010A 
At the time of ft!)' pvrchue, I wu very aware that my pame1 Is strictly fat f'armlq and that I bad no way 
t.o build a retidlllCI. A.pin, at tbe time of the purcbue. I alao wu very aware that the parcel ia dzy 
amfna only due to 1acJc of ID irription system lald no water riahfa. I apprecfate your time and etl"ott in 
tryfna to derlvina 1he purchase ofter prlco for my land; I, bowevet, llll not interatcd in •Wna it It this 
time at the price otrered. Il at some time tho Blmon County atill wtntl to puidlue my Imel, please 
contact me whell your oft'ering price reaches more sapectable figure. R.eprdl, Au;uata Grecnheart 
- On Thu, 10l29J09, Krlltlna Schindele <kachlndtl•O,elmonH:Ounty.org> wrote: 
From: Kt1st1na Schbldelo <kachindelo@elmorecounty.org> 
Subject oft'er lotter 
To: mlmotopeenheart@yahoo.oom 
Cc:jdavisla~.com 
Date: Thursday, October 29, 2009, 11: 19 AM 
Ma. Greenheart 
Pl11• ftnd encloaed herein a copy of the County's offer to resolve any clatm regarding the 
property Jay Brown IOld you. 
Krlltlna M. Schlndele 
Elmore County ProtecUUng Attorney 
1QOS. 4th!. 
Mountain Homa, Idaho 83&47 
lalchlndeleCDelmorecount.t .org 
telephone: (208) e87·2144, ext 603 




* , • ·Dec. 21. 2012 9:39AM ast Carlton Ave No. 5005 P. 19 
1 A.. I did. 1 giound Clft be Uled for tniftl- lo 1 ooncacted I few 
2 Q. Wh1 did you ma hlr? 2 thinp into thla lmlll pll'lplpk. 
3 A.Sbeaentmememlll. 3 Q. But you CO..- this parqraph? 
4 Q. lhe eent )'OU .... nntt ' A. I campol9d thll pltllllpll vwy pOOrly. • A.YA ! Q, 111 I poor choice of v.udi? • Q. Do you ......... )'OU• email' 6 A. Poor .. of wonll lllCl minmdentlndina. Dry, ., A. lomllhlna .... dlll Jawault that Mr. Brown hid '7 to me, la dry. WhM .. can you dllartbl dry'l Dry II 
• ...... 8 nat Wider la 'I'll/ mind. Dly la nat I molalt. t Q. How did IM lcftow you wert ~la tbe ' Q. lt ..... oa,. ,,. Wll fllpODdlns to, 0 laWlllit7 0 If you look It the email below, Ill emlil hm 
1 A. I blve now.a. J clo not know. 1 Ml. Schlndele with a copy to. qucM. "CountYt offer to 
a Q. 8o lhljlllt -.l)Ol lft email out of the blue? 2 resolve any claira npdlng the property Jay Brown sold 
3 A. '11lll'I OOMO&. 3 you.. Do )IOU• 1bat? 
• (Blcbibl 24 nmlced.) ' A. Ya.IMit. 6 0. (BY ML DVORAK) Hlftdlnayou whlrl been_. 5 Q. And do you recall wbll tho county's offer wu? • fat~ putpOIOI u lbchlblt 14, do )'OU have 6 A. 8U)'lna the land tom me. 1 that In hat of )'Ol.17 7 Q, For bow mw:h? 
• A.Ya 8 A. San price 11 flll purchued price from • Q. Tllil tun email that you1nt to 9 Mr. Brown. 0 Kmtinl ...... Do ,,al ... that? 0 Q. B\ll Wt otl'lr wu reftmed by you? 
1 A..Yll. 1 A. 'nlatl comet. 
2 Q, You copied Jry Brown on It • well? 2 M1t VILLBOAS: Counsel, Clll we p otrthe 
3 A. Did I? I don'l tcnow. 3 record? .. Q. lt loob ua In tht cc line tiwrets ' M1t DVORAK: Sure. 5 tbebrowncrew4@mln.com? s ~tlbn.) 
Pa91 13'1 Paqe 139 
1 A. Thea I dld. 1 (Bxhlblt25 llll'ked.) 
2 Q. In f'lct you told Ml. Schladtl• In thll email, 2 Q. (BY MR. DVORAK) I'm aolnt IO hind you wbat11 
3 "A.pin a the time of thl purch-.1 wu allo wrJ 3 been marked fbr identUbdon pmpoa. Bxhibit 25. .. t.Wlft thM dlt parcel II dr)' srotnl only due to Jade of' Do )'O\l IM that? 
5 Ill in'iaation ~ md DO water rlghta. • Do )'OU llt A. Ya 
' tblt'I Q. Parqraph IMll on there, it that your , A.Y& Ii....., 
8 Q. At JM by Noveinber 8 of2009 you bid an A.Ya 
9 aWll'Bll ot what water ri&hts me1111 by the t'IOI you're Q. I'll npcuent tbit It 1 Notice of Chant• in 
0 Ulfn1 lt In hn; correct? Waw ltlaht Ownenhlp, that. J fllal It, you ftlod with 
1 A. Wron .. the ldlho Deputment of Waw J\llOU1'Cel? 
2 Q.Oh? A. Ya.ldid. 
3 A. tr you wmt me to explail\ whln 1 llW my land, Q. k wu ftW on Februmy 14, 2012? 
4 thero'I DO Wl1tr coming to 1he around, above ground and ' A. I don't remembor mot1y the date. 
5 no...,,. to provide Irr/ Wiier. ~no waw Q. For the rec«d. to me rilht aide of your 
6 rtpt. Wm npt, in my mind. It Wllll' that ts comina lipmre on Une _.. thlt data appcmt 
7 throu8b my puac1 nndna dvou&h • toplOl1 when~ A.Y& 
8 CID ... bucket IDd piok It up lftd WllS 1111 ~ Q, Doll: that rehlb your NCOlllOdon 1110 when 
9 Tbllft nothfq lika 1bat, iD my vltw. 'Ihcnfort. DO it Wll ft1ed? 
0 Wita' rftht. It Wiii dry. A. Not whlll I ftlld. I don't remnber the met 
1 And here dq lfUlnl.,.,... whit I hid been uaina. date. But 1 did file somerime. 
2 Now l team that around it day, IO It nut be CllJled dr'J Q. I note tblt down Ill the borrmn tberl'l a 
3 palna. 1.-n. ri&bt? Dry grm. Orm. Notbina MCt1on thlt llYt tor Idaho Dlplnmtnt ofW• RMCUrCI 
• &1'0M- It Wit dry ...... omce. an1y. Do you aee tlw? "tDWll oi!ico \111 on 
•9• 
(208)34&-9811 M & M COURT REPORTING 
310 




Dec. 21. 2012 9:37AM · 1 st Carlton Ave No. 5005 P. 2 
Joe Bortoa [1SB No. 5SS2) 
Vlotar Vlllopt [ISB No. 58d0] 
DOR.TON LAKBY LAW OPPIC!S 
141 B. cmt.on Aye. 
Merldlat. m a'42 
Bolte, 1dlbo 83702 
Oflloe: (208) 908-4415 
Pax: (208) 493-461 O 
Bmall: vtctcr@borton·lakly.com 
FILED 
£G!2 DEC 2 l AH 9: 49 
BARBAR AS TEELE 
CLERK OF Tt~~~URT 
· DEPUT 1~' 
JN TBB DJITRICI' COVR.T or TD JOVKTB JDDICIAL DJSTRicr OJ 
TRI ITATI ormAHo. IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OJ &LMOU 
JA. Y BROWN and CHRISTIN! HOPSON-
BROWN. Husband and Wlf'e, 
Ptaintlffl. 
"'· 
A.UOUSTA SA YOKO MIMOTO 




County ot Ada ) 
CAI& NO. CV 2812-353 
Al'l'IDA vrr oir XINNl.TB 
BR.USll DI StlPPOllT OJ' 
DUINDANT'S OPPO&mON 
TO SUMMAllY JUDGMENT 
KBNNBTH BRUSH, beins duly nvom upon oath deposu and •YI u fellows: 
I. That lam an adult over the ap of efabteca (ti) YCil1, thlt I em a realdcnt of 
ldaho, and that l have personal knowledp ottht fictl aet forth In this Aftldavlt. 
2. t am a Cclrtlfted Ocneral AppnJser licwed ln tho Stas of Tdaho, Oreaon and 
Nevada. 
AFFJDAVIT OP KBNNl'nl BRUSK lN SUPPOR.T OP DBFBNDANT'S OPPOtmON TO IUMMAllY 
JUDOMBNT·l 
311 
Dec. 21. 2012 9: 3 7 AM st Carlton Ave No. 5005 P. 3 
3. Attlched hcnta • f.lblblc A la my rtaume aettlna f'orth IDY educational 
baokaround. oxperlenoo and quallftclUont. 
4. l Ill the ow. of an apprallll bualn• naaned Kon Btulh Appnlult and deal 
exclualvet7 with appnlllq raral and qrloult&nl 1'rma tad ranoh propertl• throupout 'Nevada. 
ONIOll lftd Tdabo. 
S. l haw appraleed native ranaeland. undevaJopod lll1d with WO rlabtl, and 
produolna firml and nnohel: located In Bhnore County. Watot rlahta ll't an lntelflf part of tho 
apprailal prooea wltll aplcuhural Janda In Elmcn County. 
6. 1 have appralad qrlcultural latml and ranchm located In Elmore County In 2007 · 
and In yean prior md since. ao t am famlllu with the land cluslflcadon1 and land values for 
aarieultural propertln Ill Elmore County tbr 2007. 
'!. Thai I have reviewed; (1) tho. Complaint tlled lft dUI cue and the exhlbtts to the 
Complaint lnoludlna the decreed pwnd water rlahts; (b) tho Purchase and Sale Alf'Oll\ent: ad 
(o) tho aftldavlt of Toni LIRM Manduoa. 
a. That hued on my revtow of tho documents above and baaed on my knowtedp 
and ox.perienco as a Cert1fiecl General Appraj• In Idaho, 1 dtsqrec wl~ Ms. Lahe'• opinion of 
value olM1. Oreenhearrs proporl)' 11 Kt forth In Paragraphs 11 11\d I 2 of her aftldavk. 
9. lo tnY opJnlon Ms. Gteenheart'1 purchaso of price of Sl,333.33 per ICl'C l1 
commenlUl'ltl with land that ha Wltlr riabts but wat undeveloped fol' lrrlpcion at tho time of 
aalo. The word "UndeYeJapect' rofen to real property that laob irrlptlon lmprovementl lucb u 
m lnlptlon i)"ltem conahtSn1 of dtatributlon mainUnes and a sprinkler l)'ltem tuob 11 wheel 
Unn, plvota, or hlndllno iprinldm ot some fonn of pavity lrrlptlon 8)'ltom and usaolated land 
hwoltng. 
Al'PIDAVIT OP tc.BNN!'m BltJSH IN S'UPPOR.T OP ~S OP'POSmON TO SUMMAlY 
JUDCJMBN1'·2 
312 
Dec. 21. 2012 9: 3 7 AM 14 st Carl ton Ave No. 5005 P. 4 
KENNETH BRUSH 
S.EAL 
APPll>AVlT OP UNNBTR BRUSH 1N SUPPOR.T OP DIPBNDANT'S OPPOliTfON TO ltlMMAltV 
JUOOMiNT·3 
313 
Dec. 21. 2012 9:37AM st Carlton Ave No. 5005 P. 5 
QBDllC4D 01 myt(.1 
1 HSR.!BY CBllTIPY that on thll ..ll dq of December, 2012. a true ud correct oopy 
or the fbreaoln1 doaumom was laived by ftnt-01111 man. poltlll prepaid. ud addreaed to; by 
ta t1'llllmilllaa ta; by ovemfaht dellv.y to; ar by pereoully dellverlna to or leavtn1 with a 
penon ln cbarp of tho offtoo u Indicated below: 
Mlchaol C. Creamer 
Thomal B. Dvarak . 
OIVBNS PuuLIY .LU 
601 Weat 88nnock Street 
P.O. Box 2120 
BolM. ID U?Ol ·2720 
Telephone: (208) 388-1200 
F1e11mllr. (208) 388· l 300 
[)(] U.S. Mall 
[ ) PIX 
[ J OVemtabt Delivery 
( ] Hmd Delivery 
AIPJDAVIT OP X!NNBn! BRUSH IN SUPl'OlT OP DBP!NDANT'S OPPOSmON TO 8UMMAllY 
JUDOMINT·-4 
314 
D'ec. 21. 2012 9:37AM 
EDIJCATION 
st Carlton Ave 
RISllMI 
XINNITJI E. BR11SU. A.LA. 
1~ DIXIE RIVD ROAD 
CALDWELL, mABO 83607 
2011414-9GM 
PAX 208/455-9898 
No. 5005 P. 6 
BS Aptcuiiurat Ensineorina, Univaity ofCalifomia. Davia, December 1975. Counewort 
diatributed tbroupout pnotical qineeriq prlnciplel. Ulima11eionoe, and buinea manapment. 
WORKEXPIJUENCE 
June 1981-rre.t: Solf-emplO)'ld; Ka Brush Apptatala. 
Aoctedlted llunl Appraiac (ARA) Appraiaina mra1 and apicultural tanm, ranohea, and 
specfa1ty •arioaltmal propertie& llUCh .. f'eedlota. potato lheds. onion ct bean. wmhouael,etc.; 
aaricultutal and economic conaultiq. Cenlftecl Appraias in Idaho, Orep and Nevada. 
1f7Wune 1985e Doane-Weetern, Caldwell. Idaho. 
Agrlc:Wmral loan comapondent and field offtcer for ABma Life.and Caaualty and Mutual of 
Now Y ort tor real estate mortpp1. Rnponsibilttlea include flnancial and mnpment analysis. 
orcdlt review, appraisal of aeourity, loan. orisinadon and submlaion. loaa. urvicina and collection. 
Otberreaponm'bill'1el included manapmont consulting, real estate appraisals, economic tiam'bility, 
and real estate .ales. 
AWILIATIONS 
Cerded Appraiser in. Idaho, Oregon and Nevada 
Accredited member-- American Society of Farm Manapra wt Rural Apprailll'I, Idaho 
State Chapter and Treuure Valley Local Group 
Mombef-Varlout Committeoa for the ASFMRA 
Put Prettdent, ISPMIA 
Directot- Piones Dix!e Ditch Company, Upper Center Point Ditch Compay 
Member- IAwer Boile R.tver Watershed Adviay Group 
Member- Caldwell United Methodist Church 
Baste Scout- Boy Scoutl of Am.mica 
PERSONAL JNPOJlMAnON 
Ap: 59. matr1ed 36 years, one dauaJiter 
Own md op«atl a 375+ head cow/calf operation in Idaho ct Oregon 
BUJ 100-300 calvealyearlinp am111aJ1y; feed ct graze these ycarUnp in. Idaho & Oregon 
Have 200-400 head of ltoors ct heften ouatom f'ed to slaughter aumually 
Hobbiea include camping. filhina, and woodworldna 
o·ec. 21. 2012 9:37AM 
1. OCCUPATION 
ast Carlton Ave 
QUALil'ICATIONS 
or 
KENNITB BRUSH. A.JU.. 
Real Batato Appralaer 
Idaho State Ccrtiflcd Appniler #42 
Oreaon Certifted Appralaer #C000287 . 
New.da CoJtifled General Apprai• #00540 
No. 5005 P. 7 




Baohelor of Soienco in Apiculturo, 1975 Univeni~ of Calltamla. Davia 
Self employed Iha 1985 
Jomed WOltcm Farm Manapment Compllly in 1'76 
Western Plml Maupment Company and Doaea Aplcu1tn1 Servtcel, 
Inc., merpcl In 1981 
Completod Amorloan Society of Farm MlnlP"I and Rural Appraiaen 
Counet-F1rm Apprafaal. Advanced Parm Appralaal. Rach A.pprailal. 
numerou llJDinarl 
AocnditodRml Appralaer(ARA) of American Sooiety ot'Parm Manqa 
and Rural Appra1aera and Member ofldabo Society of Parm Manqen and 
llun1 Appraiser, Certified u oumnt on oontinuiq education with 
ASFMRA 
.!. fiPECAL ASSIGNMINTS 
Prepared appraiaala on rural and qr:lbuainea properdea iA ldaho. ()rep. 
Waahinaton. Utah, Nevada, Montana. and Califonda fbr corporatiom, 
aovemment apnciea. lenderl. and individuals 
6. CLD:NTS INCLlJDI lntermoumain Community Bank (a divilion of Pubandlt State Bank) 
JP Morpn Chui (formerly Wubinpm Mutual Bink A Wflltem Bank) 
Baak otthe Cucadea (formerly Parmen &: Mmcbam State W) . 
US Bank (formerly Wut One ct 'Idaho Fint Natioul Bank) 
Wolll l'up Bank &: Wolla Farp Al Cmllt (formorty Pint lntentate A 
Fin& Seourity Baab) . 
Banner Bank 
Ciu.m BUIW:l1 Bmk 
lC.ey Bank of Idaho 
D. L Bvam Bank 
USDA-Farm Service Apncy (formerly PmHA) 
Parm Credit Servlooa 
Harvat Capttal Company 
Amerlcan Parm Mortpp Company 
NOl'W'elt Aariou1tunl Credit Ino. 
Zlom Aarlcultural finance &: Zions Bank 
Rabo-~inance Cformmy Lend ta. Alli·Buaiaeu) 
Tri.State Llveatock Credit Corporatton 
MUtUil Un liii\li'iiiCi compiiiy of Ntw Yori 
The Church ot Jesus ChriatofLaUCr-Day Saints 
Varioue lndividuall, Accountantl &: Attomoya 
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~ e c. 21. 2 0 12 9 : 3 7 AM ast Carlton Ave 
Joe Borton [ISB No. SSS2] 
Victor Villcpa [ISB No. 5860] 
BORTON LAICBY LAW OFFICES 
141 B. Carlton Ave. 
Meridian, m 83642 
Boise. Idaho 83702 
Office: (208) 901-4415 
Fax: (208) 493-4610 
Email: victor@borton-laby.com 
A.Ito,.,,,,, for Dl/indant 
No. 5005 P. 8 
IN THI DISTlUCT COtJRT OJ THE JOURTB JUDICIAL DISTRICI' or 
THE STATE or IDAHO. IN A.ND FOR THI COUNTY or ELMORE 
JAY BROWN and CHR.ISTJNB HOPSON· 
BROWN. Husband and W1te, 
v. 
AUGUSTA SA YOKO MIMOTO 




County of Ada ) . 
CASE NO. CV 2012-3!3 
AmDA VIT or VICTOR 
VILLEGAS IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'SOPPOSI'nON 
TO SllMMARY JUDGMENT 
VICTOR VILLBOAS. beina duly sworn upon oath depolCI and says u follows: 
1. I am an attomey with the law ftrm of Borton Lakey Law om.cos representing 
Defendant Aupta Oreenheart ln the above-entitled matter, and have personal knowleclp of the 
facts set forth heroin and can testify tharato. 
AFPIDA VJT Of VICTOR. VlLL!QAS IN SUPPORT QPlDBFENDANT'S OPPOSmON TO SUMMAltY 
ruDOMBNT • 1 3 7 
.. 
~ec. 21. 2012 9:38AM ast Carlton Ave No. 5005 P. 9 
2. Attached hereto u »xbibit A ia a true and correct copy of an email dated Aupat 
11, 2003 tlm is contalnecl in the !9COtda of the Idaho Department of Water Relourcea. The email 
relatestowaterdghts numbcn 61·7151and61-2188 that are the aubjectmetta"ofthis Utlptlon. 
SEAL 
' 
CEBTDICAD OF RBVJCI 
I HEREBY CER.TIPY that on this~ day of December, 2012. a true and correct copy 
of the foreaoinl document was served by first-clus mail, postqe prepaid, and addressed to; by 
fax transmlulon to; by ovemiaht delivery to; or by peraomilly deliverlna to or leavlna with a 
person in charge of the otlice as indicated below: 
Michael c. Oeamet 
Tbomu B. Dvorak 
GJVBNI PuilSLSY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, ID 13101-2no 
Telephone: (208)388-1200 
Faclimlle: (208) 388·1300 
rxJ U.S. Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Ovemip.t Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
AmDA VIT Of VICTOR. VILLEGAS IN SUPPOllT Ot.DEFBNDANT'S onosmoN TO SUMMAR.Y 
JUOOMENT • 2 3 t 8 
.. • . 0 e c. 21. 2012 9: 38AM 
M!MOAANDUM 
TO: Cynthll Clark 
ast Carlton Ave 
FROM: DllWln Vind• 8t11t, PNP1N1' 
DATE: 11-Aug-03 
No. 5005 P. 10 
REO!t' !D 
JAN-2~ A1c11veo 
oepnntrtdWir-.. AW z t -
--
Aece1veo 
R!: Jay I. Brown. Appkatlon 101 .... I Water Alaht rN* Bank) DEC 3 o 2003 
~· 
The 1pp11oant h• ohaneed hll flrmlnll opn11on ... no Iona• contJnuoualy tmma the 
320 ... for which ,,. hM wlflr ..... Hfl CUITll1t ptllCClot " to fal1'n about 180 ... 
and allow thl remaining 180 acr. to rmlln falow •. Aacordlngly, In order to Mid 
faffalbn of tht un.-ct-.. rlQhtl.. at diminution of the ftowl he ha hlltorlolily \Md, 
Ht wtlh11 to pl~ the unUlld wats In the ~r banlc. 
Attached n coplel of tu bllll 1hawlng 1ppllcant1 r'llmt aNI a legal deecrfptlon, and 
BABA l'llCIOf'da for the water rfghtl 11•7151 ll"ld 01·2188. PIHM !tit me know If you 
need more Information. Thenkll 
t!xHIBIT~ 
... Dec. 21. 2012 9: 4 3AM ut Carlton Ave 
Joe Borton [ISB No. 5552] 
Victor Villepa [ISB No. 5860] 
BOllTON LADY LA w omCES 
141 B. Clrltoa Ave. 
Meridian. m 83642 
Bol11, Idaho 83702 
Ofllce: (208) 908-4415 
Fax: (208) 493-4610 
Email: victor@borton-laby.com 
Attornl)'I /or Dtj'lnllant 
. No. 5005 P. 44 
IN THI DISTRICT COURT OJTBE FOURTH IVDICIAL DISTRicr OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND JOR THI COUNTY or ELMORE 
JAY BllOWN and CHRISTJNB HOPSON-
BllOWN. Husband md Wife, 
. Plaintifr.. 
v. 
AUGUSTA SA YOKO MIMOTO 
GR.BBNHEAR.T. an ln.dividual, 
CASE NO. CV 2012-353 
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO 
SHORTEN TIME TO BEAil 
THEIR MOTION TO STRIKE 
POR'l10NS or AnIDAvrr or 
JAY B. BROWN, AND TERRI 
LaRAE MANDlJCA 
Defendant, Augusta Sayoko Mimoto Oreenheart, by and through her attorneys of record. 
Victor VWeps and Borton Lakey Law Offices, moves this Court. pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Civil Pnx:cdure 6(b) hereby move tbia Court for an Order shortenlq time to allow their Motion 
To Strike Portions Of Aftldavit ot Jay B~ Brown md Terri LaRae Manuca to be heard on 
January 7 2013 at 3:00 p.m. TblJ motion is critical to the hearing on the parties' cross motions 




Dec. 21. 2012 9:43AM ast Carlton Ave No. 5005 P. 45 
and documentary evidence inttoduced by way of afttdavit by tho Plaintiff in support of their 
motion tor summary Judgment. 
DATBD this _11_ day ofDeoember, 2012. 
' 
BORTON LAKEY LAW .OPFICES 
CIBTlllCAD or SIBYJCE 
I HER.EBY CBR.TIPY that on this ..i.L day of December, 2012, a true amt correct copy of 
tho foregoing document wu served by fint·clus mall, pomp prepaid, and addressed to; by tax 
tranmdnlon. to; by ovemiaht delivery to; or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person 
m. chirp of the oftlco u indicated below: 
Michael c. Craemet 
Thomu E. Dvorak 
OMNI PuuLIY W 
601 Welt Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2720 
Bobe, m 83701-2720 
Telephone: (208) 388-1200 
FIClimlle: (208) 381-1300 
[iJ U.S. Mall 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivmy 
[ ] Had Delivery 
Victor Villepa 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME • 2 
321 
.-.-·-' 
Dec. 21. 2012 9:43AM ast Carlton Ave No. 5005 P. 42 
Joe Borton [ISB No. 5552) 
Victor Villopa [ISB No. 5160] 
BORTON LADY LAW OPFICES 
141 B. Carlton Ave. 
Meridila. m 83642 
Boi11, Idaho 13702 
Offtct: (201) 908-4415 




2012 DEC 21 AH g: 49 
. c~~CR~f ~LJr~LE 
DEPUT~\ RT 
IN THE DISTRICf COURT OFTBE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICI' OJ 
THE STATE or IDAHO. IN AND FOR THI COUNTY or ELMOU 
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON· 
BROWN, Husband and Wife, 
Plaintifts. 
v. 
AUOUSTA SA YOKO MIMOTO 
ORBBNHBAR.T, an individual, 
Detendant. 
CASI NO. CV 2012-353 
DD'ENDANT'S M0110N TO 
STRIKE PORTIONS or 
AFJ'IDA VIT or JAY B. 
BROWN, AND l'ERRI LaRAE 
MANDUCA 
Defendant. Aupta Sayoko Mimoto Qreenheart, by and through her attorneys of record, 
Victor VWeau and Borton Lakey Law Oftices, moves this Court, pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
~"-~~. CIVD PiiX:idUre' 12tf) 'tcr'ltt!B p0ttlotti li1d the Aftldavlt ot 1ay JJ. Brown lllttTerrl Lalbe 
Manduca u well as csxhibits to their mpectlve aftldavits. 
CliFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE • 1 
322 
'""·> ' ... D e c. 21. 2 0 12 9 : 4 3 AM a.st Carlton Ave No. 5005 · P. 43 
Defendant'• motion is made and based upon the pleadlnp on file with the Court, together 
with the Memorandum In Support of Defendant's Motion to Strike and Deftmdant'I Memonmdum 
In Opposition to Plllntltrs• Motion fbr Summuy Judgment 
DATBD thia -6!_ day of December, 2012. 
BORTON LAKBY LA w omCBS 
By y~y~ 
Victor Ville 
gaTD'JCAD 01 SIRYICI 
I HBRBBY CBRTIFY that on t1Us l:!. day of December, 2012, a true and eomct copy of 
the toresoina ~ wu aerved by ftnt..clan mail, postage prepaid. and addteued to; by fax 
trammilllion to; by ovemisht delivery to; or by penonally deliverlna .to or leaving with a person 
in charge of the oft1co u indicated below: 
M1cbu1 c. Creamer 
Thoma B. Dvorak 
OMNI PUl.sLBY W 
601 West Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701-2720 
Telephcme: (208) 388·1200 
Facsimilo: (208) 388-1300 
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO STRIKE • 2 
323 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ l Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
ilec. 21. 2012 9:42AM ast Carlton Ave 
Joe Borton [IS8 No. 5552] 
Victot Vll1epl [JSB No. 5860) 
BOllTON LA.DY LA w omcas 
141 B. Carlton Ave. 
Meddtan, m 83642 
Bo1le. Idaho 13702 
Oft!oo: (208) 908-4415 
Fax: (201) 493-4610 
P.mall: vlctor@bortml·Jakey.oom 
.tl.ttonllYl/or Dl/mdlmt 
No. 5005 P. 36 
'1N THI DISTRICI' COURT or THI JOlJRTR JUDICIAL DISTRICI' or 
THI STATE. or mARO, IN AND POR TBB COUNTY or ELMORE 
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINB HOPSON· 
BR.OWN, Husband and Wfte. 
v. 
AUGUSTA SAYOK.O MJMOTO 
OREBNHBAR.T, an individual, 
Defendant. 
. CASI NO. CV 2012-313 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
or DEl'ENDANT'S MOTION 
TO &TRIXI PORTIONS OJ 
A.FJIDA VlT OJ JAY B. 
BROWN, AND TERRI LIRAE 
MANDUCA 
Defendant, Aupta Sayoko Mimoto Greenheart ("Greenebartj, by and tbrouah her 
attorney of record, Victor Villegu of Borton Lakey Law Oftices, submi~ this Memorandum in 
Support of Defendant's Motion to Strike Portions of Aftidavit Of Jay B. Brown, 81ld Terri Larae 
Manduca a well exhibit.I attached to the afftdavits. 
INTRODUCl'ION 
'Ibe partlea have ~cross-motions for summary judpient and o~ arpmeat is set to be 
PlaintU'fs Browns have attempted to introduce ~nsic evidence to explain the tenns of the 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAY 8. BROWN, AND TERRI ~ MANDUCA -1 
"Dec. 21. 2012 9:42AM ast Carlton Ave No. 5005 P. 37 
unambipous Warranty Deed. The extrinsic evidcnoe is oomalnod in statements made within. the 
ddavlts In support of Plaintlfr1 modon for IUID1IJll'1 judgment and or dowmenta auacbed to 
each respective ddavlt. 
ARGUMENT 
The Idaho ~ of C1vil Procedure require that affldavits ht support of summary 
Judplent be madl on penona1 knowledp and ... forth flcta u gd la admlllihlo lg 
OYJ.dme ... " I.ltC.P. S6(e) (underlinfns added). 
Generally, the pam1 mdenoo zule pnwidea that where preliminary neaotfatlou an 
consummated by written apmem. the wrltina supeteedes all pmioua undentandfnp and the 
Intent of the part1ea must be ascortained ftom tho writi.q. Yallq Bank v. Chrln1nnn, 119 Idaho 
496, 498, 808 P.2d 415, 417 (1991). "If the written agreemem i• complete upon i11 face and 
unambipm. no hud or mistake belna allepd, extrlnsic evidence of prior or contemporaneous 
aqodatiom or eonvenatfons it not admissible to contradict, vary, alter, add to or detta¢ from 
the terms of the written contract... Id. 
In the context of whether a water riaht ii tnmalorrld In a deed. the Idaho Supteme Court 
has held that a deed that contafna appurteaance Janauago. effective to tl'IDl'fer a wats rlaht and 
abael1t hud. or mistake. parol evidence ii not admiuible to explain that the parties Intended 
sometbm1 different. Koon v. Em]JIY. 40 Idaho 6, 231 P. 1097 (1924). 
Empq involved a lawauit to ~ufet title over 600 1nches of water and to e!Vofn the delivery 
of that water. EmJ111 at P. 1098. The ipeciftc facts and procedural history of the ease are u 
foll owe: 
The deeds by which Olive conveyed the lands now owned by respondent did not 
apecliically mention any water, but they contain the clw: "Together with all and 
ifiliUlit tBe umemems, lrmedftamentt a nJlltr=eu tArrmto IWanaJna or In 
anywise appertainlna, • • •" which respondent contends effected the transfer of all 
the water appuiteDani to the land. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANl"S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAY B. BROWN, AND TERRI La'1~DUCA • 2 
'Dec. 21. 2012 9:42AM ast Carlton Ave .. No. 5005 P. 38 
On the contrary, appellants contlnd that when the deeds were executed and delivered, 
tlm pattiet agreed that the water appurtenant to the land WU to be retained by 
appellant Olive; and mmetkml ettmzmted to est@llah "AA rwmtlon 1w porol. 
The court refused to pemslt tho lntroductlon of ora1 evidence for IUeh purpose, and 
the actlon of the court ls usiped u envr. 
Id. Cunderllnina added). 
The EmIJ'Y court held that "[lt] ls an elementary Nle for the constn1Ctlon. of deeda, the 
1anpp of which ls plain and wwnblpous, that, in the absence of hud or mistake. the 
Intention of the pll'tin mUlt be ucertained &om tho instrument Itself' ••• .Parol evidence ls not 
admissible for such purpose .... Jd. The EmJHY court recopJzed t1m the use of the expieulon 
'"tcpther with all and siqular the appurtonancea thereto belonaina and appertalnins,' or one of 
similar purport, •• " in a deed is etreotlve to transfer an appurtenant water right unless there is a 
speclilc reservation in the deed. Id. at P. 1099. tntlmately, the EmIJ'Y court aftJrmecl the trial 
court's refusal to permit extrimio evidence because the appurtenance lanauqe wu 
unamblauous. The court held "[t]ho Janauap of the deeds is plain and wwnbiauous. From the 
deedt the intent of the anmtcr to convey the Janda, tggetbar with tho &mmttl!DftO•· plainly 
appeam. There was no allegation of bud or mistake in the execution of the deeds. Ind no fraud 
or miBtako is olalmed." Id. {underlfnina added). 
In this case, the pettinont parts of tho Warranty Deed to Ms. GreeMcart from the Browm 
reads "TO HA VB AND TO HOLD said premises, with their appurtenances unto the said 
Orantee.. •• .. 811 ExldbU D to Complaint; Exhibit B to ~t of Augulta Grt1nhlart In 
Support of Motton For Summary JudgrMnt. The deed contains the typical .. appurtenanco,. 
lanauage and per the !mpl)> decls!on it is not ambiauous u a matter of law and theref'ore 
contradict, vary. or alter the plain laquaao of the Warranty Deed. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAY B. BROWN, AND TERRI La~~~NDUCA • 3 
'Dec. 21. 2012 9:42AM ast Carlton Ave No. 5005 P. 39 
Based on the argument above. Oreenheart requeltl that the followlna pll'l8flPhs ·and. 
mdliblta to the tollowiq afftdavita be stricken becauae the information ii only used to try to 
explain the pat1es bl1ent, lacks ad.equate foundatJon. to be ldmfaible u presentld or is irrelevant 
In light of,,,,,.,. 
Aftldayft of Jg a. Bmwn 
• Parqrapla 18: "The per-aore price in 2007 for the Oreeaheart Property W11 
commenante with prices notmally paid in southern Idaho at the tbnt of the u1e for non-
irripted llDd which hu no water rights" 
o Statement ia ma purely to attempt to demonstrate that parties undentood water 
rlahtl were exo1uded from the Ille of the Oreenheart Pn>perty and. therefore · 
violates parol evidence rule. 
• Exhibit r to Compllblt Notice of Tax Appeal 
o Mr. Brown incorporates Exhibit F u if iUlly set forth In hit afttdavit. Plaintitia 
use this information. reprdfna Oreenheut'a written statement in the appeal notice 
u extrinsic>" evidence in attempt to demonstrate that the pll'tfea understood wu 
excluded. i'tom the we. Evidence submitted for that purpote violatel the parol 
mclerD ru1e.,,,,,., .rupra. 
• Parqnph 22: "Based on that authority and pursuant to her direction, on July 6, I 
apparecl Wore the Board of Equalization and repreMDted that the Oreenheart Property 
Wll dry land and had been purohued and conveyed u dry land without lr:lption water 
riPta and would not be lnipted 'unleu at such time a water riaht ia· purobued for the 
property by Mn. Orecmbeut.' A true and comet copy of a letter I sent to the Board 
conveyin1 mch representations is attached to the Comptamt tl1ed In tis matter u Exhibit 
Q ml fncludld hereia by reference. At the time I sem the letter, I sent a copy to Ma. 
Oreeaheart... . 
o Statemeni and related exhibit arc made purely u an attempt. to demonl1rlte that 
tho parties understood durina ti. sale that water riahta wen· .acluded tom the 
sale of the <lreenheart Pioperty. This cMdence therefom violates paml evidence 
rule. Empl)' supra. .. 
• Paraanpla 24 ud ED!blt I: 11 ••• Defendant Oreenheart responded to such ofter, and 
copied mo on her e-mail respondfna. lndicatfna, amona other thinp 'at the time of 
· v aware that the 111 grazlna only due to a lack of m 
in:igatlon 8)'ltem and DO water ri.ghts.' A true correct copy 0 
' 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS Of THE 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAV B. BROWN, AND TERRI LaRA! MANOUCA • 4 
·oec. 21. 2012 9:42AM st Carlton Ave No. 5005 P. 40 
e-mail 11 attached to the Complaint flled in tblt matter a Exhibit 'I' mid incozporated 
herein by tbia reter:ence and reltated a lt set forth ln tull" 
o The quoted Janauaae Statement md telaled exhibit 111 made purely as an attempt 
to \?)' to demcmatratt that the pmties undlrltm\cfina durfna the nc:aotfatlon of the 
Ill• that water riahtl Mii uc1udecl !om the OrMnhell1 Property. This evldance 
tbetetore violatea parol evidence rule. Empq-lllpl'Q. 
Mlclayjt of Ip LaRy Mn4p 
• Paraanpla ll: "Therefore I am of1he opinion that 1he price ofSt.333.33 an.acre paid by 
Ms. GnMmbearc at that time in 2007 wu more in line with the value of comparable real 
property at that t1mt in 2007 for ICl'eaP In that area that did not have water ri&hta of d:IC 
type dRcr1bed in the IDWR: letts UIOClated with it. I 'believe the Siller would not have 
been wilUna to loll comparable property to that purchased by Ma. Otecmheart and tramfer 
the asooWed water rights at that time for lea than S2JOO an acre." 
o Ml. Manudca•s opinion tettimony in Parqraphl 11 and 12· of her affidavit la 
extrlnslc evidence made solely to establiah that the. pardea undentood no water 
rlahta were beins transferred because the price paid f'ot the Oreemheart Property 
WU allepdl)' lest than what the propalty would bave sold for if it bad water 
rlaha. Tbla mdenoe is aa attempt to add or vrt'/. the plain lanan•p of the 
Warranty Deed·water was Included ln the oonveyance. Empq- rupra. 
DATED th.ii lJ.. day of December. 2012. 
By 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION. TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAY B. BROWN, AND TERRI !.&RAE MANDUCA • 5 
• · · • D e c. 21. 2 0 12 9 : 4 3 AM ast Carlton Ave No. 5005 P. 41 
CIBDDCATI or SD\TICI 
I HBRBBY CBR.TlFY that 01l tbil jJ_ day of December, 2012. a true and correct copy 
of the f'oreaolq dooumeai WU semcl by flnt-clan mail, .pottap pepaid, md addreaed to; by 
tax trannillion to; by ovemiaht delivery to; or by personally deliverlna to or leaving wlth a 
penoo in cbarp of the oftlce 11 indicated below: 
Mlcbul c. Creamer 
Thoma B. Dvorak 
Ol'VBNI PUuJ..BY LLP 
601 Weat Bannock Street 
P.o~ Box 2120 
Bol11, m 13101-2120 
Telepbou: (208) 381-1200 
Pacsimfle: (208) 388·1300 
329 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Ovemiaht Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT Of DEJIENDANT'8 MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAY B. BROWN, AND TERRI LaRAE MANOUCA • 8 
Michael C. Creamer (Idaho State Bar ID# 4030) 
Thomas E. Dvorak (Idaho State Bar ID# 5043) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 




Attorneys for Plaintiffs Jay and Christine Brown 
F\LED 
2Ul2 DEC 24 PH 12: 06 
BARt3ARA STEELE 
CLERK Of THE COURT 
DEPUT~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTII JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON-
BROWN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
AUGUSTA SA YOKO MIMOTO 
GREENHEART, an individual, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-353 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSmON 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COME NOW, Plaintiffs, Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown (hereinafter the 
"Browns"), by and through their attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LLP, and hereby submit this 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
INTRODUCTION 
It is undisputed that in the present case, the Defendant never believed there to be any 
water rights associated with her property or that she was to be conveyed any water rights with 
her purchase. All of her actions are consistent with this. The Browns, on the other hand, had, 
until the last year, understood that the water rights had not transferred with the property, still 
remained with the property under which they were in possession. and all of their actions are 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSmON TO DEFENDANT' 




consistent with this understanding, including maintaining the water rights in the water bank and 
contemplating transactions involving them.. This case fits within the general rule recognized 
throughout the United States that those in actual possession of real estate are never barred by any 
statute of limitations from seeking to quiet their title, and such is the case with the Browns 
seeking to confirm what water rights are appurtenant to the property retained from their 
conveyance. If indeed a statute of limitations applies, it is the 20-year statute of limitations 
found in Idaho Code § 5-203 for claims for the recovery of real property. Further, even if any 
statute of limitations applied, basic principles of estoppel, waiver or similar equitable principles 
would bar the Defendant, having in the past taken a position which would reasonably lead the 
Plaintiffs to understand that she was not only not making any claim to a portion of the water 
rights that are associated with Plaintiffs' retained property, but in fact relinquished any such 
claim and waived any statute of limitations defense against a quiet title action. 
Additionally, the law cited by Defendants to the effect that the use of the words "and 
appurtenances" in a deed automatically carries with it water rights is a misstatement of the 
applicable Idaho law. Instead the Idaho decisions on this question state that a clearly shown 
contrary intent of the parties overrides any presumption that water rights, appurtenant or not, 
were conveyed. 
STATEMENT OF DISPUTED FACTS 
Plaintiffs take no issue with the statement of facts set forth in the Defendant's Statement 
of Undisputed Facts as being accurate. Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs assert that those facts are not 
material. The material undisputed facts are that the allegations of the Complaint are based on 
quieting title to the Plaintiffs' retained real property and the water rights appurtenant and 
beneficially used thereon. Plaintiffs would further incorporate by reference the Statement of 
Undisputed Facts that they filed in support of their own Motion for Summary Judgment 
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previously in this matter as material facts in dispute preventing the entry of the summary 
judgment as requested by Defendant. 1 Most notably among that Statement of Undisputed Facts, 
and specifically with respect to the Defendant's pending Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
Plaintiffs would commend the Court's attention to the following facts which constitute 
statements by Greenheart to the effect that she knew she would be purchasing her property 
without water rights: 
1. June 10, 2007 Notice of Appeal of Assessor's value, indicating 
that Greenheart knew the land was dry at the time of purchase; 
2. July 2, 2007 letter to County Commissioners regarding tax 
appeal, indicating she was aware the land was dry at the time 
of purchase; 
3. Dry Grazing Land Lease, prepared by and initialed by 
Greenheart on 7/23/07; 
4. November 8, 2009 e-mail to Elmore County in which 
Greenheart stated that at the time of purchase she was "very 
aware" that the parcel was dry grazing only due to no water 
rights; and 
5. June 9, 2009 letter from Jay Brown to the Elmore County 
Commissioners acknowledged by the Defendant in her letter 
dated July 2, 2009, indicating that she would have to purchase 
a water right before she could irrigate the property. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Under Idaho Law the Intent of the Parties to a Deed Controls Whether Water 
Rights Pass with the Deed and the Water Rights Claimed by Defendant Were not 
Appurtenant to or Beneficially Used on Her Sixty Acres 
In response to Defendant's recitation of the law, Plaintiffs at this point would merely 
incorporate by reference and direct the Court's attention to the Idaho decisions cited in the 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.2 These cases stand 
1 See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed in this matter by Plaintiffs on December 10, 
2012 ("Plamtins MS) "at pp. 2-IO. 
2 See Plaintiffs' MSJ at p. 13. 
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clearly for the proposition that evidence clearly showing the parties did not intend for the deed to 
pass water rights will operate to prevent passage of the water rights even when the deed conveys 
the property "with appurtenances." In other words, as a matter of law, use of the words "with 
appurtenances" is deemed as a matter of law as ambiguous with respect to water rights. Further, 
as argued in Plaintiffs' motion, these water rights were not beneficially used on the sixty acres 
transferred to Defendant, but were used elsewhere on the retained real property or had been 
maintained by the Plaintiffs in the state-operated water bank and not in use. 3 
2. De Genenl Rule is nat a Statute of Limitations Is Not Applicable to A Penon 
Who is Simply Trying to Quiet Title to Property Which They Have Possession and 
Title To. 
Defendant, in support of her motion, cites no specific Idaho case that applies a statute of 
limitations in the context of quiet title in the manner in which she alleges it should be applied 
here. There is, however, a general rule under common law with respect to quiet title actions and 
statutes of limitations that is applicable and on point in this instance. As a general proposition, 
those in actual possession of real estate are never barred by any statute of limitation from seeking 
to quiet their title. In the Utah case of Condor v. Hunt, 1 P.3d 558 (Utah App. 2000), the Utah 
Court of Appeals stated the proposition thusly: 
[W]e recognize the general rule is that those in actual possession of 
real estate are never barred by any statute of limitation from 
seeking to quiet their title; See, e.g;, Riddick v. Streett, 313 Ark. 
706, 858 S.W.2d 62, 64 (1993); Mulctarin v. Barmby, 63 Cal.2d 
558, 47 Cal. Rptr. 43, 407 P.2d 659, 660-661 (1965); Ankoanda v. 
Walker-Smith, 44 Cal. App. 4th 610, 52 Cal. Rptr.2d 39, 42-43 
(1996), review denied; Peterson v. Hopkins, 210 Mont. 429, 684 
P.2d 1061, 1065 (1984); Viersen v. Boettcher, 387 P.2d 133, 138 
(Okla. 1963). See also, 65 Am. Jur.2d Quieting Title Section 55 
(1972). While no Utah case cited by the parties specifically adopts 
this rule, a number of cases seem to assume that Utah adheres to it. 
See, e.g., Rodgers v. Hansen, 580 P.2d 233, 235 (Utah 1978); 
Davidsen v. Salt Lake City, 95 Utah 347, 352-53, 81 P.2d 374, 
3 See Plaintiffs' MSJ at p. 12. 
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376-77 (1938). However, a definitive ruling on the question must 
await a case in which it is more squarely at issue. 
Id at 563 (citations in original). That anticipated case where it was squarely at issue came 
around before the Utah Supreme Court in In re: Hoopiiaina Trust, 144 P.3d 1129 (Utah 2006). 
In that case, two similar trust agreements had been prepared in 197 4 for the settler of the trust. 
These trust agreements were subsequently recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's office in 
that year. Both conveyed title to real property to the trusts. One of the trustees for the trusts in 
their will provided for the property of the trust to pass through their will. When that trustee died 
in 1997, the beneficiary appeared before the probate court and objected to the will being 
probated in a manner inconsistent with the trusts. After that hearing, the beneficiary spoke with 
the attorney for the estate, who told her that no trusts even existed, that the trustee who had 
passed away had disinherited her, and that she had no interest whatsoever in that estate. 
In 1998, the personal representative of the estate deeded the real property held in trust to 
herself and to the attorney for the trust. The deeds were recorded at that time in the Salt Lake 
County Recorder's office. Nothing further of note occurred in the dispute until August of 2004 
when the plaintiffs were contacted by a private investigator hired to locate them by their current 
counsel. That investigator informed them that they were in fact the beneficiaries of the trust and 
put them in touch with their counsel. This was the first point at which the parties had confirmed 
knowledge that the trust actually existed. On appeal, the court held: 
We conclude that no statute of limitations applies to the plaintiffs' 
claims seeking to quiet title to the real property held in Trust 1 and 
Trust 2 because the relief plaintiffs seek in these claims is simply 
to quiet an existing title to property of which they are already the 
equitable owners against defendants' adverse claims. 
Id at 1135. As support for this holding, the court stated as follows: 
In American Tie"a Corp. v. City of West Jordan. 840 P.2d 757 
(Utah 1992), we updated the framework for determining statute of 
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limitations issues in Utah. There, we again stated the four-year 
catch-all statute of limitations applies to all causes of action, legal 
or equitable, "in which affirmative relief is sought" or another 
"more specific" statute of limitations does not apply~ Id at 760 
(citing Branting, 153 P. at 1001). 
Under this framework., it is clear that all actions, whether legal or 
equitable, are subject to a statute of limitations in Utah. Id . . . 
However, suits brought to quiet title to real property have always 
been an exception to this rule. A true quiet title action is a suit 
brought to "quiet an existing title against an adverse or hostile 
claim of another," and "the effeet of a decree quieting title is not 
to vat title. but rather to perfect an existin1 title as against 
other claimants." State v. Santiago, 590 P.2d 335, 337-38 (Utah 
1979). Thus, the question becomes whether a claim is a true quiet 
title actioa or whether the claimant really seeks other relief; if it is 
a true quiet title action it is not subiect to a statute of 
limitations. Courts must proceed cautiously when applying this 
rule, however, for parties should not be able to void the statute of 
limitations on other claims by simply disguising them as claims for 
quiet title relief. 
In re: Hoopiiaina Trust, 144 P.3d at 1137 (italics and citations in original, emphasis added). 
Idaho appears to have adopted this kind of reasoning in the context of a void deed. In the 
case of Argyle v. Slemaker, 585 P.2d 954 (Idaho 1978), the deed was allegedly void on the basis 
that the description or some other aspect of it had been inserted after execution. In response. to 
an argument that the statute of limitations prevented a quiet title action, the court rejected the 
same and said as follows: 
A statute of limitations is one of repose designed to put an end to 
stale claims and was never intended to compel resort to legal 
remedies by one who is in complete enjoyment of all he claims . 
. . . Nor may it be used to transfer property from the true owner to 
a stranger simply because the void tax deed was not challenged 
within six years of the date of the recording. . . . Courts in sister 
states have adopted the same principle, . . . which is reflected by 
leading text writers .... 
The logic of such review is inescapably correct. For otherwise the 
recording of the deed resulting from such a proceeding would 
transform the owner's absolute title in fee simple into a right of 
action oiily, the exercise of which is subject to ttme Itm1tation. The 
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tax deeds constitute a cloud on plaintiff's title which should be 
removed. When void tax deeds are attempted to be made prima 
facie evidence of the regularity of the proceedings, equity will 
interfere to permit removal as a cloud on title, ... which right may 
be invoked by the owner in possession at any time as "such a right 
is never barred by the statute of limitations. It is a continuing right 
which exists as long as there is an occasion for its exercise." ... 
The action to quiet title and to set aside the alleged void deed was 
not barred by J.C. § 5-218 nor any other statute of limitations and 
summary judgment on this grotmd was improper. 
Id at 958 (citations omitted). 
In the present case, the Browns' action to quiet title fits squarely within the language of 
the quiet title provision in and of itself. Idaho Code § 6-401 provided, in pertinent part: 
An action may be brought by any person against another who 
claims an estate or interest in real •.• property adverse to him, 
for the purpose of determining such adverse claim, provided that 
all actions to adjudicate water rights and obtain a decree as to 
water source, quantity, point of diversion, place of use, nature of 
use, period of use, and priority as against other water users shall be 
brought under the provisions of chapter 14, title 42, Idaho Code. 
Id at 6-401 (emphasis added). 
First, as a preliminary matter, this action, even though it involves a water right, does not 
involve the adjudication of water rights as described in 6-401. The elements of the subject water 
rights in this case (i.e., source, quantity, point of diversion, etc.) were decreed in the SRBA in 
2000. Here the Browns seek confirmation from the Court that they are the owners of 100% of 
the two water rights. 
Second, Defendant Greenheart is making an adverse claim to Plaintiffs to a portion of 
Plaintiffs' water rights based on a claim that she received them when she received a conveyance 
of a certain portion of the property. Defendant Greenheart only recently asserted any claim to 
the subject water rights when she acted to cause the Idaho Department of Water Resources to 
state (on a non-binding basis) that the portion of the water rights at issue had been transferred to 
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her. Thus, this is a classic case where the Browns are defending their title to their property and 
the water rights appurtenant thereto against an adverse and newly asserted claim of title. The 
undisputed facts are clear that when the Plaintiffs became aware that the record was unclear or 
could imply that the rights had been transferred, they contacted the Defendant about it, and that 
was the first time that the Defendant raised the issue with them or anyone else. The Plaintiffs 
reacted promptly thereafter to bring this quiet title action. 
Accordingly, this is a situation involving an adverse claim to real property owned by the 
Browns, occurring in the present, and not one to which any statute of limitations should be 
applicable. 
3. Defendant Has Picked the Wrong Statute of Limitations, as Idaho Code § 5-203 
Would be the Statute of Limitations to Apply, If Any Apply 
The Defendant claims that Idaho Code§ 5-224 or Idaho Code§ 5-216 are the applicable 
statutes of limitation in this instance. Defendant ignores Idaho Code § 5-203 in her arguments. 
That provision says: 
No action for the recovery of real property, or for the recovery of 
the possession thereof, can be maintained, unless it appears that the 
plaintiff, his ancestor, predecessor or grantor, was seized or 
possessed of the property in question within twenty (20) years 
before the commencement of the action; and this section includes 
possessory rights to lands and mining claims. 
Idaho Code§ 5-203.4 
This statute is not found in any special section of the Code for "adverse possession", but 
it is found directly among the statutes of limitation continued within Title 5, Chapter 2 of the 
Idaho Code. As Title 5, Chapter 2 is organized, it first sets out the above-cited statute of 
limitations for the recovery of real property, and then goes on to state: 
The periods prescribed for the commencement of actions other 
4 A water right is ''real property." Idaho Code§ 55-101(1). 
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than for the recovery of real property are as follows [referring to 
Idaho Code Sections 5-215 to 5-248). 
Idaho Code§ 5-214 (emphasis added). The two statutes relied on by Defendants are within the 
range cited by Section 5-214 (i.e., 5-224) and therefore, among the periods prescribed for the 
commencement of actions "other than for the recovery of real property." However, in this case, 
the recovery of the water rights at issue which Plaintiffs allege were not transferred is an action 
for the recovery of real property and subject therefore to Idaho Code§ 5-203. 
Although Idaho Code § 5-203 typically is seen as the basis for an adverse possession 
claim once the 20-year prescriptive period has run, on its face it is the statute of limitations 
allowing an affected land owner to bring a claim within the requisite time period to stop an 
activity that otherwise would be deemed adverse possession. But by its terms it applies to any 
"action for the recovery of real property." This statute is, therefore, plainly applicable to the 
present situation and more specific to the issue at hand than the statutes cited by the Defendant, 
in that it actually applies to actions for the recovery of realty. The claim in the present case 
clearly has been brought within 20 years of when Defendant first made claim to the property at 
issue (in 2012), regardless of whether the delivery of the deed or the Defendant's recent 
statements asserting a claim to the water rights are considered to be the adverse claim. It is clear 
"[w]here two statutes appear to apply to the same subject matter, the specific statute will control 
over the more general statute." Athay v. Stacey, 146 Idaho 407, 419, 196 P.3d 325, 337 (2008). 
4. The Defendant's Conduct in Acting as if No Water Right Conveyance Had 
Occurred Creates an Estoppel or Other Equitable Bar Against the Defendant Now 
Raising Any Statute of Limitations. 
Statutes of limitations are not jurisdictional and are therefore subject to waiver, estoppel 
and equitable tolling. Bryant v. City of Blackfoot, 48 P.3d 636, fn. 1 (Idaho 2002)(citing Zipes v. 
Trans WorldAirUnes. Inc., 455 U.S. 385. 102 S.Ct. 1127. 721 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982). 
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The Defendant's conduct in this case was such that during the period of any potentially 
applicable statute of limitations, she represented repeatedly and consistently to the Plaintiffs and 
the Elmore County officials that she was not claiming any water rights had transferred to her. 
Under such circmnstances, the doctrines of estoppel, waiver or other similar equitable doctrines 
would bar her from now raising the claim. 
It has been held that 
a waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known 
right and 'the party asserting the waiver must show that he acted in 
reasonable reliance upon it and that he thereby has altered his 
position to his detriment.' 
Ada County Highway District v. Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 179 P.3d 323 
(2008) Fullerton v. Griswold, 142 Idaho 820, 824, 136 P.3d 291, 295 (2006). 
It has been noted in Idaho that: 
The only non-statutory bar to a statute of limitations defense in 
Idaho is the doctrine of equitable estoppel . . . . [T]he elements of 
equitable estoppel [are] as follows: (1) a false representation or 
concealment of a material fact with actual or constructive 
knowledge of its truth; (2) that the party asserting estoppel did not 
know or could not discover the truth; (3) that the false 
representation or concealment was made with the intent that it be 
relied upon; and (4) that the person to whom the representation 
was made, or from whom the facts were concealed, relied and 
acted upon the representation or concealment to his prejudice. 
Equitable estoppel does not eliminate, toll or extend the statute of 
limitations period; It merely bars a party from asserting the statute 
of limitations as a defense. That bar does not last forever, 
however. It lasts only for a reasonable time after the party 
asserting estoppel discovers or reasonably could have discovered 
the truth. 
Ferro v. Society of Saint Pius X, 149 P.3d 813, 816 (2006)(citations omitted, emphasis added). 
In the present case, if the Defendant actually believed she owned the water rights, then 
she made several false representations or concealments of that material fact with constructive 
knowledge of the truth. Specifically, she indicated to both the Plaintiffs and the County after the 
MEMORANDUM IN OProsmoN TO DEFENDANT' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 10 339 
sale that she did not have a water right. From these statements after the fact, it is easily inferred 
that she intended not to obtain a water right at the earlier time of sale. Cf Pflueger v. Hopple, 
156 P .2d 316 (Idaho 1945) ("constructive notice" of fact ordinarily means that person knowing 
other facts, from which it is concluded that he knew or should have known fact in question, 
should be held to have knowledge of such fact). Her statements that she owned no water rights 
were entirely consistent with the Plaintiff Browns' understanding that the water rights had not 
been transferred. Therefore, the Browns did not know the alleged ''truth", i.e., that despite her 
statements to the contrary, the Defendant actually considered the water rights to have been 
conveyed. Th.ere was no reason for the Plaintiffs to investigate the matter. Where would they 
have looked to discover the Defendant's contrary intent or claim? Would the Defendant have 
given them a different statement at that time? It was also foreseeable that the false representation 
or concealment of the truth would be relied upon in that the Defendant was attempting to gain a 
tax benefit by making the statements to the effect that she had acquired no water rights. Finally, 
the Plaintiffs had no reason to believe they would need to file any lawsuit to confirm their 
ownership and thereby relied and acted upon the representations that the Defendant was claiming 
no water rights to their detriment. Accordingly, all elements of an equitable estoppel are present. 
In this case, the evidence of equitable tolling permits only one conclusion. As the Idaho 
Court of Appeals noted in Mason v. Tucker & Associates, 125 Idaho 429, 871 P.2d 846 (Ct. App. 
1994): 
Th.us, estoppel would operate to toll the statute of limitation on 
Mason's claims only until Mason or his attorney had acquired 
knowledge of the facts or gained possession of sufficient evidence 
from which either of them reasonably could have discovered the 
deficiencies in the transcript. 
Ordinarily, a question of when the falsity of the representation or 
concealment should baye been discoyered is a Question of fact for 
the jury. Nonetheless, when only one reasonable conclusion can 
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be reached from the uncontroverted evidence, the issue may be 
resolved by the court on summary judgment. 
Id at 851-52. See also Tingley v. Harrison, 87 P.2d 960, 965 (Idaho 1994)("Estoppel may 
prevent a defendant from asserting the statutory bar when his representations or conduct dissuade 
a plaintiff from prosecuting a cause of action during the period of limitation"). 
In the case of Anderson v. Anderson, Kaufman, Ringert & Clarie, Chartered, 775 P.2d 
1201 (Idaho 1989), the Idaho Supreme Court upheld a district court's ruling that a partner in a 
partnership was not equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations against his 
partner's claims that he had misappropriated funds that had been paid to the partnership over the 
years. Specifically, the court noted that the mere fact that firm members were charged with 
knowledge of what was in the corporate books and records and that they could have discovered 
the failure to report the excluded fees by examining daily time records was not enough to avoid a 
material issue of fact of whether they could have discovered such information by looking at the 
firm records. Thus a jury trial and jury verdict against the party seeking to rely on the equitable 
estoppel was appropriate. 
An analogous example of constructive knowledge sufficient to potentially evoke estoppel 
is found in the case of Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital Bldg. Corp. v. Hamill, 644 P.2d 341 (Idaho 
1982). There, an architect's statements on several occasions that the separation and cracking in 
the mortar that was the subject of the lawsuit was allegedly due to normal expansion and 
contraction and should be of no concern, when in reality the problems were caused by the 
architect's own failure to provide proper expansion protection, resulted in an inference that the 
architect who had designed and supervised construction of the building "had actual or 
constructive knowledge of the failure to provide the necessary expansion protection and the 
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[plaintift] had no architectural expertise, and cannot be held to be required to discover the 
absence of expansion protection." Id at 347. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, material issues of fact preclude a grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Defendant. Plaintiffs believe that summary judgment in their favor is in fact merited. 
$t" 
DATED this ..21 day of December, 2012. 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
Thomas E. Dvorak 
Attorneys for Jay and Christine Brown 
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IN THI DISTRICT COURT OJ THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT or 
THE STATE or IDAHO~ IN AND FOR THE COUNTY or ELMORE 
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON-
BROWN, Husband and Wife, 
Plaintift's, 
v. 
AUGUSTA SA YOKO MIMOTO 
OREENHEART. an individual. 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CV 2012·353 
REPLY IN SUPPORT or 
DEPENDANT'S 'MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendant, Augusta Sayoko Mimoto Oreenhcart, by and through her attorney of record, 
Victor Villesas and Borton Lakey Law Offices, submits this Reply in Support of Defendant•s 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Groundwater Wu Tramferrecl To Greenheart Throup The Warranty Deed and 
Therefore The Statute of Limitations Applies. 
Drown ltlUft that the aroundwater was not transferred to Ofeenlieart Via the Warranty 
Deed because the parties did not intend to transfer the water. In support of this araument Brown 
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reincorporates their arguments in their motion for summary judgment that the phrase 'with 
appurtenances' is ambipus and therefore Brown is permitted to Introduce extrinsic evidence of 
the parties alleaed intent. From this, Brown argues that the statute of limitations does not nm 
aaainst party who is in poaaeaaion of property, and therefore, since Brown still hu possession of 
the aroundwater, the statute of limitations does not apply to him. 
Brown' 1 arguments on this issue misapply established Idaho law in an attempt to fit the 
facts of thia case. The facta show that the Warranty Deed conveyed the groundwater to 
Oreenheart by operation of law. More importantly, the extrinsic evidence Brown attempts to 
introduce in their motion for summary Judament is prohibited by the parol evidence rule. 
Greenheart restates and incorporates her arguments set forth in Dlfendant 11 M•morandum In 
Oppo1ltlon To Summary Judgm111t paaes 1 tbrouah 7 and briefly restates her araument herein. 
First, where a deed. contains the typical appurtenance lani1JIP, it is not ambiguous as a 
matter of law as Brown hu araued. S11 Koon v. Em~, 40 Idaho 6, 231 P. 1097 (1924). On the 
contrary, Empey specifically holds that a deed containing such lanaua&e is not ambiguous, and 
therefore the parol evidence rule prohibits a party from introducing extrinsic evidence. "[It] ls an 
elementary rule for the construction of deeds. the lanauaae of which is plain and unambiguous, 
that, in the absence of fraud or mistake, the intention of the parties must bo ascertained. from the 
instrument itself ••.. Paro! evidence la not adml11tble for •uc:b purpo1e." Id. (emphasis added). 
Second, it has long been recognized by Idaho courts that "a water right is an 
appurtenance to the land on which it bas been and will pass by conveyance of the land." Russell 
v. Irish, 118 P. 501, 502 (1911 ). "[A] division of a tract of land to which water is appurtenant. 
without segregatina or reservfna the water right, works a division of such water right in 
. proportion as the land is divided." Hunt v. Bremer 216 P. 964, 965 (1929). Idaho courts also 
rec:ognize that evon when a warranty deed fails to mention "water rights .. or "appurtenances" it 
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does not prevent water rights appurtenant to the land from being conveyed with the real property. 
Baglq v. 'Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, 803, 241P.3d972, 976 (2010). 
In 1his cue, the Warranty Deed did not reserve any around water riahts. but instead 
contained the typical appurtenance language that had the legal effect of transferring the water to 
Oreenheart along with the land. Moreover, Brown bu not alleaed bud or mistake that would 
allow the introduction of extrinsic evidence to chanae the express intent in the Warranty Deed. 
In the end, these two legal conclusions establish that it is Oreenheart who is actually in 
posseuion of the aroundwater and hu title to the land u well. Since Brown is not in possession 
of the aroundwater and, in fact transferred title to Oreenheart throuah the Warranty Deed. Brown 
cannot apply the rule of law that the statute of limitations is inapplicable to a party in possession 
. 
seeking to quiet title. Based on this analysis, the Browns' reliance on the holdiqs in Condor v. 
Hunt, 1 P.3d SS& (Utah App. 2000) and Arl)'l• v. Sl1maker, S8S P.2d 954 (1978) is moneous; 
the cues are distinsufshable and therefore have no application to the case at bar. 
D. ldabo Code S.edon 5-203 11 The Wrona Statute Of Limltatlon1. 
Brown argues that the statute of limitations set forth in Idaho Code Section S-203 allows 
Brown to maintain this action within 20 years and therefore this action ls timely. Brown 
misapplies Idaho Code Section S-203 because (1) that statute is the adverse possession statute 
and is therefore inapplicable to the facts of this cue; and (2) even if it were to apply Brown has 
not complied with that statute. 
Section 5-203 is the statute applicable to an adverse possession case, which is why there 
is a perquisite that a plaintiff be in posaessiott or seized for the statutory period of time. The 
cases applying this statute deal exclusively with establishing title through a period of occupation 
for a requisite time petjod. AlthouP Brown styles their case as a quiet title action. the gravcman 
of this lawsuit deals with a request to this Court to interpret the Warranty Deed and Purchase and 
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Sale Agreement to determine whether water was conveyed via those documents. Tho counts set 
out in the Complaint ask for declaratory relief to interpret the documents. not to determine 
whether either party hu established title through adv~ possession. As a result, Section 5·203 
does not apply to this case. 
Second, even lt Section 5·203 did apply to this case. Brown has not complied with the 
requJrements of the statute. Section S-203 states in pertinent part: 
No action for the recovery or real property, or for the recovery of the 
possesalon theteo£ can be maintained, \mlea it appears th!t the plaintiff. his 
•nm1tar. Pmtm1sor or cantor. WM aeizesi or ao•Mued of ihe PfQ'RWlY in 
auestion within twenty (20) years before commencement of the actign; and 
this section includes possessory riahts to lands and minfna claims. 
Idaho Code § 5·203 (underllnlna added). The underlined language and the cue law applyin1 the 
statute requires that the plaintiff have wrongful or adverse possession of the property for at least 
20 years blfml commenclna an action. This 20 year period cannot include any period where the 
plaintlif may be in rlahtful possession of the property. 
In this cue. Brown is the plaintiff and bu not adversely possessed. the disputed 
groundwater for 20 years prior to brinaJna this action. As discussed above. the Wammty Deed 
conveyed the gr0undwater to Oreenheart because it was not reserved or otherwise exempted in 
the Deed. Greenheart currently is, and has been in possession of the water for over 5 years now 
whereas Brown has never been in possession since the execution of the Warranty Deed. 
Therefore, Brown has failed to meet the requisite 20 year period of adverse possession of the 
aroundwater prior to commencing this lawsuit. 
m. E1toppel And Other Equitable Prlndplet Do Not Apply To Bar The Statute Of 
Umltadon1. 
Brown provides no reasonable argument why equitable estoppel should toll the statute of 
limitations. Brown also misapplies other equitable principles to the facts of this case. 
REPL V MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF OEFE~O,~T'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT· 4 
Dec. 28. 2012 9:58AM st Carlton Ave No. 5020 P. 6/7 
In Oreenheart's Memorandum In Support of Summa1)1 Judgment she argued that 
equitable estoppel can only toll the statute of limitations for so lona u the party could not 
dhcover tho truth. "[T]he application of equitable estoppel to preclude a statute of limitation 
defense may be made only for so long u the plaintiff did not know and could not discover the 
truth." Mason v. Tucklr and Al.roclat11, 125 Idaho 429, 433-434, 871 P.ld 846, 850 • 851 
(1994). The party relying upon the acts of another who is to be estopped must be excusably 
iporant of the true facts. Alder v. Mountain Stat11 T1lqhon1 & T1l1graph Co., 92 Idaho 506. 
446 P.2d 628 (1968). 
Hen, Brown has provided no lfiUMtm refb.tfn1 Oreenheart' s analysis that Brown could 
not have 'discovered the truth' on both the written Ianauaae of the Purchase and Salo Agreement 
and the Warranty Deed. Brown has not pointed this Court to my action showina that durina the 
.11111. Oreenheart misled Brown, made statements to Brown or prevented Brown from readina the 
· plain lansuage of those document! before they signed them. Since Idaho law requires a party to 
expressly reserve water from the deed, Brown could have easily seen that at the time the parties 
sianed it, there was no reservation language in the deed with respect to groundwater. It simply 
cannot be said that Brown could not discover the truth at the time they sipd the Deed. As a 
result, there is no material issue of fact whether Brown could not discover the truth so as to toll 
the running of the statute of limitations. 
Brown strains to focus this Court's attention to the post sale closing conduct of 
Gteenheart relative to her tax appeal with Elmore County, but those actions have no bearln1 on 
the application of my equitable theories to bar the statute of llmltatiom. After the Warranty 
Deed wu sip.eel and delivered, the groundwater was already transferred to Oreenheart. The post 
sale representations by Greenheart to Elmore County did not prevent Brown from knowina the 
truth. The Ianauaao in the Warranty Deed did not change after the sale. The Wmanty Deed 
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lacked languap resel'\ina the groundwater. and Bro\\1' could ha\·e easily discovered that this 
lanauaae \\'U lacking after the sale u well as at the time the)· sianed the Warranty Deed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the undisputed facts and the arguments set forth above. Greenehart 
mpectfull)' requests that the Court srant her Motion for Summar)· Judgment. 
DATED this 2:l_ day of December. 2012. 
BY • 
Victor Villep.'7 
Attorneys for Dtfandant 
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IN ma DISflUCI' COUKT OF1"HB· POUR.TH JUDlCIA,L DISTRICT FOR THE. 
STATE.OF. IDAHO, IN AND FOR THB.CptJNTY OF .BLMORB: 
JAY BROWN·and CHRISTJNB.HOPSON· 
BR:OWNr husband Ind win\. 
Plaintifft, 
v. 
AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO 
OREENHBART, an indi'ViduaJ. 
O~fendant. 
Cao No. CV'-2012.3·53 . . . 
REPLY IN· SllPtoltT OF 
PL"1NT1FF.St MOTION FOR 
StJMMARY JUDGMENT. . 
AND 
RES.PONSE IN ·OPPOSmoN·To 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
STRIKE PORtlONS OF 
AFFIDAVIT OP JAY JI. BROWN 
AND TERRI LaltlA MANDUCA 
Ptaintfffi, through their attorneys Oiv"1ll Pursl~· LLP aubmit this. Reply in Support of 
Plaintiffs' Motion fot· Summary Judgment-~d Rcspot\$8 in;OplJQsitkm to °"fenqant'~· M~tion «i 
Strike·Porth;ma .. of Affidavit·of ~ay .. :a. Bf9wn ~Tani Lal\ac·~~duca. 
lNTRODVtTt'ON' 
Oc~dant .. argues: 1) the-subject watetrlabtt .were.~enut to .th«:l'.Oreertheart Property 
as of the. 2007 .c6n.\toyance;. and therefore, the. deed's htclusion. of th~ words "together ~ith. 
appurtenances" ncocssarily included \\'.ater rights; 8.l'd 2.) extrinsic c,videocc cpncem.ing .. the 
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Defendant usumes water riahta were appurtenant to the Oreenhcart Property aa of the 
conveyance. and. solely-and exclusiyely-in reliance. on Koon v, &rpyt 40 Idaho 6, 23 J P. 
1.097 {1924) araues. that the.Ule oflhe word '•appurtenances":in the deod conveys water rlll\tl.by 
~tion ~f'taw and hence extrinsic evi~· showtn1 the partiol•· fntont. that no water ri~ta 
woultr l;e conveyed cannot bo eohildett!d. Th• «rgumentJ fail to account· for· the. Idaho 
deciaiona.·(ihd in· Other weatem af*tea) hc)ldlnfthat ~lns·"topther with appurtenan~;, in a deed 
<Joes ~at (a) cott~ey water· riahtt ~at .... not ~t wh~ t!:'.• deed i1. ~~~ .. Of (b) 
~vey illl)f a.pp~~t wat~ ti~~ .thaf ci~~cea ~ .the. time· of execution ,,bow wore.not 
fntc>ndecJ· io bo ·con~· .Olvon .th• undiaputecl relevarit· racts and ldliho C4ae 1aw, Defendant l• 
wt.ons. on bQth.coUl\tlj.and.-9\m'lmal'y ~u.dgrnent should.be :arantod as .requested· by Phunti~ 
nn11.telated Motiorr t~ Strike- it ~ solely 9n pefendant'~J.~ .rell~cc;t o~. ~"JJ!<IY 
for ~ P.J'OP'?~O~ that eyt:denco ~f ~c .p~~cs• i~~ eon.cem~g. ~eih~· !tlter rlP,l\9 ~ere 
int~dQd ro be con~ by a deed that ts silent as to Water rights. but inch.ides tatlpat . . . . 
conv~ying the.'Jaftd wwgether with appttttemtnc•" may taot ·be cou.idcred ·by tho.court. Rather 
than clutter·up the nrcord an IUimnMJ judgment with.yet anr.1ther·brief, Plaintiffs haye elect~ t~ 
combine thei.r btjeftng. on that. point with this reply in support o.r tummary judgment. Tho fact 
that the holdfu.1.ill Em,,_,. is not ~ Ia~ likewise provides grounds to 4eny Dofendant11· Motion 
to Strike in its entirety •. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Whetbcr a Wgter Ri&ht Passes in a. Land Conymncc Jlemmds on Wbetber the Water 
Riahi it Nm,wtenant. llld Abmm& DD Emm grant m: R§Crvatiim s>! Wiler Riahts in the· 
Deed· on Whether the Parties IDtended Amrurtenant Watu Biabll m :be Conveyed, 
Defendant•.s sole reliance on Empey is misplaced because the Empey is incons.istent with aU 
prior and subsequent decisions of the Idaho Supreme .Court on the issue .. Those Idaho decisions 
comport with tlie ;majorify of ttie prior appropriation stateS on. me lcg&l issues presenfe& h~. In 
'/ °'!"' 31 ~12 H :lllllll 288-33&- -> Pursely LLP Page BBS 
Idaho, rogardl08S of whether a con:veyance ins~ent includes the words "together with 
appurtenancea." absent~ ex.press racrvatfon or grant of'watcr riahts •. the issue.of whother ·water 
rights.J*I with the·Jand ·turns.on: 1') wbetm;r.1ho.·fishtt·at issuo are inf~ appurtenant to .. tho.land 
at inue; ~·~) ·u;e.parttoa~ iDtcnt. 
A. DlD·&bi@i water dghtl were.not mta\1tlADIDt to the Qreenhcaa bopert)!. 
Jn Idaho, a ·water right exist&· solely by referonco·to the boneftciaJ uae actually made .of the . . . . . . 
water. Idaho Const.i. art. XV, t 3; Idaho Code • 42·101. Whether a water right ts an 
aptNrtenance to. l'mid. hinges on whether it is a neceesary i.ncidfn,'lt.'O( end beneticially .. ~ed. in 
I I 
c0Mection with, theJ~d. ldal'lO Coclo f 42 .. JOl, pl'O'Yfd.• tha~ 
•... • the. right·~.~. ·U~',of ~Y .gf ~e .. ~bile watert,.wliidt have heretofore been or 
may heteaft~·~·i.llomd t1r bfttidatly applied.. stun trot .. lSe.c:ongidtted as .. l*n1 
a property risht .in itself,. but 1uoh right ahall become ·a .complement ·of, or one .6f 
the lppun~ce.: of, flier lll'ld or ;Otlier .. thing. to which, ·through netebtfy, .said 
water right 1$ being *Pplled. · 
(Bmpbaiit added): U.nder thia.tWUte,. a w.atcr right is .appurtenant.only to J.anb u~ .. which it js, 
of netesaity, .aPRlied to \xnl~~al .use. 
C9~i.~ont.with 1.a~o. Code§ 42··10.1,. f~9"QOurt.decisions addrassln1 whetli«·a·walltt·riaht . . . . . 
is. a~urtenant· to lllld all hinge on whether. water aclVilJy· is .. of nt)Cf$ity, used ·to benefit ihC 
land. ~' e:g;;· Jod1?1' v.· Dal!; 15 Idaho 137, 9~ P. 65$ (1908) .(~though a 'Y•• right~· 
originally appurtenant· to whole·mnch, ''the.inquiry,~ to ~c-par_tl~rar lat;ld1 ~ wbich.w~ ~pt 
ia·ap~ant.must. tum upon the :uso and applh::ation.of water as the same existed af thc.dime•the 
[mortgage] was executed.');. RuueJl. v. Jrula, 20 Idaho 194, 118 P. 501. (191 l) (water right. is 
appurtenant to the land on which it actually is used. and on1y·that portion of the ~tet which.had 
been continually used on the land up to the time of ·the conveyance was transf'~ y.'ith the 
lend);. Empey, 40 I~o at 9, 231P.at1099 (where evidence showed that water. was necessary 
tbr am µse of the land, mid ;11.aving been used· to :inigate.the fauds.at:the tin>ePofcen+eymee encl 
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sevoral years prior, the water bocamo appurtenant to the land"). Plaintiffs are aware.of no Idaho 
decision holdin9 a water right to be .. app)ll'tenant to land b_. solely on a ,prior decretf, or where 
it .may have. been·used in the past. or where it..may· be uaed in the.filture. Rathert l~aho decisions 
and ~t~ 1iase ~ppurten~ on. ~al '&eneftdal use on tpee(flo. land at· the ·time ·of 
Jl.'cl8Hll'll. .Jri&ht alsa held thlt..IdiihO Cbde § 35-603 (fQrmotty Rev .. COd'e f 3'1 H). des:cri~ 
tho·txtent.to· :whid,t wttw :righta are. ~t ~·~to~ in a I~ ~nv~ct .ab~t 
ovid~qf.~.fn~t. Id., 2~ 1a·~at.·%~, qs.i; .. at SO), ld.aho·Code f s~.staies: 
A. lnn'.lsfOr. of' real property passoa ·ail .casements Jiltaehcd thereto, and areutos ifr 
favOt 1h&'e0f awi ~ent to '*' other real properiy of ~e person whose estate Is· 
transfarred, Iii· tlie.taflle ittari•er aud ta di• 1ame atcin.f d.:mell property w11· 
.obvl.Oa91y ·and .permanentlf ·used by dte penon whose estate Is transferred, 
tor th' ~ileflt thonof, •t die :ume. ,Vh'en the vaster wu· ~greed upon ~r 
compteted1. 
(Emphallis added).1 Paddock v. Clafk, 22 Idaho 49'84.503, 126·P. lOS3,.10S6 (1912.);;held that a 
water right "is.an appurtenance to.thcdand irrigated by the U$o.of·~ch "'!atcr;» The Court, citing 
to .R~sell, restated the rule tJJat onc:e water becamc·an .. appumnancc. to the lant4.'"the·convcy.ance 
of tho tan~, 'togeth~ witb tho appurtenances,." would convey not. only the land, but tho· wa~ 
right ·at>Purtenant .t'.Q said Jand. unleu .if appeared .by tbe terms of the conveyanc• that .such right 
was reserved or tltat it II cleirly lhoWD by the evidence that botb parties tntondad ~OC to 
lndude .. sald water J'.'laht by. nch eonve)'ance;•'· Ifj. ~2 Idaho.at s·o4, 126 P. ~· 1054 {Emphasis 
added). 
Here it .is undisputed that none. of .the. water :that' ii- thi int~j~ of the1e water rights' ha. ·been· 
benefiaatly .used ol'l the 60 .acres purchaeed by Ma. Oreenheart since .. at. l~t 1986. ~· Priq.r to:·an<t 
1 s.,, Joyce L/.ll(tllt.oek y, rJnllM Statt1. 144 Jdlbo 1. 1Jr j 56' p;3d. 502 (2010) (acknowledsf n1.tlnlt·by. att11oU; :water 
rlabtund uwnent1·1pr!l'. wffici@tly ahnilar to hawuyiieyont low •m»isulo ta euemon11 gRPIY to appyrtnntwatot 
rights. .. . " " 1 Af'fldavih:>f1•Y Drown in SupportofModMt tor.Summary J'udament,, 12. 
' . 
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at the time of tho conveyance by,Brow.ns i.n 2.007, the Oree,nhoart Property wu dry, undeveloped 
araztn1 land with. no access to ·water or a means· to .apply water·to ~Y beneficial uso.. No .water 
right wa necetsarY. to the ~ or· ~e Oreenheart: Property., wbioh &oth Plain'tift' aild Ddfet1dant 
Indisputably understood .was .beiha conv.eyed u dry land. Siftce .the con~eyan~ the Oteen.heart 
Pfoperfy·ha1· .,._held ai\d leucd by the Defendam as· dry arazina land only. Defendant h~ 
represent:ed ta J.ilm.ore County that ahe .purch~ the land ~th "no JcaaJ water, ri'ahtt~ .-strictly 
~. amtna ~ ..... and.~ ~ M~• ·n.ot ~d will ~t ~e l~a,ated unleu at such .time a wat~ 
ript l• .purchaaed tor ·:the.~ by [l>.rerkiairt].'J ·Ddfelidlnt aJso. represented to mmoro . . . . . . 
Countr onlcbU'• tbat''''it tl1~· tltrio of· the purchaae. I w• alao vsr.r aware that.~· p,~el. ~· da:Y 
s;razh:ag dnly. .due to lack of irrigation syatctn ~ n.o· water ti .. ;• Tho irrlgati0n water .rlght:I at . . . . . . 
i..-U~ ha rfimpJy·~ ~ot ~ o~ f:ltl in.cid~ ~f,. or· n~ary .to the uso of. tho .Oreenheari. 
Property ~ ~vcyed'. Under U!OSCt undilputed tacts and .Jd~ law. the- gUbJ«oCt water rlghta 
w=-o not appurtaanttn the ~eatt P~y·at tho.tid of'.cot.rVeymc,. . . 
Tbc.2000 SR.BA Court.decree. fot water ril&hts.:61·21.88.and 61-71':1 authorized Pl~ntiff$ ~ 
irrigate no .m~ .than 2~7 ICl'CI· Within. their entire. original 320~acro property. the decram did 
• ! • ' • o' I • 00 I 
not, however, determine or direct wbi9h. act• ~c Browns could elect to cultivate, itrl.gato ·llld· 
thereb~inalcc their water rights appurtenant to. Attlidilgh the.d~ pennitmd the divenian and 
use of ,water somc'Whb·within the 320 a~ property, nowhere in. the decrees do they .QOnflrm 
that the water rights were !lppurtenant to specific lands ;ivithin. the .3-20 acres, lat aiono to lands 
upon which the water riFts were.not, would not,. or~· not.bo beneficially used. &111 JOl3lyn 
> Elc.hibit 0 to Cornpl.U.t. 
• E:xbibtt 1 to Complalnt. Defendant, .who hu pmChaed otbernlll property .in ~.aric:t...prlot apptopdation stata.ot 
Idaho ind NeYada, u..u that.she did not"wtdentand the 1ep1 import or.tbi..tmn ~ rtahtt .. When W'tlsole to 
use. tho lem1in.hot1evwa1· reptoeontationt lo Elmore.dounty .~tffcfala that w·~ .thct Jud a'I <Jty 1a'nd 'without 
water rflhts and would haw to purchase ..V.tot ri~1Q ltripte ft, Sbl dOOS,nq&.'drt,.~. tbat 1~'dicf.ft0t' 
•• ·10 I le of:ln·itrl don· . ,. u·~ a1io re ..-nWd thcr 
subject property .to be 5Jmore County. Defendarit'I ~ pOlt · tltioni mition· · · : · · g 
or IGpl lom1• Mo ohoac.\Q uae l19bjectively W11'8asomh1o.ltt Ught .ofihe r.indfspUti«l £aota:in .the~ 
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v. Daly, 15 Idaho at 14.5,, 96. P. at S70 (in determining if any water rights orisinally appropriated 
for entire ranch p~ as. an appurten.an~. at ~ime of co~ce. .tho tnquiry :tum& on tho use 
IUld applicati~n of water on a portion of' the original ranch as il existed· et the titne of ., 
conveyartce)~ Wid lf'ater Rlg!W .in ni. Wat1r.n Stt11#$.· 3d ed., §~2; p. S.88 (19U) .(Ii wi.ter right 
is ._,pwunattt .only- to such Janda of a large tract. u had been actually irrifiated from it, and a 
water dght ls incidenW or appurt~rumt co the land w~en by ·right used ~ith the land ~r its 
bencftt). In any ~ent. $R.9A p~l}l decrees (l()flfirm the .exJatence, natute and extent of water 
' ..... . .. . . . ' . . . . 
ri'ghta ~n.Jy ae ~f'fhe date the partial ·d~ it i..Ued, Wh'icb ·ltl thi• cue was se.ven. years before 
Dtsfon&nt pUfdined the 60 a~·of desert liutd. '*A partial decre.e·i•·not,.conctusive·as-ta any 
p<>st..adjudicatJt;m· circumstanCOJ ()'/ ~t."luthOri~ chanps m. ~ta· 'lSl~cnt~.~i ~':t!frit:an .fall~· 
Ruerv. :D#t. 1'{o .. ~ ~' fDWR, 14~ Jdah.~:S'G~~ •:71, t.~4~,3d ·0~.; .. ~7· (2007,). 
lda.lu:Y~·s.·requirement 'Of'a~· uso and .necessity for a. watcr·rijlt tb bccX>tn.c apptinemant to. . . . . 
land is consiatcait wUh· the neta.i.1:i of appurtenanel!$ gcmendty1 and With detj$ions throughout.the: 
prior appropriation. states. See FJl,:ii/l- v. Leaky. 14 P. 19.8, 199 (Cal . .188·7) (water ,itght 
a~rtenant ·\yhen· ad'Qally us~ to irrig~· ~~:1'114 atJd ri~~ to land'$ \JSe); Pet)7*e v. . . . . 
Cummings~ 80 P .. 626,. 622 (Cat; 19'0S)·(~afa:obtained: speoific&Jly tor use on iand .. and·neceilwy 
fur itl.uac becomes part: and parcel thetetO);.Brlgg.t v. Mutrap.. 69 P. 76.5; 17·1 (Wash •. 19()2) 
(emuil and w.ater. right found appurtenant to "mill. property wh,m canal comtru~cd and always 
used to benefit mm property and mill wholly ·dependent on can.al and water ·right to be operated)~ 
81"0olta, ~· W.ut, 69 .P. 630, 632 (Wash. 1902) (~othing passes by tho word '.•appurtcmance~~ except 
such· rights .as arc strictl~ necessary and essential to ·the proper cnjoyriicmt of· the estate granted); 
Crawford v,. Minn. and Montana Land & lmpr. Co., 38 P. 713 (Mont. 1894) (water right. and 
canal oot appurtenant to lands conveyed where at. time··of'purchase. canal was not connected to 
the en3oyme11f .6r .use Of me land, and no Water was being Used on are land through t21e· canst), 
35~ 
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Sl.mmoM v. Winters, 27 P. 7 (Or. 1.891) (where. water rijbt was being use:d to irrigatcl~d.at time 
of conveyance and without water land w_as of.little. value. the water .right was .appurtenant .to the 
extent of actual ~·and n.ecenity) ... 
B. ft:uardlm af tbt Ua of the WJ>td.I ::Tolitbm:· With APJ)Utlemln._., in .... PeecL tho 
Ougtion ·ot Whethet Water Rights PW<Tums· Eit.bcr pn Whether They m Bxpregly 
Imtgd ill bl Dud •. nt u: l')ot £ipq11Jy Tr,ated. l'hc;n, All tba P1rties, Intent Based 
on Circumtianoes et the·Timo gf tb; Conveyance. 
Defendant cftcs exclusively to Empey to argue that the parties'· itJtartiona and 
circumstances surrounding their transaction arc inadmissible to establish whether water rights 
pass in a conveyance of real property. Defend.ant ignores ·the. numerous· Idaho decisions to tne 
contrary both befOl'."·and after Empey. 
In Empey, ~11ich was a 3.."2 dccisiort, the water right! ·hid been appropnuted for .and 
continually \lied .on land· conveyed by appellant Olive to Respondent Koon up until the time of 
the 1905. conveyance. Thereaft~ the-rights .continlied to be used on the .I.and by Koon. Id., 14 
Idaho at 9 .. .lJ. In Koon's suit to quiet tide to the water- rights after Olive .attempted' 
administratively to move them elsewhere,. Olivo asserted ownetship throu~ c«:tvel'Se possession. 
Id~ 40 Idaho at· Jtt Oliv.er never dlspUtcd the ~urt's findings tb~t·the water right$' had been 
bel\Oficially used to· grow crops on the. land prior to its conveyance, that tho land wa~ 
contin\10U$ly irrigated by his grantee to ~w crops: thereafter, or ~~t wa~er ~as necessary .to 
~o Jfmited issue .. bcrorc .the .Empey coutt wu .. whether the trial court should. h1\Ve allowed 
wc.trittsi«l evi~ce. ahowina the deed was not intended by either party to include those water 
riQhts ac;tu~y u!IC!d to irrigate, the .land before and after the conveyance. Id. at 14. In concludfua 
that O'.nly an C't~. reservation. withholds an admittedly appurtenant water right from a 
' ~ . . ' ' ' . . . ' . . . .. . 
tur.ri.Y .tt1fr.Pi.At~ttr'F'j M'or10N 1()1\ St11~(MARY.JUOGMKl'ff AND J)KJ!ltNDAN'i''s M01'J()NTO STIUKE. 7 . . ' ' . ' . ' ' . ' . . . . 
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anomalous decision in Idaho and elsewhere. Tho two dinenting justices. in that .case. after citing 
to the rule expressed in· Ru.r1ell v. lrlsh (th.,. same rule. recognized a recently as 2007 ~Y the 
Idaho Supreme Court, an irifra) were .. of the opinion that the Jowcr «Ntt'1 decisio.n "ihoutd be 
~era~ an~ ~~ed. wit~ in.muctions fo a,ranf ~· new .trl·al .and permit the introdUction 6f 
extri~~io evidence to show the real transaction tiefwcetl' the parttes." Id. at. 1, 23.t P. at 1 J 00 
(WUUiatn· A .... IM and Budge, JJ. dinenting). 
Rralell· ,.., /rlilt. '1JfJ.IJ.I, .d~dC!(I l1lrte YG$1'$ befo~ ~y. l~oJved tl'.te q':leati~ of 
wl\~ a water rlgb.t:~·ttppurtenant:to the.Jand conveyed~. and if'·aa. to wh-.t extent the right . . .. . . ,. . ' 
wa oonvoy«i 'by a deod lttcJudfog ~'togetlier wit11 appurtenan•A- lti.hl\iilp. The Court held the. 
deed· included oilly "the Wa.ter·rlgh1: apPurtCl'l'.ant 'l~ tho- land o.t th~ .. tim.c of the ~nveyanoe ~l~ 
it wes·specitlcally ~ervcd in. the ~ o' ~t c.~ (?t clearly 1howu dla~ .~t "1••· ~~wn. ~o ~~th 
partl" f:hat.tll• w~~r r .. t:~•' ~~.,tate•~~ to ~ conv~~~ Id~, 20 Jdaha ai ~·9s;: l 18 P~·ai 
502 (cmphuis added)'. Und~ Rus~ell •. pamcs may .preseni; and ·tti~ .. trlal c6Utt·mfiy consider~ ·all . . ' . . . 
facts and clrcum.stances bearlttg on. Uid. i'UimtS~ intent coticeming watot rights when:, a deed 
irioludes general "together wi.th appurtenilrlces" language.. Other .Idaho decisions compo~ w\~ 
this. 
If Emp«y, indeed rcpre.scntcd a ~hange in the law ftoJ'.l1 Rwsell posited by Defendanrs-
counsel •. it took scarcely two months for the Idaho Supreme. ~Utt- to implicitly ov.crrule it. 
Molony v ... Davta,..40 Idaho 443, 233 P. 1000 (1925), ~sued two months•fter Empey,,held a water 
right becomes appu1 tenant to .land when used. on or in. .connection t~th, and passes with the 
realty to which it .is appurtenant unless there is intentkm to .the contrary. Id., 40 ·Idaho 449;:-233 
P .. at 1001.' Likewise, in Bothwell v. Keefer, S3 Idaho ·6S$;. 663., 27 P.2d·6S, 67 .. (1933), which 
analyzed the decisions in Idaho and other western states,. the Court. held "the correct rule 
s Citfna W'Jet, 'fValu Rights 'lit tM 'Wutmt Slota, 3d ed., .. fSS2, p. S89 ( 191 l)(quoted ir(frtu.t: p. J 0); Cooper v. 
$halmo11~'36 Colo. 91 •. 8, P; 175 (1906) • . .. . 
REPLY· RE: Pl:iAil'4TJPF~s MO'TION FOR'SUMMARY JtlOOMoo AND Dl:PEM>i\N't'ts MOTION" T(J sr~nu: ... 8 
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ded.uciblo from an anal~is of the statute& and decisions treatin& of the nature of water rights is 
that.ulal. It af'fltmatl\tei)' appean to the coJlttlry, directly or by lmpUcattou, a. ';\\'a.tel' rigb.t 
ls attached equally with thd land to which it. is. app~~ thouah tho land ~tone:is.,specilied' in 
~writ or·ret\ltn.of~~~ ... (~p~aai,s .. a~ed). 
''.fw{cein recent times the Idaho :Supreme.Court has again. repeated the ho1ding itt Ru1JeU. . . '• . . 
making lt clear ·that mttiinsic ·circUmttari.Cd iniy be .offet«t to thow what the parti~ trt~ 
with ~·to watetlighta when hand ii deed$d.. In J9~ LJ.vutoek"V, Unlt~tJ $~~' 144' Ida~ 
t, JS~ P;~d 5C>2 {2QO'n, t~ .. Court.rei~t~·"(il water·riaht:appu~~i·to·~l pro~ la 
collyoyed ~~ ~~ ~ p~pert~ tn\10$• {Hs·qxprcssty ~ed or the parifes.cleat'I~ ttiwna«t itiat 
tJlo·~nveyance.would'noHno1udttth.o\¥al'et·rlgbt Id., 144 Idaho at 13; J4, U6 P.3d at $14,41.S. 
Se.e 4/30, Bagt1/y v. Tbomoso11; 149 Idaho 799-, 8Q3, 24 J P J.d 972,. 976 (2010) (appurten1mt Wart« 
rlghh pus.with the lat'.ld unl~•·they are express1y m~ in tho deed ,OJ'.· ids :gloarly·sh~-:~· 
the·parties intended. ~at t~ ~tor WOU;ld"reset_"Ve t'.h'"'1);. 
Ali ·~pplicable Idaho decisions other than EIHP<'Y,hotd tharin· tfi~· ab&ence of:an .expre" 
grant or reservation; the parties' intent as .to whether appurtenant Wat~ :rights' would.pau.,tn a 
conveyance is .matter of. evidence .and proof .. The .Idaho rule .specifically oontcrnp~ates sif.uationa 
where a deed contains- •-iogetber with the-appurtenancest' language. SH e.g., Rswe/I; ·supra. 
'The Idaho.rule is consistent.with other western sta:tes. See e.g., Haya v .. Buzard, 77 P. 
423, 426 (Mont. Jg{}4) (wbat-water rlghts:plaifltiff may have acquired under deed conveying land 
together with appurten'ii\\ees to be .determined Jn light of tacts existing .at.the. time, and by parties~ 
subsequent behavior with reference.to the deed up to·~mencement of the.action); Bessemu.v. 
Woolley, 16 i;, 1053, 10S4.(C01o. 1904) (whether deed conveys water ri-ght depends· on grantorrs 
RF.PLY REI· PLf\lNTIFrt+S !\ttmON P01l 8l.JMMA1t:V JUOOMINT AND DEPENDANT'S' MOTION .TO STRIKE.• 9 . ., . . ' 
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intent,& gathered from deed's express terms as to water rights. or when .deed is silent, from 
presu~on. arising from tho.circumstances and Yt!hethcr right is ·inci.den.t to ,and necenary: for the 
beneficial enjoyment of.the. land.). The abov~ holdin&1.are. aumm~ by·~amuel Weil: 
rt it woJ' settled dl~ a water-right ma' pan with ·the land um appurtenance 
th~<>. or at a p&ttel thereof, buf.not net:a1arlly so;· and whether a water-right 
pas.aea 11 an appurtenanee irtvolves tWO question-. viz: .(a) Whether the water-
rlgbt is an &ppurtenanc~, .and (b) whether, being such, it·was intended ·to pass • ~ • 
The water-right ia not necessariJy:appllrtenant to.or p~ of·any land;.and 
w~cr it:it ~ ~ppurtenan~ .or p~I is • q~t~~ ~f. fa~ resting. chi.efly upon 
whether it·wat'used~alJf fift.the l*eflt t)fflic Jtiitd jjtquesflo't1 ••• 
The word 41appurtenancc" does not mean inseparable ..• It depends.on wliac the· 
facta •how ••t tbe partlea to the .1alo meant to do. lt ls a qu~Ot1 Of ~nterttion •. 
ta be d.riWn ftbm.the.aeed; .or, if the.d•ed 11 silent, to be drawn from tile 
sui'rOundlua dr'eamltu.cta. th~ 1c:~ df.tlie partlti·•nd patot evldena 
gene.,.tly. The,·party asserting ·that it was intended io pamrhas the burden. of 
pt'QOf. ·but ·a di.~~n'i .tha~ '1te. watcr-~sht·~ appurtenant~ ~occs~ tl! .tho. 
beneficial enjoyment ortne .land'hu usu'ally. been beld .St;iffsCient'proof of 
i~entiqn to pass it .hi ~ absen~ of an Pip~,.r".l~tion in tho deed, o.- ot'he, 
nfcltn.ce ~ tlla ·e0atraf1. · .. 
Weil. 1upro. at §§; SS()'-~52, pp. S8~S90 (boJded emphasiii'.~ded,:citatfomr omitted). 
~Cl'C't the CC>'1rt:m~t consider the drcum~~ and parties' intent in the sa1c of the 
Oreenhcart Property. inclUdi'ng: whether Plaintiff$' irrigation .. watcr riglitl'W~ U$ed on; jncidettt 
tot.or necessaryfltld S'Pecffioally used for the benefihJ'fthe Orecnheart.Proporty at the .~itne.of 
conveyance; the: 'tenns .of the purchase ·contract and other .transact.i~ documents con:cer;ning· 
whether irrigation water,.or aeces1 to an ·~trigation system would be included; and all actions of 
the.parties·up to the time of and .after.the .conveyance. inclUding Plaintl'ffs' corttiftlled poSHSSton. . . . ' . 
and control ct all wtter·rights, 1'.Dcfendtmtl..several .diStinct representations ·to Elmore County that 
th& ~cart Property: had ·rt.0 water rights or .irrigatioo syst~ 8:nd ~f~dant1a faiJure for tlvc 
years to:notjfy IDW~-01at she ofaimed ownership Of 'Vatef .rJght$ through her d~w.hich 
l.Jvuiock '"• Unllad Statea,:.144 Idaho .. It l'S6'P,3d 502 (2007). . 
1 Aft.ldtvit·~t Jny.Brown in Sttpport .ott(.fotton. tbr Summary .rudgmerit At:125; 
REPLY RES n...\iNTJFF'S M0110N FOR StJMMl\RYJUOOM'lNTAM'J DEit'!Nl>hNT~MQTIOl"fnl'StR.lt<~. to 
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notiflcation was prompted only by Plaintiffs request that. she.confirm to IDWR. that she did not 
purchase.the Grnnh~ Property with water ri.ghta~' Th~. undisputed evidence.clearly sho~·no 
water rights were appurtena1'HO the .Ore.enheart Property ~d none·~n.intended b.Y either.party 
tQ 1?e conveyed. 
·z. Ih•··fltrcbaa.md Salo Aat.Mment'lAm•~ntirma NS> Watet,RiaJ>ll .. WWlld 
be Included iD tho Sale .of1be Clmnhart pmperty. 
Detet:sdant argues that if'th.c Court does look at the surrounding cittUmst'.aticcs and ~-· 
intent ·iil the sale·ti'ansaction, it will find that the purchase and sale agreement .("Purchase and 
Sale Agrecment")9 'indicates water rights were.intended to be conveyed. Defendant points to 
Section 16 of the Agreement, which requires th~. parties. to identify any water: .fi·ghts, .. weU~:watcr 
S)'Stems, etc. "tbat·are .appurt~ant thereto that are now on or used in coMcction with the 
premiSel. ~·and which the parti~ .Jrifencl to be httluded iil the ·$ale. No water rights, wells, water 
sy&t~ms. :Cle. -6·described. The .space provided after the .. semi-Colon 'Vas· left. blank. Defenda{lt 
would bavc .. thc· Court conclude that a· ftdbu:e to fill in .. thia ~tonk so as to ;deseribe any water nabts 
that.the .. parti~ intended ~o bf!·includcd in·thc salc·i~i~es the parties .intended that water rights 
lnl.Y.14 be included in thc.sate~·10 This turns tbc.provlsfon eompletely on it$ head by frifetpreting it 
to .operate to include ·watet dghts ·whether iJ.is completed or not. 11 
~ .. Affida'vtt of Jay Brown in· Support of Motton for Summary Judamcn~ ·1 ,.16-27 .. 
IJ l:!xhlbjt' A: to Grµnlflal'I Af/idavlt :tn Swpport of Motimr for Sullflf'UU')! Jut:f.m.cmt .. 
10 tf 'fh'Ac~ the'cU&. S~tlon 16' dealiq with .W&ter rlghu would have beCn drafted the samo as Section IS dealing 
wl~ll mintrll ri*ht". which statea "Any. and a1r mincn.I rithts which are already included wfth the property wm be 
inchidit.l'in the salc·of this~ ®1•.otherwiao stipUlatod.~. . · 
11 The Defendant has ciffe.red statements Qf Andy Enrico aUcpdly purporting to atato tho legal effect of the· 'form real 
~a:tc ~ontract "aed in ~~·tnauer. Under 1.daf?o la\¥• an opinion .of. an expert th8t.C411s,fo~.a legal .conolu'°*'.J• . .ub.\ 
admisiible. Nakurv: Hackwmth.,.12.7 .Idaho 68..896 P.2d 976 (l90S);,Hawki1t1 "· CJumdlu, d Idaho 20i396.~.2d 
123 .(1964), SH a/.n,-comm•lft·10 l.R..B. 1fH by :R.ttport '1/Jdolto SIQI• ,,,,,. Evl~ Ct,mtttt(tttttt1 C 706, p. 2 (lOBS) 
~If l1'le expert'' oPimon ·ia·purely a 1ogal conchiston or concerns tho law of the~ it is ffledmiaaible •. .DecisiOh'i·Oil 
the J.w ~.not decl8ion.s·that tho jury, tlte t.ot finder, make. The)' a.re for the Juda,e to make in bit (or her} ca\)actt)r 
as Jegi) officer ~ ... "). Aecordingly. P.1aintitr..object.to the consideration of tho aamo .in oonneodon wJth ttie pemdiJ:lB 
summary Judaincm.modons. Sa..,,,,, G• Slat.fl·/M. Co. v.. Hwtch18tm, ti4;'.ldabo l O', I 75 P .3d 172 (2007) (No 
fut mal ntotkm .10 Stl ikc: itt l\ClCl01!."4f1 te tMIB Jetitftftate el9jeetle•l to e ;l'fd111~ etl'-~ WMNP)' j\irillMIM. aft.41 
ob~tion maybe made even as.late·u the bearina·on 11umrt'lary JudamentJ (citins }{«la Mining Co. 11. Siar-Morning 
Mi"'"' Co.,122Jdaho 77~. 782-83t 839 P.2d 119~, t 1'96-97 (1'992)). . .. .. . . .. 
REPLY RE: .PLAl'NTlfF'S·MlJTION FOR SUMM~ .. :v JUOOM~NT·AND'J)EFf'.ND.\Nt.'$ MOTJON TO·STRnc~. u 
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Defendant's argument also misdirects attention from the fact that i~ every imtanoe where 
wat«. watcr.riahts, water shares. ot water S)'ltemJ·were.addreued in·the Purchase and Sal• 
Agreement. the Setler'• Dl1elosute1· or the .. property listing. those sections eith~ .were .~pleted 
with "NIA" ot were left blank.11 Section S·ot·tbc·Purchuo.·and:Sale Apeement.def1ncs "NiA' . , ' ' . . . . 
~ an.abfnviatfon of"noi ·appUcabl•/' ·which "shall be. ev.id.end; .thii.t.th6partiee have 
eofttmrtplati!ld· etwtah'l racsta or eqnditiol\l .and hive detenrd~ such fact• or ccmdition•:do not 
apply'to·lhe a~ertt« tht·trans.aotioti .J;i~n. • ln .. other·w~ hutb p~ have aF,eed that 
aft~ deJ{~~nsideration ~£'the iaaues Q.f waar,, water riahts,. water systema,.etc;,...they have.. . . . . . . . .. . 
det~ined th~ydtd. not ·~J)l?lY to Ute Oracnhcatt·Prcperty. 
tblit·predudes·Dc;fertdant•s .. argnment :that ·she-did :not kn'1w '.thete'Mfalttbo· a :atou.nd 
wator·riil\t with resp¢t tQ~·OntenheartPto.peny, that ~h;o "was n.,~er~n~cxh!Url~S·tl'.l~~o 
that~ Wat.mm.a.~ ~~t~ ~gtlt and that 't WU exglucf~· ~JP ·~f) sal~;~ ot .wflat' she aid 
or did not intend in. her statements. about ••water ·riahts"' to lilmore Cowiy • Opposittott . . .. . . . " . '• 
Mem.orandi.lm aUl•l l'. u Aside &om beittl:PtlChided. by Df)fondant•s agr,oancnt·with Plfti:tltiffs, 
thiS· argutnent..aP.n incotrectly..d88Umes that thero."wu ·an·appurtenant ~ator .right~ It 11$0 
incorrectly assumes that Plaintifti ha4 an:atllrmativo duty to disclose anythi11g conocmlng water . . ' . 
rights beyond ·thof r ~eatcd written disclosures that.no ~ator right& were applicable to .tho sale; 
or beyond.what De~es own inspection .of the property wcmld,havo i'~ealed had she C'\1'.CD 
la 0( ,courM, ~ munol'OUI and COftlialent indicadOD9 in. aJI of \M lnntaotion documcnfa chat water ripts We!O Dm 
~ fn tfto·lale tcbuts Dt~s blrt.-aJlqation at pap 9'.of her OppolitionMOlllOfan<hnn that."the 
P.urchue'and Sale Aareeinent1n1Ull:riPQP.ly a1atod ihat :water 'Mlll part of tho puteha•.". 
u Pefondlftt'l·ibtent ahOuht bcr' detenninod objectively :in liaht of her :worda and aotfons ai. the time of the 
conveyw:o·anc:f hareffom~ cbull' tb4l tax oltuif'.'ca&fon.~fthe:O~ Ptqi~. lO "dry srQ{ttg.~ Ois4tt.1>. 
CddttpClubSpor#i'/~;.llC>litaho·189, 794 .. ·718P.2d 1227, t232.(14'86)(coutfdetennlnedpll'ties"lntemion 
butd Oft olrcumaUH'lCet •·they.-txfatod to conclude whether surrender .of lcasehokl oocurred); Stnl F1m118, lnc. v. 
Croft & Reetl, '/~,.2012:WL24'671, 1 l (Idaho) (court to look to pattios111objectivo inteint"·ia dctermimna.wh~ 
briptlon equ{pmfllt'IMCIMd u Rxture to·h!ttl pl'OP4'rty)~ Por .the same raeoo, tlw ~ llhould dJarcprd 
ae&mdmrt11.,.rtieft that t'flrindffJay 810 .. •t;•m 1 pheM oatl te tw in .aela Nid thlt t.••• .,..,.. •.• •illtall• whM 
he iold mt the ~«ir.righ.t." ·Greenheait.;fj/(tktvlt in Oppo.tition .Jo 'Summa,., Judgnrcmi.ai:, 10. Plahttim 
df.~181""'.th~Uuch ~ IJt~ "Nftl tmkie! or t"-t it \Wfe made, that it waa an ae¢ufllt0. IUltomont ott'acfl Ot law. 
llKPLY.:a1: Pl:AIN111'pl8·MOMON ;oa·strMMARY JUDGM&Jin' AND n1n~o~SMOTJOl'4'.toSTRIKE."12 
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visited the property b.efore purchuing.it-.. n.amely that no water was, used on, or was capable of 
being delivered to. the Oreenheart Property. Defendant never saw the Oreenheart .property 
before.she purchased it. even though Socti~n 6 of. the P~ and: Sate A:areement. stated. 
~~spi~u~{y that'. 
avv1ais STRONGLY ADYISID'TO INVEST.IGATB TIUt'CONDmON 
AND'SVITABJLITY or ALL ASPECTS or TliE PROPERTY AND ALL 
.MATTERS Al'FICTJNG THi v ALUE .oa J)ESJRABll,,TY·OI' THE 
PROPUTY INcLVDING BUT.NOT L•Mltm:To; THE· FOLLOWING: 
.... •. (E) .UTILITIES~ IMPROVSM~ ~ cm.tER ata~. SELLER 
tepte!ients.tbat the j>roperty·does liave tlicHbllOwingjrtfttti• Jmpnivanenu, 
service. wt Qtbs d·llm a\tai1ablo (dcacribe availability): NIA. .. (underlined 
emph4)is :added).' · · · · · ·· · 
3. Defendant is B!llD;Sl By.J!ltollpel. Waiyw·and.I.tachel'!mm Aumina Qlvnenhip of the 
SW2tm Yf stqr RIJJh{l.;liQ»:. 
Plaittti:tn ineorpora.tc:hctein and re~ the argµmonts sc~ forth ~ their .M~tn,o~"4u~ In 
Suppo.r:t Qf ~m~1:Y...ft1t/gmen.t prey{f!.U~.Y ft~~ ·with th.e.Cou!1· oonccming ·the ·aP,Plicabilit~ of 
0$ppel, .w:atver and lac~es ·~ ·oar Defendant•s rcccnt1y· assertirig mtitteaf Jn tho '®jeot water· 
rights. 
Plliimifftw6uld notha\tti.sold th~:Greenheart PropcrtY'to: .. Dcfcnd.ant iftta'O.y ~~~ 
that.despite.the disc1osures1.n the Purchase and Sate.Agreement and otlier transaction documents 
• t .. • • .. 
that no water.· or water rights were included ·in the sale·of sixty aCJ'CI of dry, desert l&'itdi, 
Defendant would assert owner&bip of P.laintiffs'·wa:te:rrights. Or presumably they would haye 
demanded a.higher purchase price.. Bither way~ thoy.baye·been sorely prejudiced by·the 
Defendant's .attempt to .reap a. windfal~ now. In.the meantime, they have remained in. possession 
and controf .of their water rights, and taken all legally required actions to maintain their benetlclal . . 
use on ~cir land·and·protect the unused .portions ftom.potcntial forfeiture by maintaining them in 
the Idaho Water RC$0Ut'ces Board Water Ban.le. 
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CONCLUSION 
The undisputed relevant facts clearly show that no water rights were appurtenant to the 
Otwnheart Property at the time of conveyance. that Plaintiffs understood that water riaht• were 
not inQludod in the we, and that Defendant understood she would not be getting water rights. 
Based on the undisputed facts and appUcabJe law as aet forth herein, and in Plaintiffs• Motion f'ot 
Summary Judgment and supportins briefa and affidavits. summary judgment should be granted 
to PlaintiftS es requested. 
Dcfondent•s Motion to Strike should be denied ae it is based solely on the holding in 
binpq, which holding 11 inCQnsietent with and implicitly overruled by all prior and subsequent 
14aho cases deciding the issue. As noted in Plaintiffs' initial Memorandum. In Support of 
Summary Judgment, thf s Court whon servin.g as it does here as the finder of flot has discretion to 
resolve competina inferences on summary judgment. The overwhelming weight of the ovidenc~ 
on these crou-.motions for summary judgment would CftUSc any reasonable person to conclude 
that no intent was present to transfer these water rights. 
RBSPECTFULL V SUBMl'ITBD tbia 3 J st day of December, 2012. 
OIVBNS PURSLEY u.P 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON-
BROWN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
AUGUSTA SA YOKO MIMOTO 
GREENHEART, an individual, 
Defendant. 
APPEARANCES: 
Michael Creamer for the Plaintiffs 
Victor Villegas for the Defendant 
Case No. CV-2012-353 
ORDER DENYING SUMMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON COUNT I AND 
GRANTING IN PART SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT ON 
COUNT II 
The Court heard arguments on cross motions for summary judgment on January 7, 2013. 
This case arises out of a dispute of whether a deed for the conveyance of land executed by 
Plaintiffs Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown (hereinafter "Plaintiffs") in favor of 
Defendant Greenheart (hereinafter "Greenheart") operated to convey the water rights appurtenant 
to the described land at the time of the conveyance. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On or about February 5, 1988, Plaintiff Jay Brown acquired approximately 320 acres of 
land in Elmore County. 1 As part of the Snake River Basin Adjudication (hereinafter "SRBA''), 
1 Verified Complaint, filed 4/3/2012, Ex. A. 
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the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho decreed Plaintiff Jay Brown 
water rights 61-2188 and 61-7151 on or about October 26, 2000.2 The decreed water rights were 
limited to the irrigation of a total of 287 acres in a single irrigation season, which water rights 
were also limited to being used on the combined total 320 acre parcel owned by Brown. 
The Complaint alleges neither of the water rights has been used to irrigate any portion of 
the property to become known as the "Greenheart property" since at least 1986. 3 Idaho Code § 
42-223, Exceptions or defenses to forfeiture, was added to the Idaho Code in 2000. On August 
28, 2003, Brown applied to lease 160 acres of the total 287 acres of water rights to the water 
supply bank, those rights were idled in that manner, and the lease continued until the filing of the 
Complaint. 4 The Plaintiffs allege the idled rights include the land subsequently known as the 
"Oreenheart property'' which the Plaintiffs allege had been "dry land" with no irrigation system 
for at least 20 years before the purchase by Greenheart.' 
On January 29, 2007, Plaintiffs executed a warranty deed which conveyed 60 acres of the 
original 320 acre parcel from Plaintiffs to Greenheart.6 Significantly, the deed contained a clause 
purporting to convey the land with its appurtenances. 7 It is also undisputed that the deed was 
executed in fulfillment of a real estate contract which was executed prior to the conveyance. 8 
About five months later, Greenheart made a series of representations and caused Plaintiff Jay 
Brown to make representations to Elmore County that the conveyed property was dry grazing 
land without water rights. 9 Some of these representations were made to the Elmore County 
Board of Equalization in an attempt to reclassify the conveyed land as dry grazing land, which 
had the effect of reducing Greenheart's tax burden.1° 
It is undisputed that Greenheart never attempted to apply any water to the land by any 
method or file any paperwork with any government agency regarding the allegedly conveyed 
water rights from the conveyance until early 2012. In February 2012, Greenheart received a 
2 Id, Ex. B-C. Exhibit Bis.water right 61-2188 allowing irrigation on 164 acres within the place of use described 
as T04S ROSE 824 with 320 acres total; Exhibit C is water right 61-7151 allowing irrigation on 123 acres within the 
r•ace of use described in the same manner as water right 61-2188. 
Complaint, ,15, Brown Aff., 12. 
4 Complaint, ,16, Brown Aff., 13. 
5 Brown Aff. ft 15-17. 
6 Greenheart Aff. (11/1612012), Ex. B. 
7 /dComplaint, Ex. D. 
8 Complaint, Ex. A. 
9 Complaint, Exs. F-1. 
10 JJ..; lix& i H Qyhjhjg H, the mip11tes, reflects the chjef appraiser stated an adj11ghpept had been made "h•ck to 
dry grazing ... " so it is unclear whether the property was assessed as dry grazing before the sale to Greenheart. 
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phone call from Plaintiff Jay Brown regarding the ground water right allegedly appurtenant to 
the conveyed land. 11 Several days after the call, on February 17, 2012, Greenheart filed with the 
Idaho Department of Water Resources (hereinafter "IDWR") attempting to change the ownership 
of the water rights into Greenheart's name because they were still listed as owned by Plaintiff 
Jay Brown. 12 
Shortly thereafter, Plaintiffs filed this quiet title action against Greenheart based on 
theories of contract interpretation and estoppel, seeking to quiet title to the water rights which 
Greenheart now asserts were conveyed to her by the warranty deed and which are the subject of 
the paperwork she filed with the state. 13 Greenheart answered without filing any counterclaims. 14 
Greenheart moved for summary judgment asserting that Plaintiffs' quiet title action is barred by 
the applicable statute of limitations.15 Plaintiffs then moved for summary judgment on their quiet_ 
title action. 16 Greenheart opposed Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, arguing the quiet title 
action fails as a matter of law. 17 Plaintiffs opposed Greenheart's motion for summary judgment, 
arguing the quiet title action was brought within the applicable statute of limitations, if any.18 
Both Plaintiffs and Greenheart filed reply memoranda in support of their motions.19 
These motions came before the Court for oral argument on January 7, 2013. Regarding 
Plaintiffs' motion, the Court considered the Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting 
memorandum, the Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Defendant's Statement of Material Facts in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment, the 
Reply in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, and the affidavits of Jay B. 
Brown, Terri LaRae Manduca, Thomas E. Dvorak, Augusta Sayoko Mimoto Greenheart 
(12/21/2012), and Kenneth Brush. Regarding Greenheart's motion, the Court considered 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting memorandum, Defendant's 
11 Greenheart Atf. (12/2112012), t 10; Brown Atf., ,,25-26. 
12 Brown Atf.,,, 25-29; Verified Complaint,,, 21-23, Ex. J-L; Answer, filed 5/9/2012, ,, 21-23. 
13 See generally Verified Complaint. 
14 See generally Answer. 
ts Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 11/15/2012; Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment (Greenheart's Memo. in Supp. Sum. J.), tiled 11115/2012. 
16 Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 12/10/2012; Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Plaintiffs' Memo. in Supp. Sum. J.), filed 12/1012012. 
17 Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Greenheart's Memo. in Opp. to 
Plaintiffs' Mot. Sum. J.), filed 1212lt2012. 
18 Memorandum in Opposition w Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Plaintiffs' Memo. in Opp. to 
Greenheart's Mot. Sum. J.}, filed 1212412012. 
19 Repl;i jn Suppgrt of Defendapt's Mption for Symmazy Judament (Greenhean's Reply MemO.). filed 12128/2012; 
Reply in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Plaintiffs' Reply Memo.}, filed 12/31/2012. 
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Statement of Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, the Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Reply in Support of Defendant's 




Summary judgment is an appropriate remedy if the nonmoving party's "pleadings, 
affidavits, and discovery docwnents ... , read in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 131 Idaho 473, 476, 50 P.3d 488, 491 (2002) 
(quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c)). In cases such as this where cross-motions for summary judgment are 
filed in a case that will be tried by the judge instead of the jury, special summary judgment 
considerations apply. The Idaho Supreme Court summarized as follows: 
The fact that both parties file motions for summary judgment does not necessarily 
mean that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Moreover, the filing of 
cross-motions for summary judgment does not transform the court, sitting to hear 
a summary judgment motion, into the trier before the court without a jury, 
however, the court may, in ruling on the motions for summary judgment, draw 
probable inferences arising from the undisputed evidentiary facts. Drawing 
probable inferences under such circwnstances is permissible since the court, as 
the trier o:( fact, would be responsible for resolving conflicting inferences at trial. 
Conflicting evidentiary facts, however, must still be viewed in favor of the 
nonmoving party. 
Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 117, 123-124, 206 
P.3d 481, 487-488 (2009). 
The moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact, and then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with sufficient 
evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. Id When the nonmoving party bears the 
burden of proving an element at trial, the moving party may establish a lack of genuine issue of 
material fact by establishing the lack of evidence supporting the element. See Sanders v. Kuna 
Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (1994). "Such an absence of evidence 
may be established either by an atlirmative showing with the moving party's own evidence or by 
a review of all the nonmoving party's evidence and the contention that such proof of an element 
is lacking." Id. at fn. 2. The nonmoving party "is not required to present evidence on every 
etemem or his or lter case at tltat ct111e, bat tadrer 111ust esl'dblish a ge11ai11e issue of 111ai:e1ial :fuct 
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regarding the element or elements challenged by the moving party's motion." Thomson v. Idaho 
Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 530, 887 P.2d 1034, 1037 (1994). A party opposing a motion 
for summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's 
pleadings, but the party's response . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial." l.R.C.P. 56(e). Such evidence may consist of affidavits or depositions, 
but ''the Court will consider only that material . . . which is based upon personal knowledge and 
which would be admissible at trial." Harris v. State, Dep '1 of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 
297-98, 847 P.2d 1156, 1158-59 (1992). If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material 
fact, then only a question of law remains on which the court may then enter summary judgment 
as a matter of law. Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 138 Idaho 443, 445, 65 P.3d 184, 186 
(2003). 
ANALYSIS 
Motion to Strike 
Greenheart moves to strike specifically enumerated paragraphs of the affidavits of Jay B. 
Brown and Terri Larae Manduca as wetl as the exhibits attached to the affidavits pursuant to 
Rule 12(t) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.20 Rule 12(t) gives the Court discretion to strike 
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matters from pleadings. I.R.C.P. 12(f); James 
v. i\Jercea, 152 Idaho 914, 277 P.3d 361, 364 (2012). ''An affidavit is not a pleading and, [t]hus, 
by the plain terms [of] Rule 12(t), the rule cannot be use [sic] to strike an affidavit." Utley v. 
Continental Divide Ou~fitters, 2009 WL 631465, *2 (D. Idaho 2009) (interpreting the analogous 
federal rule of civil procedure). Thus, the motion is not properly before the Court under Rule 
12(t). However, since Greenheart's memorandum asks this Court to make a legal determination 
that the parol evidence rule bars certain extrinsic evidence from being considered, the Court 
considers the substance of the motion as an objection to the adrn.issibility of certain evidence and 
addresses the admissibility in the opinion below. Zl The Court DENIES the motion to strike. 
20 Qefegdan''a Mption tg Strike Portions of Affidavit of la¥ B Browna and , .. erci ( aRae Mand11ca filed 12/21/12 
21 See generally Greenheart's Memo. in Supp. Strike. 




Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment 
I. Counts I and II - Quiet Title Based on Contract Interpretation or Estoppel. 
Plaintiffs seek to quiet title to the t\vo disputed water rights, 61-2188 and 61-7151.22 
Plaintiffs' quiet title action is based on two separate theories: (1) contract interpretation and (2) 
estoppel.23 Greenheart contends the quiet title action is barred by the applicable statute of 
limitation. Even if the action is not barred by the Matute of limitation, Greenheart argues 
Plaintiffs' action fails under bvth alkged tlu .. -ories on other growids. 
a. Whether Plaintiffs' quiet title action is barred by the applicable statute of 
limitation. 
The parties dispute at length which statute of limitation applies to the facts of this case. 
Greenheart asserts either the statute of limitation found in Idaho Code §§ 5-216 (5 years for 
contract actions) ot 5-224 (4 year catch-all) applies.24 Plaintiffs assert either there is no 
applicable statute of limitation, or, if any, it is found in Idaho Code § 5-203 {20 years).2' The 
Court's query begins \;vith when a cause of action accrued in this matter. 
'"(U]nder Idaho law, a cause of action generally accrues, and the statute of limitation 
begins to run, when a parcy may maintain a lawsuit against ru1other." Western Corp. v. Vanek, 
144 Idaho 150, 151, 158 P.3d 313, 314 (Ct. App. 2006). Actior.s to quiet •itle, such as this one, 
"may be brought by any person against another who claims an estate or interest in real or 
personal property adverse to him, for the purpose of detennining such adverse claim." l.C. § 6-
401. Real property includes water rights. LC.§ 55-101(1). 
Here, Greenherut argues that ?1aintiffs" quiet title action accrued on January 29, 2007, the 
day the deed allegedly transferring the water rights was executed.26 Greenhea..-t reasons the plain 
language of the deed transfoned the water rights, so Plaintiffs could ha·•e filed to quiet title the 
very next day to seek to undo the transfer. Plaintiffs contend their quiet title action fits squarely 
within Idaho Code § 6-401, and the plain language of that section indicates a quiet title action 
accrues at the time an adverse claim is made and no such claim was made w1til February 17, 
2012, when GceerJ1eart filed with the IDWR attempting to change the ovrnership of the water 
22 Verified Complaint, ~er 25-J4. 
23 Id 
24 Greenheart's Memo. in Supp., p. 2. 
25 p!aintiffi;, Memo ip Opp to Greenheart's Mot Sum I p 2 
26 Greenheart Memo. in St~pp. Sa:n. J., pp. ?-4; Gn::crheart Aff". (11/16 12012), Ex. B. 
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rights. 27 Applying the plain language of Idaho Code § 6-40 l, the applicable statute of limitation 
did not begin to run until Greenheart asserted an adverse claim against the water rights by filing 
with IDWR. There is no evidence in the record that Greenheart made any claims in any form or 
degree to any alleged water rights for the land she purchased from January 29, 2007 until 
February 17, 2012. So, filing with the IDWR was the first instance that Greenheart asserted any 
ownership in the water rights advers~ to Plaintiffs. Therefore, this quiet title action filed on April 
5, 2012 is well within all of the statutes of limitation asserted by the paliies. 
b. Whether the disputed water rights were conveyed to Greenheart. 
In actions regarding the interpretation of a deed and its associated real estate contract, if 
any, the Idaho Supreme Cowt summarized in Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence the 
applicable law as follows: 
Under the doctrine of merger, any recitals in the real esta-.:e contract were merged 
into the deed. When a deed is delivered and accepted as performance of the 
contract to convey, the contract is merged in the deed. Though the terms of the 
deed may vary from those contained in the contract, tne deed alone must be 
Jooked to determine the rights of the parties. 
143 Idaho 704, 710, 152 P.3d 575, 581 (2007).28 
The parties signed a real estate contract prior to the conveyance of the deed. 29 Thereafter, 
the parties executed a warranty deed to convey the subject property from Plaintiffs to 
Greenheart. 30 Thus, in the absence of fraud or mistake, the Court must look to the deed to 
determine whether water rights were conveyed to Greenheart if the language of the deed is 
unambiguous. The language of the deed is undisputed. The deed conveys the subject property 
from the Plaimiffs to Greenheart using the following recital: 
27 Plaintiffs' Memo. in Opp. to Greenheart's Mot Sum. J., pp. 7-8; Brown Aff, if~ 25-29; Verified Complaint, !ft 
21-23, Ex. J-L; Answer, !ft 21-23. 
21 See also Jolley v. Idaho Securities, Inc., 90 Idaho 373, 382, 414 P.2d 879, 884 (1966) ("the acceptance of a deed 
to premises generally is considered as a merger of the agreements of an antecedent contract into the terms of the 
deed, and any claim for relief must be based on the covenants or agreements contained in the deed, not the 
covenants or agreements as contained in the prior agreement") (emphasis added). 
29 Greenheart A ff ( J t /I 6120 12), Ex A 
30 Id, Ex. B. 




TO HA VE AND TO HOLD said premises, with their appurtenances unto the said 
Grantee and to the Grantee's heirs and assigns forever. And the said Grantor does 
hereby covenant to and with the said Grantee, that the Grantor is the owner in fee 
simple of said premises; that they are free from all encumbrances except as 
described above and that Grantor will warrant and defend the same from all 
lawful claims whatsoever. 
(emphasis added). The only encumbrances described earlier in the deed are "Subject to: Taxes, 
easements and restrictions of record." 
Greenheart contends the phrase "with their appurtenances,, is unambiguous as a matter of 
law, and thus this Court must look to the terms of the deed and not extrinsic evidence to 
determine whether the parties intended to convey water rights with the land. 31 Plaintiffs contend 
this phrase is basically per se treated by Idaho co\ll'ts as ambiguous, then requiring this Court to 
examine all extrinsic evidence to determine whether the parties actually intended to convey 
water rights with the conveyance of land.32 Plaintiffs attack the Idaho Supreme Court's holding 
in Empey and rely on several other Idaho cases in their reply. Plaintiffs assert that, regardless of 
the use of the words "together with appurtenances" in a deed, the question of conveyance of 
water rights depends on whether they are expressly treated in the deed, or if not, then on the 
parties' intent based on circumstances at the time of the conveyance. The Court considers 
Plaintiffs' cited authorities below. 
First, the following three cases cited by Plaintiffs do not address facts wherein a deed 
contained language conveying apputieaances: Botlmeli i;. Keejer; 33 Joyce Livestock Co. v. 
U.S.,34 and Bagley v. Thomason. 35 Alfaough these cases address using extrinsic evidence to 
detem1ine the intem of the pruties, it was under circumstances where ·there was absolutely no 
indication in the cii.!ed of such intent, including no appurtenance clause, so these cases do not 
address the issue before this Court. 
-------·---
31 Greenheart's Memo. in Opp. to Plainnffs' Mot. Sum. J., pp. 4-6. 
32 Plaintiffs' Memo. in ~ .. 1pp. Sum J .. p. !3. 
3353 Idaho 658, 27 P.2d 65, 67 (1933), holding water rights "pass with the land though not mentioned as such or as 
afpurtenances[,] ... unless it affirmatively appears to the contrary, directly or by implication." 
3 144 Idaho I, 14, 156 P.3d 502, 515 (2007), holding "[u]nless they are expressly reserved in the deed or it is 
clearly shown that the parties intended that the grantor would reserve them, appurtenant water rights pass with the 
lagd 9"111 fhp1igh they are p9t mentioned in the deed and the deed does ngt mentigp 'appurtenances" 
3
' 149 Idaho 799, 803, 241 P.3d 972, 976 (20 l 0), citing Joyce, supra, but construing the term "bare land." 
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Second, two additional cases are the subject of great disagreement: Russell v. lrish36 and 
Koon v. Empey.37 Uoth cases involve the conveyance of land by written deed from one party to 
another, which deeds did not expressly reserve or convey water rights except by use of an 
appurtenance clause. The court in both cases looked to the intent of the parties to determine 
whether water rights were conveyed in the land deed because of the presence of an appurtenance 
clause. Thus, Irish anJ Empey agree that the intent of the parties cor.trols. Ho\.vever, Irish and 
Empey appear to c0r.l1ict 1.m which evidence can be used to establish that iment under facts 
similar to this 1.:as~. 
The co mt in Irish used extrinsic evidence to determi11e the intent of the parties regarding 
whether a deed with an appurtenance clause conveys appurtenant water tights. The court 
reasoned such a "conveyance would carry with lt the water right appwtenant to the land at the 
time of the conveyanc-e, unless it was specifically reserved in the deed or it could be clearly 
shown that ii was known to both parties that the water right was not intended to be conveyed." 
Irish, 118 P. at 502 (emphasis added). 
However, U1irteen years later, .:he court in Empey consioered a set of facts very similar to 
those addre~scd in lnsh, but .readied a different conclusion. Spccificaliy, the court in Empey held 
it was error for a district cowt to consider extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties 
when a deed wit.ii an appurtenance clause conveys appurtenant water righi:s because the 
appurtenant clause was plain and unambiguous as a matter of law. In Empey, the court held: 
It is an elementary rule for the consuuction of de.eds, the language of which is 
plain <"ml urmnhigurms, that, in the ahsent·e l~f fraud or mistC'ke, the 
intention of the parties must be ascertained from the instrument itself. Parol 
evidence is not admissible for such pu.cpose. It is where the language of a deed is 
ambiguo11s that the intent of the parties may 1Je ascert:t.ined from the 
surrounding circumstances. 
[I]n tht> abs~:-ice of any re::1~rvation to the contni.ry, a C•:!Cd to land effects a tnmsfer 
of such \Vat~r and w::lter rjghts as are appurtenant tn the lard when the r.onveyance 
is made, where the deed contains the U'mal "appurtenance" clause. 
Id at 1090-J 099 (citations omitted)(empha3is added). Based on this hw. the court concluded 
"[t]he language of the deeds is plain and unambiguous. From the deeds the intent of the grantor 
37 40 Idaho 6, 23. P. l0~'7t I J?~j. 
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to convey the lands, together with the appurtenances, plainly appears. There was no allegation of 
fraud or mistake in the execution of the deeds, and no fraud or mistake is claimed." Id. at 1098. 
Thus, the main conflict between Irish and Empey is why the court determined in Empey 
that an appurtenance clause by itself was unambiguous as a matter of law and thus the court did 
not consider extrinsic evidence, while the court in Irish did not address the issue of whether the 
appurtenance clause was ambiguous and instead considered extrinsic evidence. Additionally, the 
Empey decision clearl)' exce:pted from its holding cases lhut involv.;d fraud or mistake. While 
this deed appears unambiguous or. its face, the matt.ers prc~entcJ by both sides in support of the 
motions for :.urnmury judgment raise the issue of whether there was a mistake which is a 
question of fact thut pr~cludes sununary judgment. 
The pleauings in this CJ.Se and evidence submiti:ea m support of the motion for summary 
judgment raise the issue uf mistake which would pem1u. extrinsic evidence to be considered. 
Collins v. Parkinson, 96 Idaho 294, 527 P.2d 1252 (1974). Therefore, this Court finds there is a 
material issue of fact related to whether there was a mistake in the deed and whether the court 
may consider extnnsic evidence for that purpose. None of the cases cited by the Plaintiffs or 
Defendant address ::he issu.e m:' rnistat<.c in the.! deed as a precursor before the determination that 
there is no ambiguity. 1 his court denies summary judgment for either party since the issue 
of whether a mu.tual mistake in the deed exists is a factual i&sut that moves this case out of 
the realm of the Empi!y de\!ision. 
However, aosent a 3howing of mutual mistake of both parties by "clear and satisfactory 
evidence" al tnat (id.), the Coun, since it is the nier of fact in ~his case, will address the law 
related to th~ conveyance if th~ P laiutiiis caru1ot meet their burden m:' pruvf of a miscak.e. 




Pursuant to Empey, if mistake is not proven by competent evidence, the Court cannot further 
consider pre-conveyance extrinsic evidence as to the water rights.38 The contract was merged 
with the deed and can no longer be considered. The clear appurtenance language in this deed 
indicates the intent was to convey the water rights appurtenant to the land conveyed and the deed 
did not purport to reserve any water rights to the contrary. 
Having a<l<lresse'1 the intent to convey appurtenant water rights, if the Plaintiff does not 
meet its burden of proof showing mistake, the Court mu.:;t next <letemune what water rights, if 
any, were appmtenwrt t0 the lmd at the time of the conveyance. In Idaho, title 42 chapter 14 of 
the Idaho Code sets forth the statuto1y provisions relevant to the adjudication and decree of water 
rights. Idaho Code 42-1402 reads in pc.~1tincnt part: 
The right confirmed by such decree or allotment shall be appu..ienant to and shall 
become a part of the land on which the water is use<l, and such right will pass with 
the conveyance of such land, and such decree shall describe the land to which 
such water snan become so appurtenant. 
Also, Idaho Code 42-220 reads in pertinent part "all rights to water confirmed under the 
provisions of this chapter, or by any decree of court, shall become appurtenant to, and shall pass 
with a conveyance of, the land for which ~he right of use is granted." (empha')is added). 
The Idaho Supreme Court, addressing facts similar to those of this case, heid that water 
rights decreed on land were appurtenant thereto in Crow v. Carlson. 39 Specifically, in Crow, a 
water right's adjudication (the Rexburg decree) granted a water right fot two parcels of land 
owned by a single person at the time of the decree. The two parcels of iand totaled 240 acres -
one of I60 a1:rc~ and th; other 80 acres where -L-ie water rights w.~re ne\'t;r used. Regarding the 
appurtenance or· the water right, Uie Idaho Supreme Comt concluded the decreed water right was 
38 This analysis and '"esult ?.''>o co'.1forms with modem recitations oftre general mle regrr~ing interprP-ting deeds 
such as is found in Benninga v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486, 489, 129 P.3d 1235, 1238 (2006). 
The legal effect of an unambiguous written document must be decided by the trial court as a 
questbr; •)t' ':!w. !I h1:\\t'"~r. t::e in~trum1::.:1 of con~e}am:t. is u~r.btguou.;, nll.erprtt.ition of the 
instrument is a '!latter of fact for the trier of fact. In interpreting and construing deeds of 
conveyance, the primary goal is to seek and give effect to the real intention of the parties. If the 
language of a deed is plain l!Ild uncmbiguous, the intention of th(' parties must be a..«certained from 
the deed itself and extrinsic evidence is not admissible. Uncertainties should be treated as 
.1mbigu;::u; St.id. ~1nbi6u;tit.:> arn ;,u!Jjec: to <ie dt:ared l•i'.' by (':!So<t lu ~;-.e i1:tt::'tk·1 ,y/ the ,Ja;iies 
as gathered from the deed, from the circumstcrnces aLtendmg and leading up to its execution, from 
lb@ 1 ubj·>ct mq"°'<' •r4 'l?C trqn"' r(;i• sjtn3tit)p qfth.~ p•jttjes qt i\Jf• tj1ne 
39 109 Idaho 46 i. 690 P 2d 916 (i 984). 




appurtenant to the .:ntirl.;'. 240 acn::s, n0t just the 160 acre parcel where the right had been used.40 
The court reasoneJ the Rexburg decree was "conclusive proof of diversion of the water, and of 
application of the water to b'!neficial use [on the entire 240 acre parcel], i.e., the decree is res 
judicata as to the V'.ater rights at issue herein."41 The court then quoted Idaho Code§ 42-220 and 
held that such appurtenant water rights pass with the conveyance of the land to which they are 
appurtenant. ld. at 466, 690 P .2.d at 921. Based on the foregoing, the court appropriateJ the water 
right for both pa:rcds. ld. 
App'iyin~ tht: ;.;t~tUh!S J.nd Ctuw tu the facts vf this case, it is u.idisputed that prior to 
the conveyance of land from Plaintiffs to Greenheart, Plaintiffs owned a pa.reel with a combined 
total of 320 acrcs.12 It.:; also un<lispLted that, as part of the SRdA., the District Coui-t of the Fifth 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho decfced Plaintiff fay Brown water rights 61·2188 and 61-
7151 on or aoout Uctober 26, 2000.4'.l The decreed water rights were limited to the irrigation of a 
total of 28 ;· acr.::s in a single irrigation season and '(hese vvai:er rights were also limited to being 
used on the combined tuta1 320 acre parcel.14 Pursuant to the authority above, the effect of the 
water rights decrees at issue was to make the water rights appwtenant to the combined total 320 
acre parcel. ·r has, vvt"1en 00 ac.res of the combined :.no a1.:res were conveyeu. from Plaintiffs to 
Greenheart, the water rights v.hich were appurtenant to the 60 acres were also cvnveyed.45 Like 
40 Id at 465--466, •S9'.i P.2C: al 92U-92 I. 
41 Id at 465, 690 P.2d 'lt 920. Plaintiffs argued int.his case that "SRBA partial decrees confirm the existence, nature 
and extent of water rights only a.:; of ttie date tlu: par;,al decree is issued, which in mis case was seven years before 
Defendant µ11rch?.sed t}J.;; 60 .icrt> . .; of Jes~rt !·:ind." Plain~iffs' Reply Memc·, p. 6. Plaintiffs SL pport this argument by 
citing to American Falls Reserv. Dist. No. 2 v. iDWR, 143 Idaho 862, 877, 154 P.3d 433, 44 7 (2007) for the 
proposition tha• "[a~ partial <!i:ere·~ is not roncl11si1,.e C'S to MY post-;c,djud.~r,tion circ1;1mta11ces or unauthori.~ed 
changes in its elements." Plaintiffs however leave out the context of this conclusion. Specifically, the conclusion in 
American Falls regarae<l me J1n:ctol's aoility ''to, in e!.sence, 1e-adjudic.1te water rights by conducting a complete 
re-evaluation of the sccpe an<i efficiencies of a decreed water right in conjunction with a delivery t·all." ld Here, 
there is no re-auJUuicalio11 ai issue. Further, Plaintiffs also cite Idaho Code§ 42-101 and seveml Idaho cases which 
Plaintiffs argue ~tand f,;r the rnlc t'.ia! wh.:.:thc;· a wat1:r right is an appur,cri<llK.: h) ~und hir·g . .:~; 1m whether it is a 
necessary incident ot: <Jml bcne:i:iall:r u::,ed in connec1ioH with, the land. Pl&mtifrs' i:lepl~ Memo., pp. 3-7. The 
Court note~ ti1i:!L, J1111k<! {Jr;'1, ,",nt 01' Fl:J.r .• if'!~;' at;Lil•Jritics <-ti.dress ,,akr r:i,.;hu dt:c:r1;._J a~ j!-:JI'; ufaa :t4iu.dication. 
The court in Cm,~ mal • .-:s dear. th;; adjudic<~tion ilseif rnak•.!S ihe determ inat;ou 0f v. hat water is !Jeneticially used on 
land for t11e put P·~.,es '·" "J.JtHii""'in~ wut;r :igltb L.1 tlli<t ii;nd, and ld1J10 ~utr-t~ tl.ereiti,...:1 <J;\:t:pt the decreed water 
rights as condusi\t plth1f f!i'be1w1k1al u~t:. 
42 Verified Complau1t, Ex. A. 
43 Id, Ex. B-C. 
44 Id 
4' The Coinplamt ;;(\ ;r'. tht aJ1uuk.n,·J v.ak: r1,5hts 1\'t:fl' !IC\ el used or· .. ti,· 0:1reeni1,;:ifi prupi;:r,y. rhe Court has 
considered the iss.1e 01 f, '''"~ i ... rt: (•f the rights a tier 1iv.: ye<tr3 'Jf nnr-·1se. lfowcvcr, id:iho (ode § 41-223(5) was 
enacted after lh<. v,i:!:!i ~.£; «l~i Ver-! d..lJllUlC«•i.!d "Ile. i1~i:,r.: 1;1c suit" vf t ·,._; ;:,;,)~tny l.d l,1,:u.J1td1't llai :;£.'!lute 
provides a tY:Jter npht ') :1q l,,,t \t( f.'1ff:);trq h:,, ti1ilqre YO r1:,en aru~1 apr,\·y '>YtHtjl >ynj\; tbs; Vlal&(C rlvht i5 placed in gr 
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the court in Crow, :his Court will not re-litigate tnose issues, including the use of the water rights 
to the land \vhich are conclusively proved by the decrees issued as part of the SRBA. Therefore, 
if no mistake i~ shown at trial by the Plaintiffs, the Court wilt go ahead and analyze at summary 
judgment the law related to the apportionment of the water rights decreed on the combined total 
320 acre parcel was convey·~d with the 60 acr·~ parcel. 
111e Idaho ~)uprrnK· Court addrcs.5cd this issue in Crow. holding ''Lal div-islon of a tract of 
land to which wat..: r is appurtenant, without segregating or :ic.serving the water light, works a 
division of suc:1 wul.\.!i r.gi.1t ~.1 prop0rtio11 us the land is divided.'' 109 Idaho at 467, 690 P.2d at 
923. Since the water rigi.·1ts .vere not scgre.gatcd or t;;;.;erved. before the saie, the court must 
apportion ih(; wa(~I rights. Here:, .:h..:. 60 acre pared is 18.75 percent of the 320 acre parcel. It is 
undisputed the decrcc<l wa:er iiglus a.rt: for 2~7 acres of fo~ c0mbin.:u total 320 acre3, with water 
right 61-2188 aHO\ving irrigatio~1 on 164 acres within lhe total 320 acres uescribed, and water 
right 61-7151 allovving irrigation ·::.in 12.3 acr~s within the total 320 acres. Apportioning 18.75 
percent to the total decree.:.; 'Water rights of 2~7 acres yields \Vould yiela a total conveyed -water 
right of 53.8125 aaes as the propomoned. 5hare for the Oreen1.1eart propcrty. 40 Therefore, unless 
Greenhean is otl1cN.1se barred rrorn a5serting her tights. 5he received 53.8125 acres of water 
rights with the conveyance of land. 
c:. \Yhether Grecnheart is otherwis~ barred from asserting any dghts to the 
«<Jm·eyecl vnth'r r\,i,ht. 
Plai'1ti:ffs a~.sert th~1t Gr.':en11emt ;s estoopt.>d or otl:e1wi~ie b:irred from .:s.:;erting aDy rights 
to the convr.'cd ·' J!cr r'ight h<1st'd on th~ th.::or1cs of (tlKi:;i-e.,toppd, :ql'i!ahlc ~stoppel, !aches, 
and waivcr. 47 Gr;.>enhcar• responds that ea.ch of these fails a> a matt.;r of !av., and quasi-estoppel 
and laches are .;. ffim1:1tive defi."!lses th:it cannot he as.;e:ted bv Ptah\tiffs 1.mrl~r these 
47 PlaintirlS M.,;mv. ,;1 S..ipp. Sur11. J., pp. 14-:7.
3 
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circumstances.'18 Regarding using quasi-estoppel and lac hes as causes of action, the Court agrees 
that cases usually refer to these doctrines as affirmative defenses. However, there is some 
indication in the cast:: law that it is proper for plaintiffs to asse11 quasi-estoppel and !aches, 
especially in actions regarding determining rights to land and watcr.49 Therefore, the Court will 
consider each doctrine below to the extent they have been ~xopcrly raised. 
i. Qua.sl-estoppel. 
Quasi-cstoppd ·•pi events a pru.ty from asserting a right, to the deuimcnt of another party, 
which is incons~stem \\.itll a position previously tak1.:n." C & U, Jae. v. Canyon highway Dist. 
No. 4, 139 Idat .. 0 140, 144, 75 P.Jd 194, 198 (2003). The rl!qui;cmems for quasi-estoppel are 
explained in Atwood 1-·. Smith: 
(1) the offendmg party wok ~ di'.:I.:r~nt position than his or her original position 
and (2) either (a) the offendi"lg party gaine<l an gd•1antar;e or caused a 
disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was induced to change 
positions; or (c) n would be unwnscionable to pe1mit the offonding party to 
ma;ntain an inco1r.i ~cent positi0,... from O!'e he or sht~ has nlready derived a benefit 
or acquiesced in. To prove quasi-estoppel, it is not necessary to show detrimental 
reliance; instead, there must be evidence that it would be unconscionable to 
perrrjt the cff;:Pding party t::- ~s~e,·t ;lle:5edly contrl:lry positions. 
143Idaho110, 114, 133P.Jd:l10,31~(2006). 
Plaintiffs ccnt;~r~d G;·~cnhe:'rt '.•hould be ~<>topped frem ass·~rtinr: any rights to the 
conveyed wa~er ri;~n;s b;:caus;.: ::.hi: .ilkgedly pre-. :ou.sly dcnkd having any water rights as a 
result of th~ conve:;ance.5'' 'Plaintiffs support their contention v.ith the following allegations: 
'~..:.) Greer:..'.1;,u;: ·:; iwv.r as.':e:ting that ;,}.c ol..:tained w.;i~er ::ighrn by virtu.;;- of the deed to the 
6u ac.n::s of property; 
tha~ she t; .. uch&scd Jr_,: prop";:tj v~ithoat \.Vater ng,11•5: 
(c) Gr~.:.rJ.J.;iirl rcc·..:.v.;:J a11 actL\iltage in the fonn of reduced tax liabi•.ity by previously 
Hu<.ing the p0.:;i1.~on thc..i she pUidmscci Jry property without water rights; 
(d) C1recni1eart's new a5sertion that she purchased the 60 acres with water rights is to the 
d1sadva.ntdge ~); P t..l111utls; 
-----·· ...... -· -- . ·----- -·- - -
48 Greenheart's Memo. in Opp. to Plaintiffs' Mot. Sum. J., pp. 8--11. 
49 See ~for,'c,nfit "• ~· ;),, .i,1rt ·.Pitl~;· (j1,'.Ar. ( 10 . . -.~'.,' ldaLc. 437 .. ?~>5 i:.Jd Ji': \_2fi !tl). ,t~ir.".,!\':J11tl.lu,..a>~-'i.;fr;n 
Homeowners'Ass'n, lrc. v. BulottiConst., Inc., 145 Idaho 17. 175 P.3d 179(2007): Hillcrest Irr. Dist. v. Nampa& 
Meridian Irr. Dist., j~- ;Jahu ~(JJ, t6 f'.1.J • t 5 U 9J l ;, Jolmsm1 "· 2>t~ong Al,,. J(t:.u.1-vuir irr. /Ji~t .. 82 Idaho 478, 
'"t1P.!d<Yf(l'486) "' u.' ,Q"'J.:. .11, IQI ltlnio!o:Rn.e23 P.:A8 l"110l!I). 
so Plaintiff!.' Memo. in Suµp. Seim. J., pp. 14-1). 
ORDER Oi'I l.KU~;:, vtv 11u:,is 1·0R '.SUM.\1/\H. Y J..:DG.vlL,'H 14 
379 
(e) It would be nnconscionahle to permit Greenhcart's contrary positions because she 
would gain a windfall by claiming water rights for which she never paid full value. 
Greenhcart re.,punds with two argumer.ts: ( l) Plamtiffs incorrectly focus on post-
conveyance corniu,,;t instead of the conduct during the sale of the prop-:rty; and (2) Greenheart's 
representations and her reduction in property taxes did not harm Plaintiffs or cause Plaintiffs to 
tak d'ft' . . l . d . ~I ea 1 er~nt pos1t1011 re t 1e1r • etnrnem: 
As aircJ.Jy uiscusscJ c<4!licr in this decis1011, the Court ~an only look to the ianguage of 
the contract e,{C(.Uk.d pnor •o the <~ecu to acalyz~ this daim il the Plaintiffs meet Lheir burden for 
sho~ing mistake. Part of that burden is an unconscionable result from the mhlake, if any. Given 
the factual issue Lhat r~if1aias on mi~tJ.Ke and ur1couscionuuilitJ, rhc C0utt DENIES the 
Defendant'J request fur sur .. 1mury judg111ent on Piaintiffs' quasi-estoppel theory at this time. 
ii. EquitabJe estoppel. 
At summary judgment the trial court "must examine the pleadings to determine what 
issues are raised in the case (because] [t]he only issues considered on summary judgment are 
those raised by the pleadings." Esser E/(;'c . . Lost River Bullis1ic.\ Technologies, lnc., 145 Idaho 
912, 919, 188 P.3d 854. 861 ('.2008). further, "[t]he trial court must also examine the pleadings to 
determine whether nil or only s0me issues raised in the pkadings have been placed at issue by 
the motion for ~urnrnary judgmem [because] [t]ht: trial colt1i may not •f\:c1de an issue not raised 
in the moving par~y·'s motion for summary judgmem:." Id. Plarn•iffs' Veri:ned Complaint does 
not raise a claim fr1r ~q11it.1blc cstopp~J!2 It raises a claim for promiss.:Jiy \!Stoppel, which is a 
substitute fot· corE,ideration w1tkr Uaho .bw, ~Ji.lt foat daim 13 n.::1t b.;cn rnised on summary 
judgment. Le/t1111ich v Kt.) Bank 1fo,' Ass 'n. 141 Idaho 3>S2, J67, 109 P .Jd 11 J:t, 1109 (2005). 
Therefore. this Court will 1·wr rull' a, thi;, time on tl-.c argu~d cLiim tor t.:qunab.e estuppel which 
was not plec.. or thl' plej daim ic;· pl'\>r11is.;nry estoppcl which v.as not art~acd. 
L;;ich~s and wah·cr. 
equity and is a s1:(.,;,1;:;s uf equita.ok 1.:~topp1~L" Sea1 s i.. Be;·t.,ml!.n, IO l Id:ihJ 843, 843, 623 P.2d 
455, 460 (1981 ). L 11de1 !aches, "long and continuous knowing ·.icquicscence in another's use and 
enjoyment of a prqc.r i.y 0r privilege ,1;ay prech.Je ,)ne flr1m :mbst:quc.11Uy asserting his claim." 
SI \', 
52 See genera/Iv Verified C~Mplaint. 
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Id To establisi1 i;;stc_;>p:! by !a..:hcs, "ff)aps1.: of ·dme is not alone sutlicient :o Jefeat a right ... 
[but] [i]t must be shm\11 that the (claimant) has been miskJ. to his injury, by the failure of the 
(holder of the right) to assert its right earlier." Id. For example, the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Hillcrest Irrigutimz District v. Nampc. & Meridian Irrigation District held that a party was 
estopped from asserting their water rights where they "stood by, with full knowledge of all the 
facts, and fof mon:: d1w. tv.t.:nty )~ars ;1;;.,•<J allow~d [the clairnantj to proceed OIL the theory that it 
had valid title tu thc.:se watc1 rights and a legal right tu have the wat\!r Jiverte<l ... ; and in the 
meanwhile has incmTed large in<lebt.::dnes!i un the strength or .:.i:.3. title." 5 i' Idai1c 403, 40&-409, 
66P.2d 115, 117 (193;). 
Regarding wai•.:er, -ihc ldaho Supreme Court summarizcJ th.;. <loctrinc of waiver as 
follows: 
A wcivet is the iml!r.Lional relinquishment of a known rignt. It is a Yoluntary act 
and implies election hy a p~:ty tf) dispense with somf'thi'1<? of vr.lue or to f0rego 
some right or advantage which [the party] might at [the party's] option have 
demanded and insisted upon. 
A party asserting waiver must have acted in reliance upon the waiver and altered 
the party's position. 
Waiver is nn eouit::ihle dortrine bas·::d upon fairnes~ and justice. Trf:' e:vistence of 
waiver ordinarily is a question of fact and is furemost a question of intent. In 
order to eswblish ·waiver the mtention to waive must clearly apperu, aithough it 
may be established by conduct. 
Hecla Min. Co. v Star-Aiorning Min. Co., 122 Idaho 778, 782, 839 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1992). 
Here, regarding iaches, there is no evidence that Plaintiffs were injured by any of 
Greenhcar.:'s re.;:.in.:sentz,tiors ~o Ellm;:-c County. Similariy, rq~,arding waiver, ~;;ere ;:; no evidence 
that Plaintiffs altered the:r position in reliance upon any alleged waiver. The court does not 
address wrether '\l.ry ?"3razing" was a proper classification of the property :onsidering the idled 
rights in the water supply bank. As explained above, absent a showing of mistake, the most that 
can be s~K\.'11 i'> tk·t Crcenb~art 111<.t~~ rep~escn1a1iom af:cr c'cquiring th.: nrop~rty that she had 
no water righ'ts a!ld. ma.y ha\c r~c1:fr.,ed a tax benei'it from a trii1J part) as a icsuH.:1 Plaintiffs 
53 Again, in rear.Jing tht. "11inc7es at Comp taint. Exhibit H, tne chief appraiser ~tated an ao_iustment had been made 
"ba£k to dry ~··zing ' 't ·s unr'e"lr 1ubctbe- roe property >y3s assessed as r 1ry trazir·; tefure the sale tq 




ha\i-: not pwvitkJ Lh.::. Cuu!t ,, :th UH) ..:1. dt!nCt' li1Jl tk:) , • ..:tL n:!:;kd tJ:, tl.c:-.c ::.tJh:mc1~t..; lo thdr 
injury. Such a .. lfH.:,inmg ti lari:c debt i!l t:\p..:r.Jing: signili.::Ul! ~urns GI mone;. o,1st:J in part on 
th.: possibl:. t:ii,!tadilig ~1~nc.:·'.1<.".:'. ,\_'th·ug'., r•;.i.d,;~Y5 a;:;, .... rt in their r·~pt~ r11~·,11orz.fo..1um that 
they hav,; tw~L•; ..iL It :.l ,I <1~.i,J1t.,, :1..~l· ;;:d t\1 ;-r.:i.intain 1.iw \\.:t1CI rii:,hh, '11·~ l'I.: is n0 :·.iJcncc that 
this w:.1:> ,b.11.· n i01:t::. n c;,..:t11n~a:t'~ pc:;t-.;...1..- :..: 1.::rc~·~ ·: ... t:,,.1~.'' !., !°;11;1. 11 i:, ,:;;~:,.;puled that 
from the day ._1::;:,. v as ;-;ig11::..: lJ!h'.arJ, Plai;.jffs ah.Jy', bdie•:ed Lh;.:y l)'>\l'll,.'t t!·.c w1tcr r;ghts 
an<l ha\ c t:(1ns1stcntl; u;;senel.i ·m..11 (Jr;.:\!nheart tir~t asserted water right-; in F-::bnuiry 2012. To 
the extent Plaintiffs rely on the fact that tile) ! ~c:~ed f1c disputed water rights tc· Lhe Idaho Water 
Resource~. BozuJ V1at .. 'r Su~·p.) !Jam .. they ~dmittcd~y hu\.c been <luing. ~o ~.i1:cc August 28, 
2003. abou; l;,'ur .'e:irs btfo;-e JllY c•. we subjc..:t n::prcs<!nt:.ni0n::;, making it 1mr0:;s:blc ihat such 
actions wen: the r·:suit uf ar.y rcp~es.;::ntations made bv Gr:i.:nhei.1.rt. 5' rhen.:f:•r~. P!uim1ffs' laches 
and \\·aiver theorit>.i foil as a math::r uf law. 
Crnv u:sm'.li 
The ('uurt Dt ~~!E 'l rn;--,unary .:1.:dgment in favor of either party on the issue of mistake as 
it relates to i. J«rlt L lhe C\\urt c..iR·\\TS summary juJgrnenl in fa\\)r (11' (HC«:nhcart against 
Count n 1.Jf th.;; Verified Complaint for quiet title. except tc1 the ;.;xtent Count \l states a claim for 
quasi-esh)ppel or promis~.ory e.stoppd. 
benefit t•1 ( irl'.:ni c'.•r( s re;;iestntati;m that ti.id lut been previou~!y rccc!l>•':d hy rre Flai.1riJ1s lhnugh ic1lmg tho: 
\\rater ri~lw .. 1n ihc "· atcr -;upp1y Pank. 
'
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IN TSE DISTRICT COtnlT o• TBI l'OtnlTB J'tJDICIAL DISTRICT or 
TSE STATI or mABo, IN AND FOR TSE C01JNTY or ELMORE 
JAY BR.OWN ad CHR.ISTINE HOPSON· 
BROWN, Hmbaad ml Wf.fe, 
Platndta. 
v. 
AUOUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO 
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CASE NO. CV 2012-353 
MEMORANDUM IN SVPPORT 
or DD'ENDANT'I MO'nON 
roR RECONSmERATION 
Defendant, Aupata Sa)'Oko Mimoto Oreeahlart, by and tbroup 1- attorney of record, 
Victor VWeau and Borton Lakey Law Offices, submita this Memorm:lum m Support of 
Defendant•• Motton fbr R.ecomideration. 
JNTRODUCDON 
Thia cue involv• a quid title and declaratory action ftled by Plaintiftk lay and Christine 
Brown (hereJnafter collectively refirted to u ''Browm") wlring 1 declantion that De~ant 
A..- Oremlltmt E'~ 1- ae rJaktt .. er im..e te _. sremcl water riPtl 
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that are appurtant to approximately sixty (60) 1Cre1 of real property that Orembemt ptll'Cbue4 
in Jl1mll')' 2001. 
Both parties moved 1br oro•motiom In summary judpent and thia Court illUld ita 
deciaion titled OrrJ.r /Jaylnf Sramna1)' Judpnt On Count I and G"""'1W In Pan ~ 
~For Dtfadant On Count 1l (-summary J\Jdament Dects!on") on Jamllf)' 31, 2013. Al 
part of tbia Comt'• Summary Jud.pent Deoition, tbia Camt hl1d " ... the matterl preeented by 
both lfdel In support of the motiom ix lmllma')' juctament raise the 1-e of whether there wu a 
miltab wbfob ii a question of taot tbat precludes summary judgment." Sramna1)' Jr.uJrtnat 
Dt#:lllon pa. 1 o. 
On:mehart nspeattblly ukt this Comt to recomider that portion of itt decilion because. 
u explained mote ft.illy below, Ptafntiftfl did not plead mistake and more importantly Grecmhl8rt 
throuah 1- various aqumems on IUlDmlZ'Y judamont aid her motions to strike did not conaent 
to try the matter of miate either through expreu coment or by implication. 
Lutly, Greenehart ub thil Court to recomid.er it8 analyais and application of the facts of 
thJs cue with respect to the statute of Jtmftatiom raiMd by Greenlteart'a motion fbr IUmllUlr)' 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Rule 1 l(a){2)(B) of the Idaho R.u1ea of Civil Procedure allows a party to aoek 
reoomidendon of 1 decision on an interlocutory order prior to the entry of bl Judament, or 
within 14 days offlnal,ludament. There bu been no ftnaljudpieat emend ill thia oue. 
The decision to arant or deny a motion fbr recomidll'ltion ia reviewed fbr an abuae of 
diac:ntion. Co,,,_rdal J'llllw'a, Int:. v. Ra M. •Lynn LMa Family nwt, 145 Idaho 208, 216, 
177 P.3d 955, 963 (2001) Abue of dilcndon is determined by a three pat test which ub 
whether the district comt (1) comictly perceived the issue u one of discretion; (2) acted within 
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the outer boundariet of its dilcntion and ooDliltently with the lepl ltlDdards applicable to tbl 
apecifio cbabta available to it; ad (3) reached itl deoiaion by Ill ex.ercile of reaoo. /d. 
ARGVMINT 
L Brow111 Did Not Plead Miltalat. 
Bfowm did not plead or otbawile allep mistake In tbeir Complaint with partimlarity 11 
requind undw the Idaho llulel of Civil Procedure which ii why Oreenhellrt DIVfl' addreaed the 
ilu of miatlke in her Allrlls. diloowry or motion Ix" summary Judament. Moreover 
Onablrt did mt try the iaau of miltlb OD summary judgment by implication. but rather 
made a fi)nml objection to the tact that mlltlke wu not pled. P!amtia lbovld not be permitted 
to tr)' I claim that it did not ask fbr, DOI' did either party &rpe mistake fn their respective 
summary J\ldamem pleedfnp. 
L Bl'OWlll dlcl aot meet LR.C.P. Rvle 9(b)'I reqalnmeat to plead mlltlb wltll 
pardlllllrlt)'. 
Tho pneral po&y behind the curnnt rm. of civil pmcedure ii to provide every litipnt 
with hit or her day m court. Carrillo v. Boll• 1h Co., Inc. 15.Z Idaho 741, 7'1..752, 274 P.3d 
12.56, 1266 • 1267 (2012). The purpose of a complaint ii to iDJbrm the defendant of the material 
f4cts upon which the plalntU!' bull his action. Id. A complaml need only contain a conciae 
ltatllll.ellt of the fictt cmmtitutint the came of action ml a demand fbr relief Id. In eome cam. 
a~ pk!4in1 ~may be imposed by rule such u acdom llleainl mistake a 
tlul'ri>remust be ltated withpll'tioularity. Id.; I.R..C.P. 9(b). 
Rule 9(b) states m perdnent part: "Ia all avermmts ••• m9take •.. tbe circmmtancel 
comtitutfna ... mistake ... ahall be stated with particu1arity." 1.1..C.P. 9(b). 
In thia cue, neither the Factt, Count I nor Count II ofBrowm' Complamt ub this Court 
to rend• J\ldameat baled OD I mistake. More Importantly there ii nothing in the Complaint that 
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ii plead with particularity that would put Oreeaheart on notice what kind of mistake ii beina 
soupt. Ia it mutual miltlb or a unHatcnl mistake? What wu the imstake? Althoqh this 
Court*• Summary Jucfament Decision ltat• that then ii 111 umeeolvld 1i.ctual i8IUe on "mutual 
miatab" the relief sought in Browm• Complaint newt uked to relCtnd or modif.f the contnct or 
deed which ii the common remedy armed by courts tbr a mutual mistake. Su '·I· Mtcalaa 
v. Bl'Otldway Ford, Inc., 280 P.3d 176, 181-182 (2012) (raciaaion ii a remedy fbr mutual 
miltake). 
It ii ol• tom the alleptions Jn the Complaint that Browns newr aouabt to litipte the 
isiue of mutual miltlke. Por example, the Browns allep amnl post Ille activitie• that, 
according to Plaintiff; " ... demonstrate and clearly show that it wu known to the Browns and 
Drimdant that no por:tkm of the Water RJghta were intended to be conveyed to D~ 
Oreeahmt," Complainl , 19, There is nothiDa in that alleption that IUgcstl that either 
Browm or Oreenheart made a mistake. Browns' CIUIO of acdcn and request fbr relief ii belt 
tummarized in puasmph 27 of the Complaint that reads: 
27. The facts and ~of the tnmaction by which Defendant purchucd 
the property tom Plaintift'a, and the part!•' subsequent conduct thereafter, establish 
that any preaumptton that any portion of the Water R.fahtl paned to Defendant 
Greenhemt under the pmn1 appurtenantoy clause of the Wln'l11t)' Deed is 
conclusively rebutted by ~ clearly demonstrating that it wg 1mpJYD to both plJtiH 
that no portion of the Water RJab,ts wen intended to be conveyed, and compel an 
into:pnltation of the purchase ml Ille aareemem and Warranty Deed to the efteot 
that the Oree.ahart Propmty wu purchued and conveyed without water right9. but 
rather u dry Jmt. 
Sid Complaint, 27 (underlinfna added). 
NothUla in that paraaraph alleps one of the parties made a mistake. Havma failed to 
plead mistake with particularity, Browm• abou1d not be allowed to present evklcmce of mistake 
which ii an exception to the parole evidence rule u dilcuaed Uld applied in Koon v. Empey, 40 
Idaho 6, 231 P. 1097 (1924), Oreenbeart bas aim.ultaneoualy tiled I aeparato Motion In Limine 
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with this Court eee1dng to limit any ml all u.trinaic IYidance of ID .Uepd contrary la.tent 
between the partite becw Dltlke WU not pied. 
b. Grealaeart ud/or Brown &1111 not try the lane of wlledler mataal mlltake 
alut la ddl ... tltbtr tlaroqla apna or lmplled eon1eDt dlll'lns.......,. 
J• ..... t. 
Gemrally, isa\111 not railed in the pladfnp ~tried by expre11 or implied comem oftbe 
pmtiea are to be treated u if u thouah they w been railed m • pllldinp. Collini "· 
Parldnlon, 96 Idaho 2M, 527 P.2d 12$2 (1974); Sn al8o LR.CP. lS(b) ("When illuea not 
railed by tbe pleaclina are tried by expr• or implied consent of the ptrtill, d1ey aba11 be treated 
m all reapectl a it they hid been raised in the plewlinp"). The requirement that the unpleaded 
luuet be tried by at leut the implied eomont of' the pardel UIU1'll that the pardel have notice of 
the illues 'befOre the court IDd ID opportunity to addrea tho• -.. with evidence ml 
qumant. M. X. 7"uuport, Inc. v. Growr, 101 Idaho 345, 349·350. 612 P.2d 1192, 1196 • 1197 
(1P80). 
The ease of Collini v. ParldMo" wu a quiet ti't!e action where appellant arped that the 
trla1 court erred in refbrmina a quit claim deed due to mutual mistake. Collini at Idaho 296. The 
buil l>r appellant'• atpmlllt wu that mutual mistake wu not pracmted by the pleadmp. Id. 
n. Colllna court held that the partiea tried the ileue 'by implication because the appellants did 
not object: "The record indicates no objection to the inquiries u to the iuue of miltab m 
preparation of the quitelaim deed. Therefbre the issue wu properly raised at trial." Id. Basad on 
the Collini couzt'• reuoning. it is reuonable to conclude that had the appellant objected to the 
mquiria 11 to the ialu• of miltake, then the il8llO would not have been tried by Implication. 
In thll cue the parties have not aone to trial yet, but ~ Gramheart bas not 
coDSentid tO uy ttii iiiiil of miitBi it lriil nor ma Griiiiia&art ti')' t1li raue of mlltikii iipiiiily 
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oppolldon to Browm' modon l>r 111mmery judamcmt and pleldinp OD i. motion to strike wn 
premiaal OD the fact that the Browm did oot allege hud or miatlke m:l thcel>re the extrlm1o 
IYideoco oifend In support of Browm' motion l>r IUmmllY judpwnt wu bmed by the parol 
evidence rule u .. tbJth in Ewqw/. 
Oremhemt'• arpmem that hud or mistake wu oot plead by Browt11 eau be l>\md in 
Oreenheart'1 memorand\1m oppolina Brown1' smnmary jvdpwnt. In the context of applyina 
the EwqwJ decision and the parol evidence Nie to the fa.ob of this cue, Grecehlrt'• oppotiq 
memorandum 9tated: 
Mote Importantly, the exc:eption to the parol evidence rule (hud or miltlke) that 
would padt the introduction of extrimio evidence bu peyc Wn pied \y Browm. 
Brown•• Complaint doel not allep had or mistake em s;crtainly dop POt mut 
I.B..C.P. 9()) ramiriDI tMt bud or miltlko be plod with wtfsulm. At a result. the 
extrimic evid8JK'll Brown a.ttempta to introduce (which Oreenb.eart currently 
ch•11cmpa in her motion to ltrib filed com.DTCIDtly) u the l>undadon tbr theh' 
motion cannot be I basil tbr grantiq nmmll')' judgment. 
S. Memorandum In Oppolldon to Plalntljfl 'Motlon/o1' Summary Jwlpat pp. 5-6. 
The quoted argument above ii a ~ expreuion by Greenhelrt that mistake wu not pled by the 
Browm nor wu miltab pled with partfcularity. More lmportamly, tbr purpoHB of this motion 
ilr recomidcntion, tho quoted 1anpage above cannot be comtrued u either expre11 or implied 
consent by Oreenebart to try the iuue of mistake. If anythiq Oremheart'a argument ii 111 
objection that would defeat a 1!ndlq of'tryiq 111 lslUO by implieation. 
Moreover, dl1rinl oral arpmcmt on tho parties' =u-motiom fbr summary judgmant, 
ccn:mael tbr Oreenhmt specifically lll'gtlCd that hud or miatake wu oot pied by tho Browm and 
therefore the extrimic evldenco offered by the Browm abould not be considered. Counsel tbr 
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Ommhelrt a1lo ltated that while then a nit.. and eue law that allow partiet to try an unplead 
illua by expre11 of impliad coment. Greeaheart wu not comentina to try the iu1ie of mistake. 
P•hapt the most tollins argument directed to ti. fiat that neither party litiaared the lslUt 
of wbClther then wu a mutual miltlke ii the 1adt of qumem tom the Bmwm that thn wu a 
mf•lke. ti.. is nothiDa contained in the Bmwna' ptM«tinp mbmitted on the cro•motfom 
fbr summary judgment that 1 miatab had been pied or that a mistake bad oQC\JmlCl whieh would 
allow a departure tom the parol evidence rWt. Tht Browm' Reply brief in IUppOrt of their 
modon fbr summary judsment tddrelam the E,,,,., decilion only ID the comm that: (1) it is 
incomiltent with other Idaho CU. both bdn al after the deoilion; (2) then WU DO 
appu.rtcmmt water npt; (3) the Purcbue and Sale A,areement confirmed no water wu beins 
sold; ml (4) Qreenheart is bmed by atoppel, lachet and Otha' equitable deftnses. At DO time in 
their brief1na or clurlna oral qument did the Browns •sue that their extrimic evidence should 
be considered becauH it met the mistake meption to the pmol evidence rule. 
Bued on tho analyail above. Oreenheart respecttUUy uks thia Court to nconaider ita 
Summary Judgment Deoiaion ml find that mrithar pll'ty tried the Issue of mtsttke on summary 
IL The Statute of IJmttadom Bu Ru In Tlalt Cae. 
Thil Court held that the BfOWDl' lawlUit ii timely undlr any of the statute oflimitationa 
cited by the pll1ies (Le. I.C. 15·216, 5·224 and 5-203) because accrual' of the Browm' cue 
beam when Oreenhean filed with the mWR. Oil February 17, 2012. s. Sunmtar.Y Jflllgmat 
Dctrton pp. 6-7. Clrembeart respecttblly dilasrees with thla Court'• IDll)'lis oftbe acorua1 date 
u well u any co111ideration that Section 5-203 ii applicable in this cue. Orcmhelrt requests that 
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1. ldlho Code Seetloa 5-20311 not tile appleable rtatate of llmltatlou. 
The Idaho Supreme Court hll let i>rth apecitlc princlplel that pidl 1 court in tbe 
~of a atatute. "Stamtmy intapntation bepa with the literal lanpaae of the ltatUte. 
Pnw111oat ...... not bt nac1 Ill llolatloa. but 1DU1t be interpreted ID the contat of the adre 
documeat. 'l1ll ltatate llaoald be eomldered 11 a whole, and words ahouJd be aiven tbelr plain, 
usual, and cm:liDary meamnp," SltM v. ScladJ, 151 Idaho 8631 866-867, 264 P.3d 970, 973 • 
91• c2011> (bo1dina added>. "It should" notec1 that the eoun DllC am eft'egt to all the won11 
and proviaione oftlw atatute ao that none will be void, IUpCrlluoua, or red1mdant." Id. 
Here. the Jaaauaae of Seodon 5·203 when reed in ltt eatnty, and sivina effect to all the 
words Ind proviliona of the ltatute do m support the application of thia statute to the fActs in tbla 
cue. Idaho Code Sec:tion 5-203 rads in ita entirety: 
No act.ton fbr the recoVll')' of real property, or 1br the recovery of the 
pos•li>n thereo( CIA be maimdppb PPM it ..... tMt the pJamti: hil 
mpolQt. pdpggr Of D"UJt• WM aflCll or gplWlld of tht mm1Y in 
;uMicm pithm twRY Qql na bdp qmmvmgmymt of OJC actiop; and 
thil MOtion. inoludet poueuory ria1U to Jada and mintn1 daimt. 
Idaho Code f 5-203 (underliniq and boJdina added). The plain Jaquqe of Section 5-203 
requh'el that the pl1tnturbe "seized or poaeaecl otthe property in question within twenty (20) 
In thil cue, thia Court hu ruled that unless the Browm can prove miltlke, the water 
rfahts wen tnmterred to Oreeaheart via the appurtenant laapap conWned in the Warranty 
Deed. S.. Sununary J""'"'1tl D1t:lllo11 pp. 11·13. Thie Court'• conch:Won ii important 
wu trimflrncl to Orembmt via the hmp11e of the Wlt'lltJty Deed on January 29, 2007, there 
wu an fmmediate brelk in owmnhfp; the Browm no Jona« aeized or po11e111d tht around 
water. It maka :no difference if or when Oreenheart oomacted IDWR.. Theo ii PA Jaw In Jdahq 
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that ga mmbip Qf ptor cmgyed b_y I dMl it Q0t eft'ectlve uptil the pntM gall1 the 
mWJl On the oonuary. the holdma• of Empq and Irllll ate that water ii trwfelred with the 
deed un1111 it ii uprmly fllll'VllL Tbm, tba Browm cannot proceed und« Section 5-203 
becau11 they have not ldvmely pot1e11ed the pound wets tom Oreeahmt 1br 20 years. 
'b. AeeruJ ltlrted at tile Jatelt oa neon11a1 tilt Warruty DMd. 
Thia Court'• recognition that the ground water wu tramferred to Oremheart via the 
Janauaae of the Wll'l'ID.ty Deed ii equally Important 1br Sxinl the date of acorua1 II well. With 
rClpCCt to wbm the cauae of action accru.ed in this cue, this Comt held that "the mma with the 
IDWR wu the first imtaa.ce that Oreenhrart UMrtecl my ownership in the wat• rights advent 
to the Plaintift"I. n.ri>re. the quiet title action filed on April 5, 2012 ii well withm all of the 
statute of limitations." Sn Summary Judgment D«:&ton p. 7. Greenhnrt submits that thil 
concluaion however is incorrect based on the uncontrovmted evidence. 
If the teat fbr accrual is to look at when Oreenheart &st "ussted any ownership in the 
water dahtl advene to the Plah:atlifl" the act of contacdna IDWR. ii not the f1nt tmtanco. The 
Brat imtance of ulm'tins ownarahip ii when Oremheart recorded the Warranty Deed in the 
public rec:orda of Blmore County. Moordiaa to Empq and lrllh water appmtemmt to the 
property ii tnm&ftned tmle91 expreuly rl8ll'Ved. Thil Court held the ume in its Summary 
Judament Dec!sion. When Oree.oheart recorded the deed in the public records she wu not only 
lettiq the whole world know that lhe ii the record owner of the real property leplly described 
in that deed, ebe ii a1ao making it known to the world that she owm all appmtenant waur 
The Warraty Deed ii attached to the Complaint and a1lo attached to Orecmheart'1 
Aftldavit In Suppon of Summary Jud.plmt .. Exhibit B. The Wamnty Deed ii recorded u 
Imtrwnent No. 384017, in Elmore, County with a date of January 30, 2007. The Complaint 
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wu filed on April 5, 2012 which ii more than !ve years tom t11e date of the reoordJna of the 
Wmanty Deed. n..dxe, the Browm' lawsuit ii untimely und.- ldlbo Code Seotion S-216 
(five )WI l>t contract aotiona) mi Section S-224 (fbur.ym catch all). 
DI. Tile Staaate of Llmltatlou Ila Run Oa Tiii Brvna' Mlltlke Clalm (11 Appllcablt) 
Should thil Court detamine that Bmwm .. permitted to introduce evidenee of mutual 
miatab and that trial ii neceamy, any reUot atlbrded by the Jaw of mutual miatake ii untimely 
'becaUle tJ2at claim wu not broupt within the three-ym ltltUte of Jfmftatiom. 
The statute of Jfmttadom on the around of hud or miltab mutt be commenced within 
three (3) yean. I.C. f 5·218. Section S-218 ltltll that aC1.WJ1ofac:tion tbr bud or mistake does 
not accrue until "until dilcovmy, by the agrieved party, of the Sacts comtitutina the taud or 
miatab... Id. In the context of ftaud, "our Supreme Court bu held tJ2at •1CtUa1 knowledge of 
the hud will be fnfemd if the alleaedly aarieved party could have dilco'Wll'Cd it by the IDl'Cile 
of due dillpnce."' A.ltkn v. Gill, 108 Idaho 900, 901, 702 P.2d 1360, 1361 (Ct. App. 1985) 
(quodq N'1l'U':Y IA• Mina, Inc. v. HanVon, 95 Idaho 546, 547, 511 P.:Zd 828, 829 (1973)). The 
..4.ttan court hold that tbil same principle applies to causes of action. bued upon. miatab: 
We believe the aame principle logically applia to causes of actkm bued upon 
miltab. Acoordhialy, we bold that ID action 1""11 rejicf fi:om mjpke will 
be timtlmnd tmd« I.e. f s-211(4) un1w I it ftJcd w#NA tbl1I mm Wr 
1U miltakP COJJld hmm dlammd m ti&• mn• of 4" 4P'nnst· 
Id. (underlinhia and boldina added). 
"Ordinarily, what oomtitutea [the eurcise of] reuonable dilipnee to diacover taud so 
11 to a&ct the tine when the statute of Hmitatiom beaim to nm ii a queation of fUt tbr the 
jury .... Of come, wlmt gnly QM coucluemn cm be drawp tom tbo ~ tho qygtign gf 
rnemnablo dlliaow tQ dlgyor fi:tt'41 mg bt dmjdrl by the wqrt y a mattm pl lg" Full . 
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Cltclf. Inc. v. ScMllbtf, 108 Idaho 634, 638, 701 P.2d 254, 258 (Ct.App.1985)(underlinina 
added). 
In thil cae, lince tbe law in Idaho bolds that water pu1e1 with the 1ml lln1ea the deed 
ccmveylna the 1ud expreuly resems the nts rfsht E,,,,,., 1f1Pra., the Browm oould have ml 
sho11ld have dilcowred the miltake on the date tbey liped the Warranty Deed. Then ii no 
dilpute that the Warnnty Deed did not oomam Ianauaa• reservina the sround nter tom the 
trau&r oftht property, Thia Court should c:larmine u a mattar of law, that the plain 1quap 
of Wllrlllt)' Deed IUPPOftl the ocmoluaioa that the Btowm should of am could of rlisoovad the 
nriltlb Oil the date they lipd the Wamnt)' Deed (JU'1W7 2,, 2001). 
If the date the Browm siped the Wmaaty Deed is wu not enough to put them on notice 
of diacoVflrina the mistake. then the date the Wmu>.ty Deed WU recorded in the real propcty 
records pmvidn the next opportunity 1br the Browm to diloover the m:lstlb. The Warnmy 
Deed wu recorded u lnstn.mHmt No. 384017, in Blmore, County on January 30, 2007 tbr the 
entire world to •· OUr c:ourtl have recopsized that '1t]he primary pm:poac of the recontins 
statutes ii to &fve notice to othen that an interelt ii olainied m real property," Ka/angl "· 
RlllCMr, 13d Idaho 192, 196, 30 P.3d 970, 974 (2001). Bued on the lrlllt and Empq holdinp, 
it logically tbllowe that a recorded deed Jacldna any reservation 1quaao reprdins water ptaoes 
others 011 notice that water wu tramferred with the land. 
Based on the diacuaion above, thia Court abould determine that mutual m1ltako ii not &m 
available remedy 1br the Browns becauae they ooukt. have cltlooverecl the mistake eithlr on the 
date they liped the Wemnty Deed (Jmury 2t, 2007) or the VfllY nut day when the Wmamy 
Deed wu recorded (Jmury Jo. 2007). Either datt ii t>e,ond tht tbree-ys statute of 
limftadom period Idaho Code Section 5-218 ad tbere1bre any claim of miltake ii untimely. 
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CONCLUSION 
Bald upon the undisputed &cu llld the arpments set 1brth above. Oreenhellt 
nspecdblly requests that the Court: (1) preclude Plaintift'a ftom mating a claim of"miatab" u 
a bail l>r 111)' relief' niq\lllted; ad (2) araat Defendant'• motion fbr summary Judamem bued 
on the atatute of limitatiom. 
DATBD tbJs 15* day of Pebruary, 2013. 
BORTON LAKEY LA w omcss 
By~· 
.4.ttornq1 for Dt/Dllltmt 
CQTIUCAD gr sgytg; 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15* day of Pebrmy, 2013, a truo and correct copy of 
the ibresoinl documem WU IMll'VOci by ftnt-clau mail, poltqe prepaid. and addreued to; by fiax 
trammisaion to; by ovemilht d.ellvery to; or by personally deliveriq to or leavina with a pmon 
in chirp of the ot!oe u indicated below: 
Micbael c. Creamer 
Thomu B. Dvont 
OIVBNS PUlsLBY I.LP 
601 West Bmmock Street 
P .o. Box 2720 
Boiae, ID 83701-2720 
Telephone: (208) 388-1200 
Pacsfmile: (208) 388-1300 
[ ] U.S. Mall 
[X] Pax 
[ ] Ovniaht Delivcy 
[ J Hmd Delivery 
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Joe Borton [ISi No. 5552] 
Victor Villegu [ISB No. 5860] 
BORTON LAICBY LAW omcss 
1 "41 B. Carlton A vt. 
Maidia. ID 83642 
Bo• Idaho 83702 
OfBce: (201) 90M41$ 
Pu: (208) 49,-4610 
Small: victor@bofton-laby.com 
..4ttomq.r/OI' ~ 
No. 5189 P. 2/9 
~:- f LED 
IN TD DISTRICT CO'ORT or THE lO'OllTB JUDICIAL DISTRICT 01' 
THE STATE or mABO, IN AND FOR TD COUNTY o:r ELMORE 
JAY BR.OWN and CHRISTINB HOPSON· 
BROWN, Husbad and Wife. 
Plahitifl. 
v. 
AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO 
GR.BBNHJ!ART, an indivlduaJ, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CV 2012-353 
DDENDAN'f•S MOttON IN 
LIMINB TO PRBCLVDE 
ALLEGATIONS o:r MISTAKE 
Deftmdant, Aupm Sayoko Mimoto Gremheart, by and through her atiomeys of record, 
Borton Lakey Law Otflces, moves dlla Court tn ltmlu fbr an Order excludins evidence md 
testimony on the iuue of mistake. Tbis motion fl buecl on the pleldfnp on file, and 
Memonn«hrm In Support ot Defendant•1 Motion 1br llecomideration (which fl npoduced in 
part withm this Motion) and all filed contemporaneoualy herewith. 
198 
'Feb. 15. 2013 4:49PM st Carlton Ave No. 5189 P. 3/9 
l'N'JJ\QDUCIJON 
Thia oao fnvolvea a quiat title ml declaratory action filed by Plainti.tD Jay and Chriatim 
Brown (hainak collective1y referred to u "Browm") 1"'dn1 a deolaration that Ddmdlllt 
Aupata Oreenhelrt ("Oreenhelrt") bu no riabt, title or interat to certain pound water rigbtl 
that a appurtemmt to approximately sixty (60) acrea otreal property that Oreonheart purchased 
in January 2001. ~ 
Both pardos moved tbr cro•motiom tbr IUmm&rf judpient ml this Court ilsued ill 
decision titled Order Denying Summary Judpent On Count I and Qrantias In Part Summary 
Judpient For Ddmdld On Count II (MSummary Judpient Decilion") on January 31, 2013. At 
part of tbil Court'• Summary Judgment Oeoiaion, tbia Com held " ... tu mau.n prwatld by 
both nda In lflPPOl't of th• motlon.r for"""'"""' jwlpwnt rob1 thl tau of whsther thlre waa a 
ml.ftaa wldch tr o fU"llon of fact that precludu llOMI01)' judgm1nt." Summary Judpient 
Decision PS. 1 O. 
PJaintifft did not plead miltako and more importantly Greenbeart tbroush her various 
arpmanta on rnmmwy judgment and her motions to strike did not consent to uy the matter of 
mistake either throuah express con.sent or by implication. 
A&GUMENT 
L Bnnnu Did Not Plead Mistake. 
Browm did not plead or othenrile allep miltllce in their Complaint with particularity u 
required under the Idaho R.ulel of Civil Procedure which fa why Greeahart never addressecl the 
ia\le of· mistake in her .Answs, diacovery or motion 1br rnmmwy judgment. Moreover 
Oreenehmt did not try the iuue of miJtake on summary judgment by implication, but rather 
made a bma1 objection to the fact that mistake wu not pied. P1efntl1!11hould not be permitted 
DEFENDANJ"S MOTION IN LIMINE • 2 
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to try a claim that it did not uk tbr, nor did eithrr party quo mistake in their respective 
mmmmy judpumt p1-Hnp. 
L Browm clld aot meet LR.C.P. Jhle t(h)'• nqaJn .. t to plead mlltab with 
pardc1allrlty. 
The pmra1 policy behind the cmrent nilel of oivil procedure ii to provide tlVflr/ lltipat 
with hfl or lwr day fn court. Cmillo v. Boile Tire Co., Inc. 152 Idabo 741, 751-752, 274 P.3d 
12!6, 1~ • 1267 (2012). The purpose of a complaint ii to int>tm the defendant of the material 
1Utl upon which the plaintift' bull his action. Id. A complaint need only contain a colldse 
• .,. of the 4lcta comdtutiq the C1U1t of action IDd a demand 1br relie£ Id. In some euet. 
a heJabtad pleadtna requirement may bo impoaed b)' rule such u aatiom alleaiq miatake ml 
thcreibre must be ltatld with particularity. Id.; I.R..C.P. 9(b). Rule 9(b) atatea in pertinent pm: 
"In all avsmenta ... mistlb ... the circumstances comtitutfq ... mistake ... ahall be stated with 
paztieuJcity." I.R..C.P. 9(b). 
In this cue, neither the Fact&, Count I nor Count Il of BroWDI' Complaint alb this Court 
to render judgment baaed on a mistake. More importantly there la nothins in the Complaint that 
ii plead with pll'tfeularity that would put Oreenheart on notice what kind of mistake ii being 
IOqht, II it mutual miltake or I umlatm.l miatake? What WU the mistakes? Althoush this 
eoun•s Summary Judpnent Decision states that there ii ID unreaolved factual luue on "mutual 
mistake" the relief .ought in Browm• Complamt never uked to rescmd or modliY the contract or 
deed which ii tho common remedy granted by cow fbr a mub.111 mistake. S. 1.1. MlcMll111 
v. Broadway Ford, Inc., 280 P.3d 176, 181-182 (2012) (reecialion. ii a remedy fbr mutual 
mistake). 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMlNE. 3 
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It ii clear tom the alleptiona in the Complaint that Browm nevs apreal)' aoqht to 
lldpte the iame of mutual misteb. Por example, tbe Browm allep MVa1 post lale IOtivlties 
that. aocordina to Plainti~ " .•. demonttrate ml clear!)' lhow that it WU 1mown to the Browm 
IDd Deftmdant that DO portion ottbe Wmr RJahta wa Intended to be conve,ed to Ddmdant 
Oreenhelrt." Complaint , t 9. 'n1m fl nothing in that alleption that IU8P* that eitmr 
Browm or Oreenhelrt made a miltake. Browm' cauae of &Odon and request i>r relief ii beat 
aummarizld in pangnph 27 oftht Complaint that reD: 
27. The f4cta ml circumltanoet of tho tramactfon by which Defadant 
purdwed tho property tom Plaindffl, an4 the pmtiel' mbleq'Uent conduct 
thcreaftcl', establish that ID)' ~ that ID)' portion of the Water RJabtl 
pmerl to Ddmd1nt Oreenbmt undlr the saeraI appmteaantcy c1auae of the 
Warranty Deed ii oonclulfvely rebutted by t.«I clearly demomtratma that it wu 
known to both parties that DO portion of the Wat• Rfahts were inteaded to be 
conveyed. and compel an interpretation of the purohue ml ale aanement and 
Warranty Deed to the effect that the Oreenholrt Property WU purcbued ml 
conveyed without wit• rightl, but rather u di)' land. 
s. Complaint, J1 (wWrltnlnf atldtd), 
Notmns in that pnsrapb allepa that one otthe parties made a miltlke. Havina &iled to 
plead mistake wllh partlcularUy. Browm' lhould not be allowed to preaent fNideace of miatab • 
- an aception to the parole evidence rule • diseualld and applied in Koon v. Empq, 40 Idaho 6, 
231 P. 1097 (1924). 
b. Gntnburt ud/or Bron• did not try tile ltlae of whether mataal mlltl.ke 
mlted In th!I cue eltller tlu'Oup apnn or Implied comu.t darl:q llUIUIW')' 
Jdpuat. 
Oeoerally, illuet not raiaed in the pladinp Jet tried by ex.prma or implied c:onsent of the 
pmtles 11'1 to be treated u if u thou&h they hid been railed in the pleldinp, Collllu "· 
Parldluon, Pd Idaho 294, 527 P.2d 1252 (1974); Su allo I.R.C.P. 15(b) ("When inues not 
railed by the pladmg are tried. by apr• or implied conacmt of the parties, they lha11 be treated 
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in all reepectl .. if tb&:y bad been raised in the plOldinp"). The reqWrement that tho unplOldecl 
iuuea be trlld by at least the implied coDllDt of the plltiel auures that the patties have notice of 
tht issu• betbre the oourt and an opportunity to addreu tboae iuull with evidence and 
arpmmt. M. K. .7>mr.rport /no. v. Grovlr, 101 Idaho 345, 349-350, 612 P.2cl 1192, 1196 • 1197 
(1980). 
The cue of Colllnl v. Parldn.ton wu a quiet title action where appellant argued that the 
trial oourt erred m zdmnins a quit: claim deed due to mutual mistake. Collbu at Idaho 296. The 
basil fbr appellant's ll'pment WU that mutual miltake wu not presented by the pleadinp. 14. 
The Collln.r oourt held that the plltiel tried the iuue by bnplbtfon beoae the appellants did 
not objeot: "I'he record fndioatee no objection to the inquiries u to the issue of miltako m 
preparation of the quitclaim deed. There1bte the iuuc wu properly raiacd at trial." Id. Based on. 
the Colllm court's reuonin& it ii reasonable to conclv.de that bad the appellant objected to the 
inquiries u to the isma of mistake, tbm the iaue would not have been tried by bnpllcatlon. 
In tbia cue the plltiel have not aone to trial yet, but nevertheless Oreenehart hu not 
consented to try the issue of' mistake at trial nor did GrecmhaTt try the issue of mistake a.prealy 
or by implication durfna aummary judsmeat. To the contnry, Gremheart'1 pleadinp in 
opposition to Browm' motion fbr tummary judgman.t and pleadfnp 011 her motion to mike wen 
premilad 011 the &at that the Browm did not alle1e hud or mistake and theret>re the extrimic 
evidence off'cred in aupport of Browm' motion fbr summary judpiont wu barred by the parol 
evidence rule u let fbrth in Empq. 
OreeDheart'1 araument that taud or mistake wu mt plead by Browns can be tbund in 
Oreenhean'• m.emoraadum oppolina Browm' summary judpient. In the context of applyins 
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the Empq deaiaion and the parol cvidcmco rule to the faota oftbil cue. Oreenehart't oppoliq 
memorandum stated: 
More bnportatly, the ucepdon to the pll'Ol evlclat nJ1e (had or 
miltlke) that would permit the lntroctacdon of extrJmfo evidence hu newr becm 
plld by Browm. Brown'• Complaint doe& not allep hud or mietlko llnd 
cctain1y dote not melt LR.C.P. ~) nqu.irins that hud or miltab be plld with 
pardcn1Jarity. At a result. the extrimfc evideDco Btown attempts to introduce 
(which Greenbellt CUl11l1tly cballqa in her motion to ltrike flied concurrently) 
u the fbUDdation fbr tin motion oannot be a buia fbr arantins IWmDll')' 
Judameat 
S• Mmmandum in Opposition to PJaintifti' Motion fbr Summary Judaznent pp. 
5-6. 
The quoted argument above ii a clear a.preuion by Oreenehmt that mistake wu not pied 
by the Browm nor wu mistab plld with pat1k:u.Wity. More importantl)', tbr pmpo1e1 of thia 
motion fbr rocomidatioa, the quoted lanpap above eanot be construed u either expreu or 
implied consent by Oreeulw't to try the fuue of mistake. lfln)'thina Greea.ebart'• mpmem Js 
an objection that would defeat a findiq of trying an iuuo by implication. 
Moreover, du.rins oral argument on the parties' crou-motions fbr mmmary judsment, 
counsel t>r Oreenelwt specli1cally aped that hud or mistake wu not pled. by the BroWlll aid 
thercfbre the atrimic IVidence offered by th.I Browm lhould not be considered. CoumeJ. ibr 
Oreenehatt also stated that while there are rulea wt cue law that &tlow parties to try a unplead 
iuuo by express of implied consent. Greeuhart wu not comentins to try the iuue of miatake. 
Perbapl the most telling argument direetod to the fact that neither party litigated the iasue 
of whether there wu a mutual miltlb ii the lack of argument fi'om the Browm that there wu a 
mistake. There 11 nothiq contained in the Browm' pleldfnp mbmitted on the cro•motiom 
lbr IUlm1W'Y Judamem that a miltab had been pied or that a mistake hid occurred which would 
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allow a departure tom the parol evidence rule. The Browm' Reply brief m support of their 
motion 1br IU1Dm8I')' judgment lddreaet the Empq dectlton only in the context that: (1) it ii 
inconsistent with other Idaho cues both bcfbre and after the decision; (2) there WU DO 
appurtenant water risht; (3) the Purcbue and Sale Aareement confirmed DO water WU beina 
sold; aDd ( 4) Oreenehart it bmed by estoppe1, 1achea and oth« equitable defenses. At no time in 
their briefing or d1Jrinl oral araument did the Browna quo that their extrimic ovidence should 
be ooufdered becauae it met the miatab exception to the Pll'Ol evldeDce rale. 
Bued on the IDllym above. CJremhe8rt respcctiblly ub this Court enter its Order In 
Lbnine to preclude Plaintiff tom ll8ll'ting a claim ot ~· at the trill of this matter. 
PJaintifft did not plead mistake with part!cularity u requJred by I.R.C.P. 9(b), and mm i.ftbeir 
failure wen aCUHd by this Court. a cauae of action ibr miatlb is outaide the three-year etatute 
of Hmkationa. 
DATED thia 1s• day ofFebnmy, 2013. 
BORTON LAKEY LAW OPFICBS 
By 
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CllTIDCATI Ol QRyJg 
I HBl.BBY CBl.TIFY that on thia 15* day of Pebnmy, 2013, 1 true lad conect copy ot 
the 1bregofna document Wll mVld by fint-clut mail, poltlp prepaid, and lddreaed to; by Ax 
tnmmdafon to; by OVll'Dfaht delivery to; or by penomlly delivlriq to or ltlvina with a penon 
fn ohlrp oftht of.Bee u lndlclted below: 
Michael c. Creamer 
Thoma B. Dvorak 
OMINsPt.Juuyw 
601 W• BIDDOdE Street 
P.O.Box2720 
Bofle, m 13101-2120 
Tellpllone: (208) 388-1200 
PIOlfmile: (208) 388·1300 
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[X] Pax 
[ ] Ovntabt Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
Victor vrutiil 
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Jot Borton [ISB No. 5552] 
Victor Vil1lpl [ISB No. 58~] 
BORTON LADY LAW omcss 
141 B. Carltoa Ave. 
Maridian, ID 83642 
Boile, Idaho 83'702 
OtBce: (20I) 901-4415 
Pa: (201)49M610 
Email: ~n-Jlkey.oom 
.4ttornqa /or ~adanl 
No. 5190 P. 2/5 
F\LED 
1013 fEB 15 PM 4: 52 
~L~~~ 8t~t~tif R\ 
IN TBI DJSTltlCT COtJRT or THE JOUllTB JVDICIAL DJSTRJCI' or 
TBB STAT& or mABO. JN A.ND FOR TBB CO'ONTY or ILMOD 
JAY BR.OWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON· 
BR.OWN, Husband and Wife. 
PJafntifD, 
v. 
AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO 
OllBBNHEAR.T, ID fndMduaJ, 
Ddmdant. 
CA.SE NO. CV 2012-313 
DD'BNDANT'S MOTION TO 
SHORTEN' TIME TO mwl 
BER MOTIONS JOR 
RICON&mlRATION AND 
MO'nON IN LIMlNB 
Dtlmdem. Auauata Sayoko Mimoto ~ by and thfouah her attomeya of record, 
Vldm' Villapl of Borton Lakey Law Of!ces, moves t1Us Co~ puraumt to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 6(b) bmby IDOVI tlWa Court mr Ill Order ~ time to allow her Motion fbr 
Recomidation and Motion in Limine to Preclude Alllptiona of Miatab to be heard on 
February 22. 2013 at 2:30 p.m. Thia motion fl critical to the hemina on the partiea' Pre-Trial 
ConfereDc:e soheduled fbr the Amt day, u It admea. the edmf•tibllity of testimony and/or 
documentary evidence reprdiDs the illU8 ofmiatake. 
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DATBD tbia U* da)' of Pebrumy, 2013. 
BORTON LAKEY LAW OFFICES 
CIRDllCAD or SIByICI 
I HBR.BBY CER.TIP'Y that on thit Is* day of February, 2013, a true and oomot copy of 
tbl fbreaoin& dooummt Wll .-ved by t1nt-otu. mail, poltlp prepaid, and lddrmed to; by fax 
tnnamiation to; by ovemisht delivery to; or by personally deliverin1 to or leavina with a penon 
in eharp of the ofBce u mdicated below: 
Miohael c. Cnmmr 
Thomal B. Dvorak 
GMINS Pt1uulY W' 
601 Wat Bmmock Street 
P.O. Boi 2720 
Boise, ID 83701·2720 
Telephone: (208)388-1200 
FIClhnile: (208) 388-1300 
DEfENDA.NT'S M0110N TO SBOllTEN TIME • 2 
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[ ] U.S. Mail 
[X] Pax 
[ ] Ovemiaht Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
.. 
.. 
Michael C. Creamer (Idaho State Bar ID# 4030) 
Thomas E. Dvorak (Idaho State Bar ID# 5043) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
Telephone: 208-388-1200 
Facsimile: 208-388-1300 
1617060_1 (I IS43-3) 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Jay and Christine Brown 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR nm COUNTY OF ELMORE 
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON-
BROWN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
AUGUSTA SA YOKO MIMOTO 
GREENHEART, an individual, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-353 
MOTION TO AMEND 
COME NOW, Plaintiffs, Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown (hereinafter the 
"Browns''), by and through their attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LLP, and hereby move this 
Court pursuant to Rules 15(a) and (b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for entry of an order 
permitting Plaintiffs to file an Amended Complaint in the form attached hereto as Exhibit "A" 
and incorporated herein by this reference. This motion is made on the grounds and for the 
reasons set forth herein and in the accompanying Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Motion to 
Shorten Time to Hear Her Motions for Reconsideration and Motion in Limine filed 
contemporaneously here with. The proposed change on the Amended Complaint is indicated 
with redline and in substance seek to clarify the claim for relief by mutual mistake and equitable 
esto el. 
MC>TION TO EXTEND EXPERT WITNESS DEADLINES- l 
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The trial court bas broad discretion to allow amendments to the pleadings at any staao to 
confmm to the proo( even when objection is made. See, 0.1., Cameron Salu, Inc. v. Klem18h, 
93 Idaho 4Sl. 463 P.2d 287 (1970). In addition. Defendant will suffer no undue prejudice or 
delay as a result of the requested amendments as they ~losely pertain to tho circumstances 
aJmMly alleged in the existin& Complaint and the legal theory sugested by the factual 
circumstancea as noted by this Court in the recent SUDUD1ry judgment ruling. 
This Motion is made and based on the records and documents lodged and filed herein. 
Oral argument ii requested on this motion. 
DATED this ~ ( tr;ay of February, 2013. 
GIVENS PURSLEY LU' 
B. Dvorak 
Attorneys for Jay and Christine Brown 
CER'IMCATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on thisZ/~ of February, 2013, I caused to be served a truo and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to the persons listed below the method indicated: 
Victor Villegas 
Borton It Lakey 
141 E. Carlton Avenue 
Meridian. ID 83642 
Facsimile: 493-4610 
MOTION TO Ex.TEND IXPIRT WIDllSS DliDLJNES • 2 
_ HJnd Delivery 
_U_ac a sisimile 
_Overnight Courier 
U.S. Mail 




Michael C. Creamer (Idaho State Bar ID# 4030) 
Thomas E. Dvorak (Idaho State Bar ID# 5043) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs Jay and Christine Brown 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON-
BROWN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
AUGUSTA SA YOKO MIMOTO 
GREENHEART, an individual, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-353 
AMENDED COMPLAINT TO 
QUIET TITLE 
COME NOW, Plaintiffs, Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown (hereinafter the 
"Browns''), by and through their attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LLP, and for cause of action 
against Defendant, plead, allege and complain as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiffs the Browns are husband and wife residing in Mountain Home, Elmore 
County, Idaho. 
2. Defendant Augusta Sayoko Mirnoto Greenheart (hereinafter "Greenheart") is an 
individual residing at 8708 Willow Cabin Street, Las Vegas, Nevada. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT TO QuIET TITLE - 1 411 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
3. The amount in controversy falls in the jurisdictional limits of this Court. 
4. Jurisdiction and venue are proper in Elmore County, based upon the location of 
the real property and the water rights at issue in this litigation. 
5. The Defendant is subject to this Court's jurisdiction and the laws of the state of 
Idaho, including without limitation Idaho Code Sections 6-401, et. seq. and 10-1201, et. seq .. 
COMMON ALLEGATIONS 
6. On or about February 5, 1988 Jay Brown acquired approximately 320 acres of 
land situated in the East Yi of Section 24, T4S, RSE, B.M,, in Elmore County ("Original Brown 
Property''). 
7. A true and correct copy of the deed by which the Jay Brown acquired the Original 
Brown Property, and which contains a legal description of the same, is attached hereto as Exhibit 
'"'A." 
8. The Snake River Basin Adjudication ("SRBA") Court in Twin Falls, Idaho, 
decreed Water Rights Nos. 61-2188 and 61-7151 (the "Water Rights") to Jay Brown on October 
26, 2000, authorizing the use of groundwater and making the Water Rights appurtenant to a 
permissible place of use that encompassed the 320 acres comprising the Original Brown 
Property. True and correct copies of the said decrees are attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and 
Exhibit "C" respectively (collectively "SRBA Water Right Decrees"). 
9. In January of2007, Defendant Greenheart purchased approximately sixty (60) 
acres of the Original Brown Property (the "Greenheart Property") from the Browns, leaving the 
Browns with approximately 260 acres (the "Current Brown Property''). 
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l 0. A true and correct copy of the deed by which Defendant Greenheart acquired the 
Greenhcart Property, and which contains a legal description of the same, is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "D." 
11. A true and correct legal description of the Current Brown Property, then, would 
consist of the legal description of the Original Brown Property less the legal description of the 
Greenheart Property. 
12. Water Right 61-2188 was decreed authorizing the irrigation of up to 164 acres of 
land within a 320-acre permissible place of use wholly within the Original Brown Property. 
13. Water Right 61-7151 was decreed authorizing the irrigation of up to 123 acres of 
land within the same 320-acre pennissible place of use authorized for 61-2188 and wholly within 
the Original Brown Property. 
14. As decreed, the Water Rights may be used together to irrigate no more than 287 
acres within the 320-acre permissible place of use. 
15. Neither of the Water Rights has been used to irrigate any portion of the 
Greenhcart Property since at least 1986. 
16. On August 28, 2003, the Browns applied to the Idaho Department of Water 
Resources ("'Department'') to lease portions of the Water Rights appurtenant to 160 acres of the 
Original Brown Property to the Idaho Water Resource Board ("IWRB") Water Supply Bank, and 
pursuant to that application, contracted with the IWRB to idle 160 acres of the 287 authorized 
acres from irrigation. The Water Supply Bank lease remains in effect as of the date of this 
Complaint. The acres idled and not irrigated by the Browns pursuant to the Water Supply Bank 
lease have always included the entirety of what is now the Greenheart Property. 
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17. The warranty deed conveying the Greenheart Property to Defendant Greenheart 
("Warranty Deed") recites that the premises are conveyed ''with their appurtenances unto said 
Grantee and to the Grantee's heirs and assigns forever." 
18. Under Idaho law, a deed containing language conveying real property •'with 
appurtenances" is presumed to convey appurtenant water rights unless it can be clearly shown 
that it was known to both parties that the water rights were not intended to be conveyed. Russell 
v. Irish, 20 Idaho 194, 198, 118 P. 1031 (1900) (conveyance carries with it the appurtenant water 
right unless it was specifically reserved in the deed or it could be clearly shown that it was 
known to both parties that the water right was not intended to be conveyed). 
19. The following facts and circumstances demonstrate and clearly show that it was 
known to the Browns and the Defendant that the no portion of the Water Rights were intended to 
be conveyed to Defendant Greenheart: 
a. In 2007, at the time Greenheart Property was purchased by Defendant 
Greenheart, it was dry land and it had not been irrigated during the 19 
years that the Browns owned it prior to selling it to Defendant Greenheart; 
b. At the time of the conveyance to Defendant Greenheart there was no 
system in place on the Greenheart Property to divert or distribute water to 
irrigate it; 
c. At the time of the conveyance to Defendant Greenheart the Greenheart 
Property had been idled from irrigation pursuant to the Brown's Water 
Supply Bank lease with the IWRB. 
d. The per-acre purchase price in 2007 for the Greenheart Property was 
commensurate with prices normally paid in southern Idaho at the time of 
sale for non-irrigated grazing land; 
e. Prior to the sale to Greenheart, the Browns and the Browns' real estate 
agent each represented to Defendant Greenheart as buyer that the 
Greenheart Property was being sold without water rights; 
f. The purchase and sale agreement executed by the Browns and Defendant 
Greenheart included a seller's property disclosure form (a true and correct 
copy ofwlrieh i9 Mtaeheti herete M=BK:hieit "B"). Uneer die eisele!M'e 
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entitled "Irrigation water provided by:", the Browns indicated "NIA" for 
not applicable; 
g. After the closing of the purchase and sale of the Geenheart Property, 
Defendant Greenheart submitted a June 10, 2007 Notice of Appeal to the 
Elmore County Board of Equalization ("Board") for the Greenheart 
Property wherein Defendant challenged the classification of the property 
as irrigated agriculture and sought to have it reclassified as Category 5 Dry 
Grazing, and stated that at the time of the purchase Defendant was told 
"that the land is dry." A true and correct copy of the Notice of Appeal 
which was provided to the Browns by Ms. Greenheart is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "F'; 
h. On July 6, 2007, at Defendant Greenheart's direction and upon her express 
written authorization, Jay Brown appeared before the Board and 
.regresented that the Greenheart Property was dry land and had been 
purchased and conveyed as dry land without any irrigation water rights 
and would not be irrigated ''unless at such time a water right is purchased 
for the property by Ms. Greenheart." A true and correct copy of the letter 
from Jay Brown to the Board containing such representations is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "G"; 
i. On July 6, 2007, the Board granted the Defendant's request to reclassify 
the land and upheld the assessor's adjusted valuation of the Greenheart 
Property to reflect that it is, indeed, dry grazing land with no irrigation 
water. A true and correct copy of the minutes of the July 6, 2007 Board 
meeting approving Ms. Greenheart's requested reclassification of the 
Greenheart Property as dry grazing. as maintained and published on the 
Elmore County website, is attached hereto as Exhibit "H"; 
j. Since July 6, 2007, Defendant Greenheart has received a financial benefit 
of more favorable tax treatment from that reclassification of the 
Greenheart Property as Category 5 "dry grazing"; 
k. In a November 8, 2009 e-mail to Ms. Schindele, an employee with Elmore 
County concerning Elmore County's offer to purchase the Greenheart 
Property, Defendant Greenheart stated, among other things, that "at the 
time of the purchase, I also was very aware that the parcel is dry grazing 
only due to lack of an irrigation system and no water rights." A true and 
correct copy of that November 8, 2009 e-mail, of which the Browns were 
included as courtesy copy recipients, is attached hereto as Exhibit "I"; 
20. Because the Browns were and are contemplating one or more sales or transfers of 
Water Rights 61-2188 and 61-7151, and wished to clear up any potential issues concerning their 
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February 8, 2012 and requested that she confinn in writing that she was aware she did not 
purchase the Greenheart Property with water rights and did not object to any sale or transfer of 
the Water Rights by the Browns. 
21. In response, on February 17, 2012, without notice to the Browns, the Defendant 
instead filed with the Idaho Department of Water Resources a Notice of Change of Water Right 
Ownership ("Notice,,) and attached copy of the Warranty Deed. In the Notice Defendant 
Oreenheart represented among other things that the Water Rights were "divided proportionally 
based on the portion of their place(s) of use acquired by the new owner." The Notice makes no 
mention of Defendant's agreement with the Browns and admissions to the Elmore County Board 
of Equalization that she had purchased the Greenheart Property without water rights. A true .and 
correct copy of the Change of Ownership form obtained from the Idaho Department of Water 
Resources electronic water right database is attached hereto as Exhibit "J." 
22. On March 9, 2012, the Department revised its water right database to indicate 
Defendant Greenheart as the current owner of portions of the Water Rights, and reduced the 
quantity of water and irrigated acres authorized under the Water Rights decreed to the Browns 
commensurately. Due to certain technical errors in the Departmenf s revisions the water right 
database was subsequently revised by the Department on March 22, 2012. True and correct 
copies of the Department's correspondence to the Defendant and to the Browns concerning the 
corrections to its water right records database for water rights 61-2188, 61-7151, and for water 
rights 61-12272 and 61-12273 as revised on March 22, 2012 are attached hereto as Exhibit "K" 
and Exhibit "L" respectively (hereinafter, "Notices"). 
23. Each of the Notices states that "[ c ]hanges to the ownership of water rights in the 
department's database are based on infonnation provided in the Notice of Change of Ownership 
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by the person submitting the form. The department includes the infonnation provided in its 
database, but does not determine legal ownership." 
24. Plaintiffs are without an adequate remedy at law and this Complaint concerns 
unique real property, Idaho Code § SS-101, for which the remedy of a decree of rights and/or 
specific perfonnance will lie. 
COUNT1 
Quiet Tltle/Dedaratory Judgment - Contract lnterpretadon 
25. The foregoing paragraphs are hereby incorporated by this reference and restated 
as if set forth in full. 
26. Based on information and belief, Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant claims an 
interest or estate adverse to the Plaintiffs in the Water Rights 61-2188 and 61-7151 in that 
Defendant alleges that they are connected with the Greenheart Property. 
27. The facts and circumstances of the transaction by which Defendant purchased the 
property from Plaintiffs, and the parties' subsequent conduct thereafter, establish that any 
presumption that any portion of the Water Rights passed to Defendant Oreenheart under the 
general appurtenancy clause of the Warranty Deed is conclusively rebutted by facts clearly 
demonstrating that it was known to both parties that no portion of the Water Rights were 
intended to be conveyed, and compel an interpretation of the purchase agreement and Warranty 
Deed to the effect that the Greenheart Property was purchased and conveyed without water 
rights, but rather as dry land. The facts and circumstances of the transaction and the parties' 
prior. contemporaneous and subsequent condu'-1. among other things, create an issue of mutual 
mistake and allow the court to consider the extrinsic evidence described in this Complaint for the 
12urpose of reforming the Wammty Deed to reflect the parties' mutual intent that no water rights 
were to be conveyed. 
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28. Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment decreeing and declaring 
a. that the Purchase and Sale Agreement did not provide for conveyance of 
any portion of the Water Rights, and that no portion of the Water Rights 
was in fact conveyed by the Warranty Deed to Defendant Greenheart as an 
appurtenance the Greenheart Property or otherwise; 
b. that the Water Rights, as and to the full extent originally decreed to the 
Browns by the SRBA Court, are the sole and exclusive property of the 
Plaintiffs; and 
~that the Defendant has no right, title or interest in the Water Rights 61· 
2188 and 61-71S1, or those portions of the Water Rights now identified in 
the records of the Idaho Department of Water Resources as 61-12272 and 
61-12273. 
e.d.that the Wammty Deed be reformed and rewritten to reflect the foregoing. 
COUNT2 
Quiet Title/Declaratory Judgment - Estoppel 
29. The foregoing paragraphs are hereby incorporated by this reference and restated 
as if set forth in full. 
30. The parties hereto have a dispute over the interpretation of their Warranty Deed 
and Purchase and Sale Agreement 
31. At the time the Purchase and Sale Agreement and Warranty Deed were executed, 
Greenheart knew or should have known that the Greenheart Property was being sold as dry land 
with no water rights. 
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32. Greenheart's subsequent conduct including representations to third parties to 
obtain a monetary benefit after her consummation of the purchase of the Greenheart Property 
was consistent with her agreement that she had indeed purchased dry, non-irrigated land with no 
water rights. 
33. Based on Defendant's conduct as alleged in this Complaint and her 
representations, the Browns are entitled to a judgment decreeing and declaring that Greenheart is 
barred Wlder principles of equitable estogl. promissory estoppel, quasi-estoppel and/or waiver 
from insisting or asserting that the Greenheart Property enjoys any benefit of Water Rights Nos. 
61-2188 and 61-7151 including any portion of same currently identified as 61-12272 and 61-
12273 in that 
a. The Browns reasonably and detrimentally relied on Greenheart's conduct 
and representations; 
b. Greenheart, having taken the position that the Greenheart Property was 
dry land with no irrigated water rights, is precluded from asserting an 
inconsistent position because it would be, or would cause a disadvantage 
to the Browns or be unconscionable to permit Greenheart to change her 
position; and/or 
c. Oreenheart voluntarily and intentionally relinquished any right to claim or 
assert that water rights passed with title to her to the Greenheart Property. 
34. Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment decreeing and declaring 
a. that the Purchase and Sale Agreement did not provide for conveyance of 
any portion of the Water Rights, and that no portion of the Water Rights 
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was in fact conveyed, by the Warranty Deed to Defendant Greenheart as 
an appurtenance the Greenheart Property or otherwise; 
b. that the Water Rights, as and to the full extent originally decreed to the 
Browns by the SRBA Court, are the sole and exclusive property of the 
Plaintiffs; and 
c. that the Defendant has no right, title or interest in the Water Rights 61-
2188 and 61-7151, or those portions of the Water Rights now identified in 
the records of the Idaho Department of Water Resources as 61-12272 and 
61-12273. 
ATTORNEYS' FEES 
Plaintiffs have been forced to retain the services of Givens Pursley LLP to pursue this 
action and are entitled to a reasonable attorneys' fee and costs incurred for doing so pursuant to 
the purchase and sale agreement, Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) and Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure 54(d) and 54(3), in an amount not to exceed $5,000 in the event of a judgment by 
default or in such other and further amount as this Court may deem appropriate in the premises t 
the appropriate time in the proceeding. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray this Court enter the following relief: 
1. For judgment in Plaintiffs' favor on each count of the Complaint, decreeing and 
declaring the specific relief prayed for in each such count; 
2. For a declaration that Defendant Greenheart has no right, title or interest in or to 
any portion of Water Rights 61-2188 and 61-7151 as decreed, or in those portions of Water 
Rights 61-2188 and 61-7151 currently identified as 61-12272 and 61-12273 in the Department's 
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water right records, and further that Defendant Greenheart has no right of notice, review, protest, 
consent, authorization or waiver with respect the Browns' beneficial use and enjoyment of the 
Water Rights, including but not limited to the Browns' right to sell, transfer or convey the Water 
Rights, and any portion thereof, to other persons and to change any element of the Water Rights, 
including but not limited to the place of use, point of diversion or nature of use. 
3. For an order of costs and attorneys' fees on the bases set forth above, which are 
hereby incorporated by reference, in an amount not to exceed $5,000 in the event of a default 
judgment, or in such other and further amounts as may be deemed appropriate by the Court at the 
appropriate time in the proceedings; and 
4. For such other and further relief as this Court may deem appropriate in the 
premises. 
DATED this ___ day of February, 2013. 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
Thomas E. Dvorak 
Attorneys for Jay and Christine Brown 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this __ day of February, 2013, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to the persons listed below the method indicated: 
Victor Villegas 
Borton & Lakey 
141 B. Carlton A venue 
Meridian, ID 83642 
Facsimile: 493-4610 





Thomas E. Dvorak 
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' 
Michael C. Creamer (Idaho State Bar ID# 4030) 
Thomas E. Dvorak. (Idaho State Bar ID# S043) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 




Attorneys for Plaintiffs Jay and Christine Brown 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR 11IB 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON-
BROWN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
AUGUSTA SA YOKO MIMOTO 
GREENHEART, an individual, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-353 
MOTION SHORTEN TIME TO 
HEAR MOTION TO AMEND 
COME NOW, Plaintiffs, Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown (hereinafter the 
"Browns"), by and through their attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LLP, and hereby move this 
Court pursuant to Rule 6(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and the inherent power of the 
Court to control its docket for entry of an order shortening time to allow their Motion to Amend 
to be heard on February 22, 2013 at 2:30 p.m. This motion is critical to the hearing on the 
parties' Pre-Trial Conference scheduled for the same day, as it addresses an issue of amendment 
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to the pleadings that was raised by the Court's rccc:mt decision on crosa motions for summary 
judpnent. 
DATED this 
Attorneys for Jay and Christine Brown 
CERTIJICA.TE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 21 J{.Y of Pobmary, 2013, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foroaoins document to thc persons listed below tbe method indicated: 
Victor Villegas 
Borton & Lakey 
141 B. Carlton Avenue 
Meridian, ID 83642 
Facsimile: 493~10 
_ l;iand Delivery 
_-V'F_aes timile 
_ Ovemigbt Courier 
U.S. Mail 
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Thomas E. Dvorak (Idaho State Bar ID I 5043) 
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60 I West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 




Attorneys for Plaintiffs Jay and Christine Brown 
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JN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR 11IE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON-
BROWN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
AUGUSTA SA YOKO MIMOTO 
GREENHEART, an individual, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-353 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME TO 
HEAR HER MOTIONS FOR 
RECONSIDERATION AND 
MOTION IN LIMINE 
COME NOW, Plaintiffs Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown, by and through their 
counsel of record, Givens Pursley LLP, and hereby files this Response in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion to Shorten Time to Hear Her Motions for Reconsideration and Motion in 
Liminc. Plaintiffs believe that the Motion to Shorten Time is not appropriate, as it is prejudicial 
to them in that hearing it on February 22 does not allow Plaintiffs' sufficient time to file full 
briefs in opposition as contemplated under the rules to each of said motions. Plaintiffs would 
simply ask that the Court allow these issues to be orally argued during the time set for the court 
trial in this matter and any briefing be done in the context of written closing arguments. In the 
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alternative, Plaintiffs would ask that they be afforded reasonable time to draft a brief in 
opposition and an opportunity to argue the same to the Court 
ARGUMENT 
A. Hearing these Motions at the Pretrial Conference Prejudices Plaintiffs' Ability to 
Meaningfully Respond to Them 
The Defendant filed a Motion to Shorten Time on two underlying motions, a Motion in 
Limine to Preclude Allegations of Mistake and a Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's 
January 31, 2013, Order On Cross Motions for Summary Judgment. The Motion in Lirnine 
appears to overlap with about a third of the Motion for Reconsideration, at least to the extent that 
it seeks to exclude evidence based on an argument that mutual mistake has not been plead and 
may not be plead at the present time. The Motion for Reconsideration then goes on to seek 
reconsideration of the Court's rulings on the statute of limitations issues and also introduces a 
new statute of limitations, one applicable to a claim of mistake. The Motion to Shorten Time 
seeks to hear all of these issues at the February 22, 2013 Pretrial Conference. 
However, these motions were filed on February 15, 2013, and only faxed to Plaintiffs' 
counsel's office at approximately 4:50 p.m. on that Friday. By that point, Plaintiffs' counsel had 
already left the office on a planned three-day out of town trip with family that was available due 
to the occurrence of President's Day (which also caused courts to be closed on Monday). That 
left a total of three working days for Plaintiffs' counsel to respond to these motions. In the 
course of those three working days, Plaintiffs' counsel had a mediation scheduled in another case 
and had already planned to draft the required Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
and Witness and Exhibit Lists for this case, as well as tend to other matters. Needless to say, 
Plaintiffs' trial counsel has not had a full and fair opportunity to research the issues raised and 
write an adequate response to the same in the limited time available. Indeed, Defendant's 
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counsel themselves from receiving the Court's Decision that was mailed on January 31, 2013, 
took a full two weeks to put their Motions together, despite the fact that they have known of the 
pretrial conference hearing since it was set on September 2012. This time pressure is prejudicial 
to the interests of Plaintiffs in having a thoroughly researched, well-written brief, and is the main 
reason that Plaintiffs are unable to file anything but a response in opposition to Motion to 
Shorten Time. In and of itself, this is grounds to deny the Motion to Shorten Time and not hear 
these other motions. As a practical matter, on this basis and the basis of judicial economy and 
efficiency, the Court can deem to take the underlying Motions up in the context of the court trial. 
After all, there is no jury to be confused by the evidence if the ruling on the Motion in Limine is 
postponed. And, as in most trials, counsel for the Plaintiffs (and presumably for the defense as 
well), desires the opportunity to submit written closing arguments. Thus, the Court can take 
these arguments up in the ordinary course, within the trial and the written closing arguments, and 
rule on the same accordingly without having to rush its decision or rush counsel. There is no 
need to shorten time. 
B. The Motion to Shorten Time should be Denied as the Underlyin1 Motion in Limine 
and Motion for Reconsideration are Without Basis; This Court bas Discretion to 
Find that the Issue of Mistake was Impliedly Tried on Cross Motions for Summary 
Judgment; or Alternatively to Allow an Amendment of the Complaint to Reflect the 
Reformation by Mutual Mistake as Being Suggested by the Evidence. 
In Defendant's Motion in Limine as well as its Motion for Reconsideration, Defendant 
argues that Plaintiffs did not plead mutual mistake, that Plaintiffs should be precluded from 
raising the issue now, and implicitly, that no amendment of the Complaint should be allowed. 
Because these arguments are without merit, the Motion to Shorten Time should be denied. 
This Court was essentially correct in its decision when it stated that: 
Pleadings in this case and the evidence submitted tn support of the motion tor 
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summary judgment raise the issue of mistake, which would permit extrinsic 
evidence to be considered. 
Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment at p. 10. In other words, the conclusion that 
mistake is the appropriate legal doctrine to be applied in considering extrinsic evidence has been 
lurking in this case the whole time, suggested by the evidence that was described in the case, and 
nothing about the Court's determination to openly announce the applicable legal doctrine and 
bring it to the forefront changed the essential character of the facts and circumstances comprising 
mistake that have always been present in this case and will be the subject of a court trial on 
March 5. For this reason, the Court has discretion to determine that the issue of mistake was 
tried by express consent of the parties. 
In the case of Mikesell v. Newworld Development Corp., 122 Idaho 868, 840 P.2d 1090 
(Ct. App. 1992), which involved a complaint to quiet title based on an alleged oral contract to 
convey land, in answer to an argument that the court had found for a party on fraud, but pursuant 
to I.R.C.P. 9(b), that party was required to plead defenses constituting misrepresentation with 
particularity, and failure to so plead at all precluded the district court from finding fraud on the 
part of the other party, the appellate court noted: 
Newworld argues that pursuant to I.R.C.P. 9(b) the Burgesses were required to 
plead the circumstances constituting misrepresentation with particularity, and that 
their failure to plead misrepresentation at all precluded the district court from 
finding fraud on the part ofNewworld. I.R.C.P. 15(b), however, provides: When 
issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by the express or implied consent of 
the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised by the 
pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them 
to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of 
any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect 
the result of the trial on these issues. 
Pursuant to this rule, the supreme court had held that where a theory of recovery 
is fully tried by the parties, the court may base its decision on that theory and 
deem the pleadings amended accordingly. Failure to amend the pleadings to 
include issues tried Q}'. the express or implied consent of the parties does not affect 
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the trial court's findings on those issues. The supreme court has applied this rule 
to actions where issues of fraud or mistake have been litigated, though not raised 
by the pleadings. 
The determination of whether an issue not raised by the pleadings has been 
tried by the consent of the parties is within the discretion of the trial court 
and such determination will be reversed only when that discretion has been 
abased. In this case it is clear that Newworld had notice of the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the Burgess's assertions of misrepresentation, and that 
the issue was fully litigated by the parties at trial. To reverse the district court's 
finding of misrepresentation on a procedural technicality argued by Newworld 
would be contrary to the very purposes of Rule 15 which are: 
First, to allow the best chance for each claim to be determined 
on the merits rather than on some procedural technicality; and 
second to relegate the pleadings to the limited role of providing 
parties of notice of the nature of the pleader's claim and the 
facts that have been called into question. 
Clarie v. Olson, 110 Idaho 323, 326, 715 P.2d 993, 996 (1986). Because the issue 
of misrepresentation was fully litigated with the consent of the parties, the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in treating that issue as though it had been 
properly plead. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's finding of 
misrepresentation as well as its order to reform the deed based on that 
misrepresentation. 
Id. (citations omitted)( emphasis added). 
Defendant is essentially arguing that somehow they were able to raise a technical 
"gotcha" before trial and thereby cut off the ability of the Court to determine each claim on the 
merits rather ''than on some procedural technicality." If a Court has the ability in a trial to 
introduce and find on a new cause of action suggested by the evidence because of the desire to 
decide cases on the merits, when the same thing happens on cross motions for summary 
judgment, i.e., the evidence points to an unplead cause of action, there is no distinguishable 
policy that demands a different rule. Indeed, in the present case, the parties filed cross motions 
for summary judgment in a matter to be tried by the Court. That action in and of itself is an 
invitation for the Court to decide conflicting issues of fact in a trial like setting. See Banner Life 
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Insurance Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixon Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 117, 123-124. 206 P.3d 481, 
487-488 (2009)(holding Court may draw probable inferences from evidence offered on summary 
judgment since it will ultimately be sitting as finder of fact). Here, the Court appears to have 
determined that the evidence suggests the legal theory of mistake may be applicable, and that the 
Court would like to hear additional evidence under the mistake theory. Based on the Mikesell 
holding. it is well within the Court's discretion to determine that the door has been opened on 
mistake and it has been tried by the consent of the parties. See e.g. Brown v. City of Pocatello, 
148 Idaho 802, 808, 229 P.3d 1164, 1170 (2010)(noting that in prior case court held where 
complaint facts sufficiently alleged three part test for promissory estoppel but never mentioned 
promissory estoppel by name nevertheless the short and plain statement in the complaint 
succinctly offered allegations that if true would meet the elements of a claim for promissory 
estoppel)(citing Gillespie v. Mountain Park Estates LLC, 138 Idaho 27, 56 P.3d 1277 (2002)). 
In any event, even in the face of an objection from an opposing party, under I.R.C.P. 
l 5(b ), a motion to amend under Rule 15 may be made and granted at any time, even after trial. 
Given the separate Motion to Amend that Plaintiffs have determined to file as a precautionary 
measure with this Response, the portion of Rule 15(b) that is relevant is not the first sentence 
relating to trying issues by implied or express consent that is raised by the Defendant, but rather 
the parts that come after that sentence, namely, 
Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform 
to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at 
any time, even after judgment; but failure to so amend does not affect the result 
of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground 
that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the 
pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of the 
merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to 
satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice the party in 
maintaining the party's action or defense upon the merits. The court may grant a 
continuance to enable the objecting party to meet such eyidence. 
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I.R.C.P. 15(b) (emphasis added). On its face, this rule contemplates that free leave to amend 
shall be given even in the face of an objection by the opposing party, and in fact only denied 
upon a showing of such prejudice that a continuance would not cure the prejudice. Accordingly, 
contemporaneously herewith, amendment of the pleadings is now sought to conform them to the 
evidence as outlined in the Court's decision on summary judgment. 1 
In applying Rule l S(b ), the Court is given broad discretion to allow amendments to the 
pleadings to conform to the proof. See, e.g., Pennsylvania-Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. 
Gallagher, 19 Idaho 101, 112 P. 1044 (1910); Gaskill v. Jacobs, 38 Idaho 795, 225 P. 499 
(1924); Durant v. Snyder, 65 Idaho 678, 151 P.2d 776 (1944); Smith v. Big Lost River Irrigation 
District, 83 Idaho 374, 364 P.2d 146 (1961). Indeed, the case law reiterates the portion of Rule 
1 S(b) stating that even if the new cause of action has not been consented to, it is simply 
necessary that a party request leave of the court to amend in order to bring the legal issue 
forward. Reynolds v. Continental Mtg. Co., 85 Idaho 172, 377 P.2d 134 (1962)(noting that even 
if issues are not tried by express or implied consent, if an objection is made that the trial of an 
issue not raised by the pleading "an amendment is to be allowed to raise the issue, unless the 
objecting party can show that he would be actually prejudiced, and even in that case the court 
may permit an amendment and grant a continuance so that the objecting party can meet the new 
issue, and thus obviate the prejudice that he would suffer if obligated to litigate the issue at that 
time. The sporting element in litigation is eliminated.")(quoting Moores Federal Practice, Vol. 3, 
p. 805). In ruling on such a motion, the trial court has wide discretion to allow such 
amendments, even as late as the close of testimony. 
implied consent of the parties on summary judgment. 
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In the case of Cameron Sales, Inc. v. Klemish, 93 Idaho 451, 463 P.2d 287 (1970), in a 
case which had been initiated on the basis of a farm laborer's lien, the Idaho Supreme Court held 
that the trial court did not err in allowing an amendment after the offering of evidence to amend 
the pleadings to confonn to proof to show the existence of a compromise and settlement, which 
had not been plead. The court noted: 
The rule is well established that a trial court has wide discretion in permitting 
amendments of pleadings at any stage of the proceeding to confonn to the proof. 
Even prior to the adoption of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Idaho 
recognized liberality in this regard. l.R.C.P. 15(b) states in pertinent part that: 
If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not 
within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the 
pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the 
presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby 
and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission 
of such evidence would prejudice the party in maintaining the 
party's action or defense upon the merits. The court may grant a 
continuance to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
At trial, both appellants were represented by the same counsel, even though their 
interests were opposed to each other by reason of their different interests in the 
check representing the proceeds of the grain crop. Appellants object to the 
admission of any evidence related to the January 13, 1968, meeting [at which the 
court found a compromise and settlement]. The record, however, fails to show 
any prejudice of such nature as to require reversal in that regard. The record 
reflects that counsel representing both appellants was present at the meeting, 
which was held in his office. At that meeting, he purportedly was representing 
both parties. The record fails to show that any request was made for a 
continuance of trial in order to prepare a better defense to meet this issue 
presented by this evidence of a compromise. The appellants argued that the trial 
court erred in allowing the respondent to close the evidence to amend his 
complaint to allege a compromise agreement because such amendment, they 
contend, introduced a new cause of action. l.R.C.P. 15(b) does not bar 
amendments which change the cause of action or the theory of the case. Moore 
states that: 
Rule l 5(b) has rejected any concept that such amendments are 
barred if they result in change to the Plaintiffs' "cause of action." 
Rule l 5(b) does not even limit the amendment to the transaction or 
occurrence set forth in the pleadings; the only apparent limitation 
is. that the court have jurisdiction over the matter tried, although as 
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ordinarily do arise from the same general set of facts set forth in 
the complaint . . . The fact that tbil involves a change in the 
nature of the cause of action, or the legal theory of the action, 
ii immaterial as long as the opposing party bu not been 
prejudiced in presenting hil cue. 
Id at 454, 463 P.2d at 290 (citations omitted). 
The case of Collins v. Parkin.son, 96 Idaho 294, 527 P.2d 1252 (1974), cited by 
Defendant in its Memorandum in Support of Reconsideration, p. 5, does not imply what 
Defendant takes from it. The Defendant cites this case indicating that it was a quiet title action 
where the issue of mutual mistake was tried by implication because, as the Supreme Court put it, 
no objection was made and therefore the issue was properly raised at trial. Defendant infers that 
the converse would be true, i.e., any objection would have prevented mutual mistake from being 
raised. However, presumably had an objection been made and the other side asked to amend, the 
appropriate analysis would have been under Rule 15(b ), the latter portion. In whicll case, the 
opposing party would have had to demonstrate prejudice such that even a continuance could not 
cure the prejudice. Indeed, in the Collins case, the court noted that, 
the remedy of reformation was properly utilized by the trial court because the 
final judgment in an action is to afford the prevailing party the relief to which it is 
entitled, even if that relief ii not demanded in the pleadings. 
Id at 296, 527 P.2d at 1254 (citing I.R.C.P. 54(c) and Nab v. Hilla, 92 Idaho 877, 452 P.2d 981 
(1969)). 
If anything, Rule l 5(b) contemplates that even as late as trial, a motion to amend will be 
allowed and only when the defendant can show unusual prejudice as a result of the amendment 
such that cannot be cured by allowing a continuance, should the court exercise its discretion to 
deny such an amendment. This is in accord with both Rule 1 (a) and its admonition that "these 
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rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive termination of every 
action and proceeding" and Rule 61, which provides: 
No error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or admitted by the 
court or by any of the parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside 
a verdict or vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, 
unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial 
justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or 
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
l.R.C.P. 1 and 61. Rule 15(b) is one of those rules and must be construed in accordance with 
them. This situation fits squarely within those rules. The just determination of this action 
requires that it be determined on the facts that are plead, and the Court's determination of the 
appropriate legal theory to apply to those facts is an afterthought to determining the matter on the 
facts. It would be a miscarriage of justice to not allow the case to be tried on the facts that have 
been plead to this point on the basis of a mere technicality. Further, Rule 61 's admonition that 
an error is harmless unless it is such that it is inconsistent with substantial justice cries out for 
allowing the case to go forward on the issue of mutual mistake as framed up by the Court in its 
recent decision on summary judgment. Defendant simply cannot point to any prejudice or 
inconsistency with substantial justice simply because the Court is requiring the Defendant to 
meet the facts that have been in the case since the Complaint was filed under what the Court has 
determined to be the appropriate legal cause of action. 
In the interest of doing substantial justice, and the absence of prejudice to Defendant, the 
Motion for Reconsideration and the Motion in Limine are without basis and thus the Motion to 
Shorten Time should be denied. Indeed, even if the Defendant requestc; a continuance, Plaintiffs 
would have no objection to the same and, in fact, after receiving the Court's decision requested 
that the Defendant join with Plaintiffs in seeking a continuance to allow for a mediation of this 
dispute The Defendant refused to engage in the same. 
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C. The Motion To Shorten Time Should Be Denied Because The Motion for 
Reconsideration Argument That The Statute of Limitations Has Run in This Case 
Likewise Has No Merit. 
The argument that the statute of limitations has run in this case has no merit. This issue 
was thoroughly briefed and it is and remains the Plaintiffs, position that there is no applicable 
statute of limitations or in any case, Idaho Code § 5-203 applies and that clearly the Plaintiffs 
were seized or possessed of property within 20 years of the date this lawsuit was filed, as 
Plaintiffs were undisputedly seized or possessed of the real property that was transferred (which 
allegedly brought along the proportionate share of water rights) as late as 2007 when the deed at 
issue was rendered. This falls within the 20-year time frame. Plaintiffs would also cite to and 
agree with the Court's reasoning in its Order on Motions for Summary Judgment as to the statute 
of limitations. The focus should be on the water rights at issue-which the Browns had every 
reason to believe were still their property and not being claimed by Greenheart until February of 
2012-and the focus should not be on the real property that was transferred. As this Court held: 
Applying the plain language of Idaho Code Section 6-40 l, the applicable statute 
of limitations did not begin to run until Greenheart asserted an adverse claim 
against the water rights by filing with I.D.W.R. There is no evidence in the 
record that Greenheart made any claims in any form or degree to any alleged 
water rights for the land she purchased from January 29, 2007, until February 17, 
2012. So, filing with the I.D.W.R. was the first instance Greenheart asserted any 
ownership in the water rights adverse to Plaintiffs. Therefore, this quiet title 
action filed on April 5, 2012, is well within all the statute of limitations asserted 
by the parties. 
Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment at p. 7. 
D. The Motion to Shorten Time Should Be Denied Because the Argument That The 
Statute of Limitations Has Run on the Brown's Mistake Claim is Without Merit. 
The Defendant argues that Idaho Code § 5-218(4) applies and that the three-year statute 
of limitations for a claim based on mistake has passed. Plaintiffs believe that when the mistake 
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was discovered or could have been discovered is an inherently factual detennination and that it is 
appropriate for the Court to hear evidence on the matter at trial. Plaintiffs contend that that 
evidence and the evidence offered at trial provides an ample basis for this Court to conclude that 
the statute of limitations wider§ 5-218(4) did not start rwining based on discovery until February 
17, 2012, when the Defendant first asserted a claim to the water rights that were allegedly 
transferred by means of the deed and its reference to appurtenances. 
Idaho Code Section 5-218(4) provides a plaintiff has three years to file suit for: 
(a]n action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake. The cause of action in 
such case not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved 
party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake. 
Idaho Code § 5-218(4). The language itself focuses on discovery of "facts constituting the ... 
mistake." The tune sounded by the Defendant in this case is the same technicality-type tune that 
she has been playing the whole lawsuit. Namely, that the end all and be all is the reference to 
appurtenances in the Deed and that automatically a proportionate share of water rights went 
simply by virtue of use of that reference. At this jwicture, the Defendant alleges that the use of 
that reference started the three-year clock ticking automatically and that the Plaintiffs should 
have been on constructive notice by operation of law and the recording statutes. 
In contrast, this is a much more fact-specific test and an archaic term in a deed such as 
"appurtenances" that makes no express reference to ·-water rights" cannot be said as a matter of 
law to conclusively put a party on notice of the facts comprising a mistake. Indeed, the language 
of the statute itself talks in terms of discovery "of the fact constituting the fraud or mistake." 
The argument urged by the Defendant is essentially a legal interpretation of the meaning of the 
word "appurtenances." The Deed itself does not use the words "water rights" or anything else 
that would excite the attention of a reasonable person to the fact that a transfer of those rights had 
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accrued, unless they were a legal scholar who was able to divine the framework of the relevant 
Idaho case law. See, e.g., McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 820 P.2d 360 (1991)(bolding that 
although issue of when cause of action accrued in fraud action is question of law for summary 
judgment purposes. where discovery of cause of action commences statute of limitations, date of 
discovery is fact question for jury unless there is no evidence creating question of fact). 
An argument very similar to that made by Defendant was made and rejected by the Idaho 
Court of Appeals in the case of Aitken v. Gill, 108 Idaho 900, 702 P.2d 1360 (1985). In that 
case, the seller, Aitken, had sold certain land near Riggins, Idaho, to the buyer, Gill, in 1962. At 
that time, the buyer, Gill believed that approximately 17 acres of land known as Rocky Flat were 
supposed to be included with the property to be described in the deed. However, Aitken thought 
otherwise. The deed in 1962, in fact, did not include Rocky Flat in the actual legal description. 
In 1975, the assessor's office advised all parties that the land description in the deed was 
defective for reasons unrelated to the Rocky Flat issue. To correct that defect, the parties 
executed and delivered two more deeds, one in 1976 and one in 1978. Each deed was recorded 
shortly after delivery, but both contained descriptions that, unlike the 1962 deed, included Rocky 
Flat. In 1981, Aitken, the seller, became aware of the mistake in the 1976 and 1978 deeds and 
brought suit in 1982 seeking reformation based on mutual mistake. On appeal, the timeliness of 
the bringing of suit was challenged. The Aitken court noted that: 
[i]n applying the statute of fraud case, our Supreme Court has held that "actual 
knowledge of the fraud will be inferred if the aIJegedly aggrieved party could 
have discovered it by the exercise of due diligence." . We believe the same 
principle logically applies to causes of action based upon mistake. Accordingly, 
we hold that an action seeking relief from mistake will be time barred under J.C. § 
5-218( 4) unless it is filed within three years after the mistake could have been 
discovered in the exercise of due diligence. 
In this case, it is uncontroverted that seller sued within three years after the 
mistakM was di~overed i11. 198 I, but more than three years after the mistake first 
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occurred in 1976 and later reoccurred in 1978. The district judge made no 
determination as to whether the mistake could have been discovered by the 
exercise of due diligence before 1981. An issue of due diligence is one of fact, to 
be addressed in the first instance by the trial court. Whereas here, no finding has 
been made upon a material issue, the case must be remanded unless the record is 
clear "yields an obvious answer to the relevant question." 
Our examination of the record discloses no "obvious answer" to the question 
of due diligence. On the one hand, the 1976 deed clearly refers to land in 
"section 21 ... lying east of the Little Salmon River:• which undisputedly is 
Rocky Flat. On the other hand, it is also clear that the 1976-78 deeds were 
intended to remedy an apparent defect unrelated to Rocky Flat. Moreover, the 
circumstances surrounding the procurement of property descriptions and the 
incorporation of those descriptions in the 1976-78 deeds are obscure. Whether 
the sellers failed to exercise due diligence in examining the descriptions is a 
question ill suited to appellate fact finding on this record. A remand is required. 
For guidance on remand, we note that the recordation of the 1976-78 deeds has 
no bearing on the question of due diligence. When deeds are recorded, 
constructive knowledge of their contents is imparted to "subsequent purchasers or 
encumbrancers." I.C. § 55-811. In any event, such constructive knowledge 
can be no greater than the seller's actual knowledge when they signed and 
delivered the deeds. 
Id at 901, 702 P.2d at 1361 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). 
In the present case, both parties were apparently laboring under the shared assumption 
that no water rights were passed. Indeed, the Defendant herein seems not to have understood the 
legal technical meaning of "appurtenances" until 2012. The fact that a technical nuance of the 
Deed improperly included the word "appurtenances" and had the legal effect of passing such 
water rights is not a fact that is readily within common understanding and not something that 
could have easily been discovered by the sellers. The teaching of Aitken is that in a deed mistake 
situation, the focus should be on what the seller's actual knowledge was at the time. Further in 
this case, the conduct of the Defendant in not asserting such rights until February 17, 2012, after 
being contacted by the Plaintiffs would seem to corroborate that no one knew of the effect of the 
Deed as being contrary to the original intent of the parties until much, much later than the 
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original delivery of the Deed. Accordingly. there would appear to be an issue of fact to be 
detennined on this point as to when discovery could have commenced. Therefore, the 
underlying motion for reconsideration raising the issue of the statue of limitations is without 
merit and the Motion to Shorten Time should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Again, based upon the press of time and other matters, counsel for the Plaintiffs has not 
had an opportunity to fully respond to the main motions, the Motion in Limine and the Motion 
for Reconsideration. Counsel has elected instead to put what response could be put together in 
the limited time afforded as an objection to the Motion to Shorten Time. Counsel would offer 
and suggest that the Court deem that these matters be taken up in the ordinary course and that the 
Court allow for a briefing schedule by way of closing arguments to be presented at the 
conclusion of the court trial in this matter. The efficient and inexpensive administration of 
justice would be promoted in this fashion and there is no reason why these arguments that are 
raised by Defendant could not be orally argued during the Court trial of this matter and be more 
fully and formally dealt with and fully briefed at that time as part of the other briefs. 
If the Defendant raises an issue of prejudice that requires a continuation of the trial to 
address, the Plaintiffs would not be opposed to the same. However, the Plaintiffs did already 
offer to stipulate to a continuance of the trial upon receiving the Court's decision in this matter 
so as to submit to a mediation, but the Defendant was not so inclined. As part of any such 
continuance, the Plaintiffs would ask that the Court sua sponte consider ordering the parties to 
participate in a mediation of this matter. But again, only if the Court deems a continuation is 
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necessary to avoid prejudice to the Defendant or the Court otherwise dcsiies to more fully hear 
the pending motions without holding a Court trial. 
RESPBCTFULL Y SUBMrrr'.ED this 2o* day of February, 2013. 
OJVENS PURSLEY LLP 
Attomcys for Jay and Christine Brown 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 20111 day of February, 2013, I caused to be served a ttue and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to the persons listed below the method indicated: 
Victor S. Villegas, Esq. 
Borton-Lakey Law Offices 
141 E Carlton Ave. 
Meridian, ID 83642 
victor@borton-lakcy.com 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs Jay and Christine Brown 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF ELMORE 
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON-
BROWN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
Case No. CV-2012-353 
PLAINTIFFS' TRIAL WITNESS LIST 
v. 
AUGUSTA SA YOKO MIMOTO 
GREENHEART, an individual, 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW, Plaintiffs Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown (collectively 
"Plaintiffs") by and through their attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LLP, and hereby discloses 
the following as witnesses who may be called at trial in this action: 
l. JayBrown 
2. Christine Hopson Brown 
3. Augusta Sayoko Mimoto Greenheart 
4. Daryl Rhead 
5. Terry Hughes, Elmore County Assessor 
6. Danni Smith. Idaho Department of Water Resources 
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7. Steve Clelland, Idaho Department of Water Resources 
8. John Homan, Deputry Attorney General 
9. Terri LaRae Manduca 
Plaintiffs reserve the right to call any witness identified by Defendant. This reservation is 
made without waiving any right to object to Defendant's witnesses or to Defendant's failure to 
timely identify witnesses. 
Plaintiffs intend this disclosure to include any witness who is needed to lay a foundation 
for any exhibit and any witness who may be necessary for the purpose of impeachment or 
rebuttal. 
DATED this 22nd day of February, 2013. 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
Thomas E. Dvorak 
Attorneys for Jay and Christine Brown 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 2t111 day of February, 2013, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to the persons listed below the method indicated: 
Victor S. Villegas 
BORTON & LAKEY 
141 E. Carlton Ave. 
Meridian, Idaho 83642 
Telephone: (208) 908-4415 
Facsimile: (208) 493-4610 





PURSUANT TO COURT'S ORDER- JUDGE'S COPY SENT VIA EMAIL 
lnorton@adaweb.net 
hfurst@Jlmorecounty.org 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs Jay and Christine Brown 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON-
BROWN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
Case No. CV-2012-353 
PLAINTIFFS' TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST 
v. 
AUGUSTA SA YOKO MIMOTO 
GREENHEART, an individual, 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW, Plaintiffs Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown (collectively 
"Plaintiffs'') by and through their attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LLP, and hereby submits 
its Exhibit List as of February 22, 2013. Plaintiffs reserve the right to withdraw, revise, or 
supplement any of these exhibits, and/or to submit further exhibits to conform to proof presented 
at the time of trial. 
~ . . ' ~ .. . , . ~ .. '. .,. •'" r .. . 
' 
1 215188 Quitclaim Deed betWeen United 
States Department of Agriculture and Jay 
Brown (Bates Nos. BROWN0049-
BROWN0050) 
2 Water Right 61-02188 dated 10/26/00 
(Greenheart Deoo Ex. 31) 
3 Water Right 61-07151 dated 10/26/00 - . -
\Ul • LJIOilJV IJA, .J.&.I 
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4 10/1410.S RE-2.S Seller's Propaty 
Disclosure Form (Greenheart Depo Ex. 
No. 
S MLS #97281069 dated 1'2/18/06 (Bates 
No. EK 0044XGrce:nheart Depo Ex. No. 
6 
6 114101 RE-24 Vacant Land Real Estate 
Purchase and Sale Agreement (Bates 
Nos. EK 001-EK 007)(0reenhcart Depo 
Ex. No.2 
7 1125/07 Email from Linda Sloderbeck to 
Augusta Greenheart fotwarding closing 
documents for signature, with 
handwritten notes. (Bates No. EK 
008 Greenheart D Ex. No. 5 
8 1/29/07 Warranty Deed, Brows as 
Grantors and Augusta Sayoko D. 
Mimoto Greenheart as Grantee. 
Greenheart D Ex No. 4 
9 1130/07 First American Title Company's 
Statement of Settlement for Sellers. 
ates No. BROWN0036 
10 1/30/07 First American Title Company's 
Statement of Settlement for Purchasers 
Bates No. BROWN0037 
11 2/1/07 Dry Grazing Land Lease between 
Augusta Mimoto Greenheart and Jay 
Brown (Bates Nos. EK 0041-EK 
0043 Greenheart D Ex No. 18 
12 2/17/07 Sales Verification signed by 
Augusta Greenheart (Bates No. EK 
0048 Greenheart D Ex No. 3 
13 6/5/07 -6/8/07 Handwritten Notes 
regarding phone conversations Augusta 
Greenheart had with various individuals. 
(Bates Nos. EK 0019-EK 
0021 Greenheart D Ex No. I 0 
14 6/6/07 Email from Augusta Greenheart 
to Elmore County Assessor's Office re: 
Elmore County Property Tax Assessment 
Notice (Bates No. EK 003 l)(Greenheart 
D Ex No. 12 
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15 617/07 Email from Augusta Grcmheart 
to Elmore County A!SellOr's Office re: 
Elmore County Property Tax Assessment 
Notice (Bates No. EK 0030)(Greenheart 
Ex No. 23 
16 619107 Letter &om Jay Brown to Jo 
Gridley, Elmore County Assessor stating 
that the property is not irrigated 
Greenhcart Ex No. 13 
17 6110/07 Notice of Appeal submitted by 
Augusta Greenheart (Bates No. EK 
0025 Greenheart Ex No. 1 S 
18 6110/07 Notice of Appeal submitted by 
Augusta Greenheart (Greenheart Depo 
Ex No. 14 
19 · 6/20/07 Elmore County Assessor' 
Assessment Notice and Estimate of Tax 
(Bates No. EK 0023)(Greenheart Depo 
Ex No. 11 
20 6/26/07 Letter from Marsa Grimmett, 
Elmore County Board of Commissioners 
to Augusta Greenheart regarding 
scheduled meeting of the Board of 
Elmore County Commissioners to review 
her Notice of Appeal (Bates No. EK 
0022 Greenheart D Ex No. 16 
21 7 /2/07 Letter from Augusta Greenheart 
to the Elmore County Board of 
Commissioners re: Appealing my 2007 
tax assessment for parcel number 
RP04S05E249010A (Bates No. EK 
0046 Greenheart D Ex No. 17 
22 116101 Commissioners Minutes (Bates 
Nos BROWN0045-BROWN0047 
23 8/20/07 Email from Augusta Greenheart 
to Elmore County Assessor's Office re: 
lease agreement (Bates No. EK 
0029 Greenheart D Ex No. 22 
24 8/27 /07 Email from Augusta Greenheart 
to Elmore County Assessor's Office re: 
lease agreement (Bates No. EK 
0028 Greenheart D Ex No. 21 
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2007 Elmore County Aueuor' 
Assessment Notice (Bates No. EX 
003 Greenheart Ex No. 19 
26 2008 Elmore County Aawtor' 
Auessment Notice (Batel No. EK. 
0069 Greenhect Ex No. 20 
27 1213/08 Letter ftom Di111& Ball. 
Department of Wau:r Reaourcea, to Jay 
Brown re: Rental of Water Right Nos. 
61-2188 and 61-71Sl Leued to the 
Water Supply Bank. Warrant 
Notification. ates No. BROWNOOSS 
28 1 l/8/09 Email from Augusta Greenheart 
to Kristina Schindele stating that at the 
time she purchased the parcel she was 
very aware that the parcel was dry 
grazing only due to lack of water rights 
and irrigation. (Greenheart Depo Ex No. 
24 
29 2/14/12 Notice of Change in Water Right 
Ownershi Greenheart Ex No. 25 
30 3/13/12 Letter from Danni Smith, 
Department of Water Resources, to 
Augusta Greenheart re: change of 
ownership for Water Rights Nos. 61-
12272 & 61-12273. (Bates Nos. EK 
0082-EK -118)(Greenheart Oepo Ex No. 
27 
31 3/16/12 Letter from Monica Van 
Bussum, Department of Water 
Resources, to Augusta Greenheart re: 
water supply bank lease for right nos. 61-
12272 and 61-12273. (Bates Nos. EK-
0079 - EK 0081 )(Greenheart Depo Ex 
N0.29 
32 3/22/12 Letter from Michael Creamer, 
Givens Pursley LLP to John Homan, 
Deputy Attorney General, re: ownership 
of Water Rights 61-2188, 61-7151 and 
Portions Thereof Re-designated as 61-
12272 and 61-12273. (Bates Nos 
BROWNOl 59-BROWNOl 60 
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33 3/23/12 Letter from Danni Smith, 
Department of Water Resources, to 
Augusta Grecnheart re: Com:cted change 
of ownership for water Rights 61-12272 
& 61-12273. (Greenheart Depo Ex No. 
30 
34 3/23/12 Letter from Danni Smith, 
Department of Water Resources, to Jay 
Brown re: Corrected change of 
ownership for water Rights 61-12272 & 
61-12273. (Bates Nos. BROWN0237-
BROWN0252 
35 5/10112 Email from Michael Creamer, 
Givens Pursley, to Jay Friedly re: the 
sale to the City the undisputed portion of 
the Water Rights. (Bates No. 
BROWN0223 
36 7/17/12 Amended Agreement for Ale of 
Water Rights between Jay Brown and 
Christine Brown to the City of Mountain 
Home. (Bates Nos. BROWN0420-
BROWN0436 
37 7/24/12 Warranty Deed between Jay 
Brown, Christine Brown and Daniel 
Lindstrom. Bates No. BROWNOOl 8 
38 11113112 Affidavit of Augusta 
Greenheart in Support of Defendant's 
Motion for Summ Jud ent 
39 12110/12 Affidavit of Jay B. Brown in 
Support of Motion for Summary 
Jud ent. 
40 12110112 Affidavit of Terri LaRae 
Manduca 
41 12121112 Affidavit of Augusta 
Greenheart in Support o Defendant's 
sition to Summ Jud ent. 
42 12121112 Affidavit of Kenneth Brush in 
Support of Defendant's Opposition to 
Summ Jud ent. 
43 Deposition of Augusta Sayoko Mimoto 
Greenheart taken on 10/26/12. 





State of Idaho Department of water 
Resources Aerial Map for Water Right 
No. 61-12272 which depicts the place of 
use for the water use taken in 2009. (For 
demonstrative sea onl 
State of Idaho Department of water 
Resourca Aerial Map for Water Right 
No. 61-12273 which depicts the place of 
use for the water use taken in 2009. (For 
demonstrative sea onl 
Various dated aaial maps downloaded 
from Goo e Earth 
DATED this 22nd day of February, 2013. 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
Thomas E. DvOrak 
.. 
Attorneys for Jay and Christine Brown 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of February, 2013, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to the persons listed below the method indicated: 
Victor S. Villegas 
BORTON & LAKEY 
141 E. Carlton Ave. 
Meridian, Idaho 83642 
Telephone: (208) 908-4415 
Facsimile: (208) 493-4610 
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Michael C. Creamer (Idaho State Bar ID# 4030) 
Thomas E. Dvorak (Idaho State Bar ID# 5043) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 




Attorneys for Plaintiffs Jay and Christine Brown 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON-
BROWN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
AUGUSTA SA YOKO MIMOTO 
GREENHEART, an individual, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-353 
(PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED) 
FINDING OF FACTS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
THIS MA TIER is currently set for trial on March 5, 2013 and pursuant to this Court's 
Notice of Trial Setting and Order Governing Further Proceedings dated September 19, 2012, 
Plaintiffs hereby submit their Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Plaintiffs are 
submitting this document in accordance with the Court's scheduling order, but Plaintiffs reserve 
the right to submit amended or alternative proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law at the 
conclusion of the court trial in this matter and would specifically request that the Court afford 
them an opportunity to do so. Further, to the extent that any of the following findings of fact 
should more appropriately be labeled conclusions of law, and vice versa, it is requested that they 
be deemed and treated as such regardless of their label. 
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PROCEDURAL IDSTORY 
1. This action was initiated by Plaintiffs Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown 
(the "Browns") on April 5, 2012. 
2. In the Complaint, the Browns assert two causes of action against Defendant 
Augusta Sayoko Mimoto Greenheart ("Oreenheart,'). 
3. Each of the causes of action are for Quiet Title/Declaratory Judgment relating to 
two water rights owned by the Browns and that Greenheart is now claiming were passed to her 
under the general appurtenancy clause of the Warranty Deed when she purchased the Jand from 
the Browns. 
4. On May 9, 2012, Greenheart filed an answer. 
5. The Browns' lawsuit seeks to clarify that: a) the water rights owned by the 
Browns did not transfer to Greenheart when she purchased the land from the Browns; and b) that 
Greenheart was very aware that the land she purchased from the Browns did not have any water 
rights attached to it. 
6. On January 31, 2013, after hearing cross motions for summary judgment, this 
Court issued an order that denied in part and granted in part those motions. Additionally, the 
Court ruled that "the matters presented by both sides in support of the motions for summary 
judgment raise the issue of whether there was a mistake which is a question of fact that precludes 
summary judgment." Order at p. 10. The Court also noted that the issue of equitable estoppel 
had not been plead. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
I 
On or about February 5, 1988 Jay Brown acquired approximately 3 20 acres of land 
Property"). 
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II 
The Snake River Basin Adjudication ("SRBA") Court in Twin Falls, Idaho, decreed 
Water Rights Nos. 61-2188 and 61-7151 (the "Water Rights'') to Jay Brown on October 26, 
2000, authorizing the use of groundwater and making the Water Rights appurtenant to a 
permissible place of use that encompassed the 320 acres comprising the Original Brown 
Property. 
m 
The decreed Water Rights were limited to the irrigation of a total of 287 acres in a single 
irrigation system, which water rights were also limited to being used on the combined total 
320-acre parcel owned by Brown. 
VII 
Water Right 61-2188 was decreed authorizing the irrigation of up to 164 acres ofland 
within a 320-acre permissible place of use wholly within the Original Brown Property. 
VIII 
Water Right 61-7151 was decreed authorizing the irrigation of up to 123 acres of land 
within the same 320-acre permissible place of use authorized for 61-2188 and wholly within the 
Original Brown Property. 
IX 
As decreed, the Water Rights may be used together to irrigate no more than 287 acres 
within the 320-acre permissible place of use. 
x 
Neither of the Water Rights has been used to irrigate any portion of the Greenheart 
Property since at least 1986. 
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v 
On August 28, 2003, the Browns applied to the Idaho Department of Water Resources 
("Department''} to lease portions of the Water Rights appurtenant to 160 acres of the Original 
Brown Property to the Idaho Water Resource Board ("IWRB"} Water Supply Bank, and pursuant 
to that application, contracted with the IWRB to idle 160 acres of the 287 authorized acres from 
irrigation. The Water Supply Bank lease remains in effect as of the date of this trial. The acres 
idled and not irrigated by the Browns pursuant to the Water Supply Bank lease have always 
included the entirety of what is now the Greenheart Property. That lease continued until the 
filing of the Complaint in this lawsuit and to the present day. 
VI 
In January of2007, Greenheart purchased approximately sixty (60) acres of the Original 
Brown Property (the "Greenheart Property") from the Browns, leaving the Browns with 
approximately 260 acres (the "Current Brown Property''}. 
XI 
Prior to the sale to Greenheart, the Browns' real estate agent represented to Greenheart as 
buyer that the Greenheart Property was being sold without water rights 
XIII 
The purchase and sale agreement executed by the Browns and Greenheart was 
accompanied by a seller's property disclosure form. Under the disclosure entitled "Irrigation 
water provided by:'', the Browns indicated "N/ A" for not applicable. The purchase price paid 
was not in keeping with the price charged for comparable ground sold with water rights. 
XIV 
At the time of the conveyance of the Greenheart Property to Greenheart there was no 
system in place on the Greenheart Property to divert or distribute water to irrigate it. 
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xv 
After the closing of the purchase and sale of the Greenheart Property, Greenheart 
submitted a June 10, 2007 Notice of Appeal to the Elmore County Board of Equalization 
("Board'') for the Greenheart Property wherein Greenheart challenged the classification of the 
Greenheart Property as irrigated agriculture and sought to have it reclassified as Category 5 Dry 
Grazing, and stated that at the time of the purchase Greenheart was told "that the land is dry." 
Greenheart also made statements to the effect that she had purchased without any irrigation water 
rights. 
XVI 
On July 6, 2007, at Greenheart's direction and upon her express written authorization, Jay 
Brown appeared before the Board and represented that the Greenheart Property was dry land and 
had been purchased and conveyed as dry land without any irrigation water rights and would not 
be irrigated ''unless at such time a water right is purchased for the property by Ms. Greenheart." 
XVII 
On July 6, 2007, the Board granted Greenheart' s request to reclassify the land and upheld 
the assessor's adjusted valuation of the Greenheart Property to reflect that it is, indeed, dry 
grazing land with no irrigation water. 
XVIII 
Since July 6, 2007, Greenheart has received a financial benefit of more favorable tax 
treatment from that reclassification of the Greenheart Property as Category 5 "dry grazing" and 
that tax savings has been in excess of $600 a year since that time. 
XIX 
Sometime later, a dispute developed between the Browns and the County over the 
propriety of the original split of the Greenheart Property. As part of the settlement of that 
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dispute, Elmore County offered to purchase Greenheart's Property. In a November 8, 2009 e-
mail to Ms. Schindele, an employee with Elmore County, concerning Elmore County's offer to 
purchase the Greenheart Property, Greenheart stated, among other things, that "at the time of the 
purchase, I also was very aware that the parcel is dry grazing only due to lack of an irrigation 
system and no water rights." 
xx 
In February 2012, the Browns were contemplating one or more sales or transfers of 
Water Rights 61-2188 and 61-7151. The Browns had an offer to purchase their water rights, and 
the portion of the water rights attributable to the Greenheart Property was believed to have value 
of approximately $106,000.00 for just the water rights. The Browns spoke with counsel 
regarding the potential sale and it was in these discussions that they first learned that the 
reference to "appurtenances" in a deed had been interpreted by some Idaho case law to include 
water rights even if they were not expressly mentioned, although it was believed at that point that 
background circumstances could be used to show the true intent of the parties. Shortly after 
learning this information, Jay Brown contacted Greenhearrby telephone. 
XXI 
On February 8, 2012 Jay Brown contacted Greenheart by telephone and requested that 
she confirm in writing that she was aware she did not purchase the Greenheart Property with 
water rights and did not object to any sale or transfer of the Water Rights by the Browns. 
Greenheart alleges that during the telephone conversation in February 2012, that Jay Brown had 
indicated to her that he had "mistakenly sold the groundwater right to her." 
XXII 
Greenheart has never attempted to apply any water to the land by any method or to file 
any paperwork with any governmental agency regarding the allegedly conveyed water rights 
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from the 2007 deed until early 2012 after she received a phone call from Plaitniff Jay Brown 
regarding the groundwater right at issue. 
xxm 
On February 17, 2012, evidently prompted by that phone call, and without notice to the 
Browns, Greenheart filed with the Idaho Department of Water Resources a Notice of Change of 
Water Right Ownership ("Notice,'). In the Notice Greenheart represented among other things 
that the Water Rights were "divided proportionally based on the portion of their place(s) of use 
acquired by the new owner." The Notice makes no mention ofGreenheart.,s agreement with the 
Browns and admissions to the Elmore County Board of Equalization that she had purchased the 
Greenheart Property without water rights. 
XX1V 
On March 9, 2012, the Department revised its water right database to indicate Defendant 
Greenheart as the current owner of portions of the Water Rights, and reduced the quantity of 
water and irrigated acres authorized under the Water Rights decreed to the Browns 
commensurately. Due to'certain technical errors in the Department,s revisions, the water right 
database was subsequently revised by the Department on March 22, 2012. These notices of 
revisions indicated that they do not reconfirm the validity of the right. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
xxv 
Mutual_ Mistake 
The party asserting mutual mistake bears the burden of proof. Mu" v. Se/ag Corp., 113 
Idaho 773, 777, 747 P.2d 1302, 1306 (Ct. App. 1987). That burden is significant-mutual 
mistake must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Cline v. Hoyle & Associates, Ins., 
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Inc., 108 Idaho 162, 164, 697 P.2d 1176, 1178 (1985). Because mutual mistake is a question of 
fact, a trial court's finding thereof will not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous. Id. 
A mutual mistake occurs when both parties, at the time of contracting, share a 
misconception about a basic assumption or vital fact upon which they based their bargain. Bailey 
v. Ewing, 105 Idaho 636, 639, 671P.2d1099, 1102 (Ct. App. 1983). To prove mutual mistake, a 
party must set forth proof of: (i) a mistake; (ii) commonality; and (iii) materiality, i.e., that the 
mistake is so substantial and fundamental that it defeats the object of the party asserting mistake. 
O'Connor v. Harger Construction, Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008). 
A mistake is defined as an unintentional act or omission arising from ignorance, surprise 
or misplaced confidence. Bailey at 639, 671 P.2d at 1102. Thus, not all mistakes are actionable. 
A party is said to bear the risk of a mistake when he is aware, at the time the contract is made, 
that he has limited knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake relates but treats his 
limited knowledge as sufficient. This is not a mistake, but is conscious indifference. If the 
parties thus treat their knowledge as sufficient, they may be mistaken, however their indifference 
may assume the risk of the mistake of which they complain. Id. 
As stated, the mistake in question must be shared among the parties. This is relatively 
straightforward. However, two issues arise under this element. For example, in Bailey, the 
Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether, to be entitled to relief under mutual mistake, 
the parties must have the same misconception as to the same assumption of fact. Some 
jurisdictions require this. The Court of appeals declined. Thus, as long as there is a different 
belief as to the same assumption of fact, the mistake is mutual. This is true regardless of whether 
the different misconception as to the same mistake is in itself different. 
The other issue that arises is where the mistake in question is only that of one party. In 
other words, the mistake is unilateral. The general rule is that unilateral mistake is not grounds 
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for rescission unless ''there has been a misrepresentation or knowledge of the mistake by the 
other party." Belk v. Martin, 136 Idaho 652, 657, 39 P.3d 592, 597 (2001 (internal citations 
omitted). Thus, if the precipitating factor of the mistake is a misrepresentation or the non-
mistaken party is aware of the other party's misconception, rescission may still be obtained. Id. 
Mutual mistake is a doctrine by which a party may rescind a contract and return parties to 
their pre-contract status. O'Connor at 909, 188 P.3d at 851. Mutual mistake may also be 
employed to modify or reform a contract so as to reflect the parties' true intent. Primary Health 
Network, Inc., v. State, Dep't of Admin., 137 Idaho 663, 668, 52 P.3d 307, 312 (2002). 
The evidence in the case at hand supports the conclusion that at the time of contracting 
and of tendering the Deed at issue, the parties here shared a fundamental mutual assumption, that 
the Greenheart Property was being sold as dry ground without water rights. The language in the 
Deed is a situation that is referred to by the public as a "legal technicality" in that it does not 
reference ''water rights" as being transferred, and instead uses an arcane term "appurtenences," 
which this Court has held is given the legal effect when employed in a deed of transferring water 
rights in the absence of fraud or mistake. Mr. Brown and Ml's. Brown have testified to their 
understanding that no water rights were being transferred. Greenheart's actions subsequent to 
the Deed with respect to taxes and her response to the county attempting to buy her out are 
further clear and convincing proof that she shared this misassumption of fact. Although 
Greenheart now says that she had a misconception at the time of what water rights were, this 
does not change the fact that she employed this term and ultimately believed at the time that 
whatever water rights were, she was not obtaining any. Just as was the case in Bailey, there was 
no event or action where Defendant Greenheart claimed a water right had been transferred until 
she was called by Plaintiff Jay Brown, who disclosed to her that there was a potential "mistake" 
that he had learned of in the Deed and he asked her to confirm the contrary intent. 




Quasi-estoppel "prevents a party from asserting a right, to the detriment of another party, 
which is inconsistent with a position previously taken.» C & G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist. 
No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 144, 75 P.3d 194, 198 (2003). The doctrine applies when: 1) The 
offending party took a different position than his or her original position, and 2) either the 
offending party gained an advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other party, the other party 
was induced to change positions, or it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to 
maintain an inconsistent position from one from which he or she has already derived a benefit or 
in which he or she has acquiesced. Allen v. Reynolds, 145 Idaho 807, 812, 186 P.3d 663, 668 
(2008). 
Some cases have interjected an additional requirement of unconscionability with regard 
to the advantage or detriment portion of the doctrine. This does not appear to be required by the 
phrasing of the doctrine, though this issue is not settled. In Atwood v. Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 138 
P.3d 310 (2006), the court stated that "to prove quasi•estoppel, it is not necessary to show 
detrimental reliance; instead there must be evidence that it would be unconscionable to permit 
the offending party to assert allegedly contrary positions.» 143 Idaho at 114, 138 P.3d at 314. 
This suggests that unconscionability must be proven to apply quasi-estoppel. However, when we 
go to the Atwood decision, the citation to the above-quoted portion takes us to Thomas v. 
Arkoosh Produce, 131Idaho352, 48 P.3d 1241 (2002). This is significant because of a subtle, 
but significant, addition to quasi-estoppel law that is not contained in more recent decisions. 
Indeed, the Court in Arkoosh begins its analysis with the standard blurb on the law 
regarding advantage, disadvantage or unconscionability. However, instead of employing the 
disjunctive "or", Arkoosh uses the conjunctive "and." Thus, to prove quasi-estoppel under 
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Arlcoosh, a party must prove an inconsistency, advantage, disadvantage, and unconscionability. 
More recent statements on quasi-estoppel use the disjunctive "or," (See e.g. Washington Federal 
v. Van Enge/en, 153 Idaho 648, 289 P.3d 50 (2012) (most recent quasi-estoppel case, stating that 
to prove the same you must satisfy advantage, disadvantage or unconscionability, but not all 
three). Based on the more recent cases, Ar/coo.sh contains an inaccurate statement of quasi-
estoppel. Thus, a party does not have to prove unconscionability, just an advantage, 
disadvantage or unconscionability. 
All of these elements are met here: (l) Greenheart is now taking a different position than 
her original position wherein she disclaimed any interest in water rights in 2007 and 2009, and 
(2)(a) Greenheart gained a substantial tax advantage over the years by doing so; and/or (b) 
Greenheart's actions in confirming the mistaken mutual assumption caused a disadvantage to 
Brown in that Brown believed they had the water rights to sell and incurred legal expenses and 
took other efforts to sell the water rights, thereby inducing them to change positions; and/or (c) it 
would be unconscionable to permit Greenheart, having received the tax benefit and taken the 
position she has, especially in light of the value of the water rights, to essentially make off with a 
windfall that was never intended by the parties at the time of their contract, and the Court would 
be doing so by now allowing her to maintain that the "appurtenances" language operates in a 
technical fashion to transfer water rights, an inconsistent position from one from which 
Greenheart has ( c )(i.) previously derived a benefit; and/ or ( c )(ii.) in which she has acquiesced. 
A quasi estoppel arises against Greenheart now maintaining that the "appurtenances" language 
has the effect for which she argues and entry of an order to this effect is appropriate. 
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Equitable Estoppel 
The elements of equitable estoppel are: "( 1) a false representation or concealment of a 
material fact with actual or constructive knowledge of the truth; (2) that the party asserting 
estoppel did not know or could not discover the truth; (3) that the false representation or 
concealment was made with the intent that it be relied upon; and (4) that the person to whom the 
representation was made, or from whom the facts were concealed, relied and acted upon the 
representation or concealment to his prejudice." Washington Federal Sav. v. Van Enge/en, 153 
Idaho 648, 289 P.3d 50 (2012). 
In the present case, (l)(a) the original statement in the purchase and sale agreement that 
left a blank after the sentence saying water rights to be sold, if any, and (b) Greenhearfs 
instructions to Plaintiff Jay Brown to represent her before the tax board and request that he lease 
from her, which included her representation that the ground was dry and she had no water rights, 
meet the first elements and comprise a false representation of material fact with constructive 
knowledge of the trust. (2) The use of an arcane word m a deed with no reference to a transfer 
or water rights would not have excited the attention of a reasonable person that the situation was 
different than represented by Greenheart, i.e., that she had no water rights and no water rights 
were transferred; (3) Greenheart made the representations in the contract and later in sending Mr. 
Brown to talk to the Board with the intent that they be relied upon; and ( 4) the Browns have 
acted upon the representation to their detriment in entering into negotiations and expending 
money on legal fees to sell these water rights, which Greenheart now claims are conveyed. 
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XXVID 
Promissory Estoppel 
The elements of promissory estoppel are: (1} reliance on a specific promise; (2) the 
detriment suffered in reliance was substantial in an economic sense; (2) substantial loss to the 
promisee acting in reliance was or should have been foreseeable by the promisor; and (3) the 
promisee must have acted reasonably in justifiable reliance on the promise as made. Brown v. 
City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 808, 229 P.3d 1164, 1170 (2010}; Zollinger v. Carrol, 137 
Idaho 397, 49 P.3d 402 (2002}. 
There are two statements of promise here by Greenheart, ( 1} the original statement in the 
pmchase and sale agreement that left a blank after the sentence saying water rights to be sold, if 
any, and (2) Greenheart's instructions to Plaintiff Jay Brown to represent her before the Board 
and request that he lease from her, which included her representation that the ground was dry and 
she had no water rights. Both of these induced Mr. Brown to believe that Greenheart shared the 
same view he had, than none of these water rights had transferred to her. This reliance was 
reasonably foreseeable based on the representations made. And the consequential damage if 
Greenheart is allowed to withdraw these promises that she was not receiving water rights is 
substantial in the loss of Brown's right to sell these water rights. 
XX1X 
Relief Granted 
Based on the forgoing, it is hereby ordered that Judgment consistent with the forgoing be 
entered on Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint in favor of Brown. Counsel for Brown to 
submit a proposed form of judgment. 
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DATED this 22nd day of February, 2013. 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
~rak 
Attorneys for Jay and Christine Brown 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of February, 2013, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to the persons listed below the method indicated: 
Victor Villegas 
Borton & Lakey 
141 E. Carlton A venue 
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Joe Borton (ISB No. 5552] 
Victor Villepa [ISB No. 5860] 
BOR.TON LAKEY LAW OPPICBS 
141 B. Carlton Ave. 
Mntlan, m 83642 
Boile, Idlbo 83702 
OfBce: (208) 908-4415 
Fax: (208)493-4610 
Email: vlctor@borton·Jakey.com 
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OR.EBNHBAR.T, an individual, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CV 2012-353 
DEPENDANT'S PROPOSED 
FINDINOS OPPACI' AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Defendant, Augusta Sayoko Mbnoto Greenheart, by and· through her attorneys of rec;ord, 
Borton Lakey Law Oftlcea, aubmita Deftmdant'a Proposed Finctinp of Pact and Conclusiom of 
Law pursuant to this Court's scheduling order. Defendant reserves and resp~y requests that 
thfa Court allow Defendam to submit amended or supplemental fhidfnp or &ct and/or 
conclusions of law at tho condusion of the trial in this matter. Some of the proposed tlndm11 of 
fact or conclwriom may be used intc:rdumpably or considered mixed findinp of &ct and law. 
Defendant reqi1Mt1 tbli this Comt to apply tbem accoa:dinaJy reprdlu1 oftMir law. 
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Fehr. 25. 2013 4:23PM ast Carlton Ave No. 5232 P. 3/12 
l'INDINGS or FACT 
1. On or about February s. 1988 Plaintitr Jay Brown acquired approximately 320 
acres of land situated in the But ~of Section 24, T4S, RSE, B.M., m Elmore County ("Original 
Brown Property"). 
2. The Snake River Bum Adjudication ("SRBA ") Court in Twin Falls, Idaho, 
decreed Wat« RJahts Nos. 61-2188 and 61-7151 to Plaintil' Jay Brown on October 26,2000, 
authoriziq the use of aroundwat« to the 320 acres eompriaing the Original Brown Property. 
3. On January of 9, 2007, Defendant Greenheut and Jay Brown entered hlto a 
written contract to purchase approximately sixty (60) acres of the Original Brown Property (the 
"Oreenbeart Property") from the Browu, leavma the Browns with approximately 260 acres (the 
"Current Brown Property"). The two written documentl oompdsina the contract between the 
parties includet an RB·24 Vacant Land Real Estate Purchase and Sale Aareement ("Purchase 
and Sale Agreement") and an RB·13 Counteroffer (Cowiteroft'er"). 
4. The tm:ms of tho Purchase and Sale Aareement inelude the transfer of any and all 
water rfahts that appurtenant to the real property being sold. Pa:raaraph 16 of the Purchase and 
Sale Asrnment reads: 
"16. WATER RIGHTS: Description of water rl&hta, water systems, wells 
springs. water, ditches, ditch riahts. etc. if any, that are appurtenant thereto 
that are now on or UICd in conmction with the premises and shall be included 
in the sale unless otherwise provided herein: [blank] " 
S. Oreenheart did not prepare the type written tanauas• in the Purchase and Sale 
Aareement or the Counteroffer. 
6. Durins the purchase of tho Oreenheatt Property, Ms. Oreenheart never pcnonally 
met or had any conversations with either Plaintiff' Jay Brown or Christine Hopson-Brown. 
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7. Greenheart hid previoUlly purcbued real property In Emmitt Idaho ("Emmett 
Plol*t1"} prior to the purchae of the Oramhurt Propolty. 
8. The :Emmett Propolty that Oreenbem:t purcbuecl hid a ditch rwmina across the 
propllty that hid water nmning tbroup it. 
9. At part of the purchase of the Bmmett Pioperty, ar.mu.t received lharet of 
wat« throup m iniption district. 
10. Bual on her prior purobue experience of the Emmitt Propolty, Oreenheart 
believed that that a purcbaMr of real proptrty obtained a "water right" by virtue of 9\lritace wat« 
travelfna aero• the property. 
t t. Until thil lawsuit wu filed, Oreenheatt did not know that a "water riaht" could 
cover "ground" water or that a court of law could dacne a apecitlc amount of ground water to a 
particulat piece of real property. 
12. Greenhetrt hu no specialized training or experience in Idaho Water Law. 
13. At no time durlna the tramaotion wu Oreenboart told orally or in writing that 
there wu an adjudicated and decreed ground water riaht by the Snake Riv• Buin Adjudication 
auodated with the 320 acre property. 
t 4. At no time during the tramadion wu Oreenheart told orally or in writing that 
Water RJabta Nos. 61-2188 and 61·71'1 existed and that it wu excluded from the aale of the 
Greenhelrt Property. 
t5. <lncm.beart wu led to believe that a could dia a wen to aet wat•. 
16. Orecmhcart undentood that there wu nothhia at all beins exc1wlec1 ftom the sale 
of the Oremhell't Property. 
17. Gnenheut expected that upon the purchase of the Oreenheat Property, she 
would receive everythfna that would normally be included in a purchue of real property. 
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18. Jay ml Christine Bmwn had 1 thll opportunity to review the tenm of tho 
Purcbue ml Sale Aarelment ml m plrtioular Paragraph 16, prior to obHpting tbamelvea 
contractually to tell the Oreeaheart Propey. 
19. The purc:hue price b' the Greenheart Pmpert)' WU S 1,333.33 ptl' acre. 
20. The pmchue price ii oommemurate with 1IDd that hu wat• riahts but was 
undeveloped fbr frription at the time of Ille. The word "undeveloped" refi:n to real property 
that Jac:b frript1oD improvemcmt1 such u m frript1on system ooutstma of distribution 
matnJfnes ml a sprinkler l)'ltem such u wheel lines, pivots, or handline sprink1en or 10me tbrm 
of ar&vity frript1oD lyltem and UIOofated 1IDd Jevelfna. 
21. Jay and Christine Brown uec:uted a Warranty Deed dated January 29. 2007 
tramfenina the Oreeaheart Pmperty to Ms. Oreeaheat. 
22. The Warnnty Deed WU recorded in the real property recordl of Elmore County 
on January 30. 2007 u Imtrum.ent # 384017. 
23. The language in the Wam.nty Deed mabl no mention ofreservina water riahts 
and recita that the premiaea are conveyed •6witll their appurtenances unto said Grantee and to the 
Onntee's heirs aDd 1utan1 fbrever." 
24. Greenhmt did not prepare the language in the Wmauty Deed or live directions 
u to how the Warranty Deed should be prepared. 
25. Oreeahmt was not present in the room when the Browns aiped the Wazrmty 
Deed nor did Oreonheart see or have po9MSsion of the Wmauty Deed until after the Browm 
signed the Wmauty Deed. 
26. Jay and Christine Brown had a ft.ill opportunity to read the Janauaae of the 
Wamnty Deed and make any changes they deemed necessary prior to aignin1 it. 
27. Jay and Christine Brown were nealiaent fn reviewina the Warranty Deed 
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28. The Browm mUtakenly believed that by placins the water m the Idaho Water 
Bank. the wn wu leplly levered tom the portions of llDd that were not irrigated. 
29. Aft• the Ille, Plaintiff Jay Brown knew that u of Jun 9, 2007, the Blmore 
County AllellOr had messed the Oreenblart Property u tnipted sround. 
CONCLUSIONS or LA w 
L Matul Mlltake 
A "miltake ia an unintentional act or omiuion lrisina tom iprance, smpriae, or 
misplaced confidence." Bat/11 "· Ewlni. 10! Idaho 636, 639, 671 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Ct.App. 
1983). A mutvll m1stab occun when both par:det abare a miaconception about a vital fact upon 
which they 'baed their 'barpin at the time of contracdna. Id. The mistake must be material or, 
in other worda, ao l1.lbltantial and filDdamental u to defeat the objeot of the parties. Id. 
"rhe assumption or fact must be the same; otha:wiso two unilateral mistakes, Instead of 
om mutual mistake, would result." BaU11 v. Ewtna, 10$ Idaho 636, 639-640, 671 P.2d 1099, 
1102 • 1103 (Ct.App. 1983). Be1bre relief will be sranted, it must appear that tha mistake WU 
mutual Ud•lavlm v. KelcM11, 33 Idaho 165, 190, 191P.1029, 1030 (1920). 
'4The burden of proof ii on the party al1eaiq mutual mistake." Uulavltz "· X.tch•, 33 
Idaho 165, 190 P. 1029 (1920). 'TAI evidence must be clear and lltisfactory, leavhla but little, 
if any, doubt of the mistake. It must be made out by the clearest and mo• utisfictoty tesdmony 
such u to leave no tm and reasonable doubt on the mfnd that the writing does not comct1y 
embody the real Imation of the parties. A mere prepondenmce of the evidence will not 
suftlce •.• " Id. 
R.elciufon is an equitable remedy which ideally brfnp the partie1 to their pre-contract 
1tatu1 quo. O'Connor v. Hfll'ler Con.rt, Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846. 851 (2008). 
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R.eeciasion ii the proper rmnedy where there it a mutual mistake of fact that ii material or 
~mdamental to the oonttact. Id. •'[M]utual mistake permits a party to reacind or modify a 
contract u Iona u the miltak.o ia ao IUbltantial and fimdamental u to defeat the object of that 
pmty." ld. ffl"tlnr Prllltal'y Hltlltlt Network, Inc. v. Sta#, DIP't of A.dwdn., 137 ldabo 663, 668, 
S2 P .3d 307. 312 (2002). Mutual mistake may alao be uaed to modify or reft)nn a contract to 
reftect the tnJ.e intent otthe partiot. "A court Ida properly 'm refbrmina an instrument when it 
appem tram the cvidmce ••. that the inatrummt do• not reflect the intmtiona of the parties'" 
becauloofthomutualmistake. Ballqv. Ewing, 105 Idaho 636, 641, 671P.2d1099, 1104 
(Ct.A.pp. 1983) tJllOllnl &;,,,,, v. Po'f'WM41-Manll Yallq lrrlptlon Co., 38 Idaho lSS, 220 P. 112 
(1923). 
usumption of tact shared by the pertiet. Gteenheart wu never told that a around wat• rfaht 
existed let alone that decreed Water lUgb.tt Nos. 61-2188 and 61-71.51 were excluded tom the 
ale of the Gremhcart Property. Gnenheart wu led to believe that I.he could dig a well to git 
water if 1he d.elired. The Purchue and Sale Agreement makot no mention that any around water 
riaht• were a.eluded tom the Ille of the Oreenheart Property. The WamntyDeed likewise 
do• not reserve wat• tom the transfer of the Oreeahurt Property. 
IL Statute of IJmitadom ('Mlltake) 
The statute ofllmitatiom on tho around of taud or mistake must be commenced within three 
(3) years. I.C. f S-218. Section 5-218 states that a cause of action tbr ftaud or mistake does not 
accrue until "until discovery, by the agrieved party, of the ficta constituting the bud or 
miltake." Id. In the context of fraud, "our Supeme Court bu held that 'actull knowledge of 
the bud wW be. inferred if the alleaedly agrieved pirty could have disoovend it by the exercise 
of due diligence.'" .A.ltan v. GUI, 108 Idaho 900, 901, 702 P.2d 1360. 1361 (Ct. App. 1985) 
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(quoting Nancy Lu Mina, Inc. v. Harrllon, 9! Idaho 546, 547, 511P.2d828. 829 (1973)). The 
J.lthn court held that thit same principle appliet to C1UM1 of action hued. upon mistake:: 
We believe the ume principle Joatcally applies to Cl\1lel of aotion baaed upon 
mfatake. Accordiqly, WO hold that ID aotion ""'101 reUot tqm mi•eke wW 
be tim•lamd pndc l.C, f }-211(4) uplw it la ftlcd wjtNn throe nart ak 
the mfatW sgpld ha!' l!tm dltsgyen4 la da' mnla pf dpt dW1pg. 
A party•• nealiaence may preolude a 8ndiq of due dilipnce necesmy to ftnd that 111 action wu 
timely bfouPt. J.ltka v. Gill, 108 Idaho 900, 902, 702 P .2d 1360, 1362 (Ct. App. 1985) 
In t1m oue, usumina the Browm can prove t1m both parties intended to exclude a 
proportionate share ofWater R.ightl NoL 61-2188 and 61-7151 tom the Ille ofthe Oreenheart 
PJ:operty, the Browm in an exercise of due diligence could have and should have discovered the 
alleged "miatab" on three separate oecuiont; at the time of contracting and once again at the 
dme of olosiq. 
First, upon exercise of due diliaence. the Browm could have and should have noticed that 
the terms of the Purchuc and Sile Agrcem.cmt and in particular Paraaraph 16, clearly stated that 
water wu included in the sale of the property. The Counteroftir incorporates all the tc:nns of the 
Purchase and Sale Aareement except the purchase price. The Counteroffer was signed and 
create a bindiq contract on January 9, 2007 which is more than 3 years tom the date of the 
f!llna of the Complaint in this action. 
Second, the Browns could have and should have discovered the mistake when each of 
them siped the Wamnt Deed. Idaho law recognizes that "a watc right is an appurtenance to 
the land on which it hu hen and will pu• by conveyanco of the land." Ruu1ll v. Irl.rll, 118 P. 
soi. 502 (1911). "A division of a tract oflm:t to which water Is appurtenant, without 
sesrepting or mervfna the water right, worb a division of such watc right in proportion u the 
land ii divided." Hunt v. Bremu 216 P. 964, 965 (1929). "Unless [water riahtsl are expressly 
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reserved In the deed or it is clearly shown that the parties Intended that the srantor would remve 
them. appurtenant water rigb:ta pua with the land even thouah they are not mentioned In the deed 
and the deed does not mention •appurtenances.' " Bailq v. 77aonuuon, 149 Idaho 799. 803, 241. 
It ii undisputed that the Warranty Deed does not contain Ianauaae reservins Water R.isJita 
Noa. 61-2188 and 61-7151. Oreenheart did not pnrvent the Browm fiomrmdfna the language of 
the Wmanty Deed. Oreenhcmt did not prepare the Janauaao of the Warranty Deed or have 
coa.trol bow the deed would have been prepared. The Browns could have and should have 
. 
diacovcnd the mistake whm each of them Biped the Warrant Deed on Iamwy 29, 2007, which 
is more than 3 years tom the date of ftlina the Complaint. 
Lastly, when 1ay Brown wrote his June 9, 2007 letter to Elmore County Auesaor, Jo 
Oridley. Iay Brown knew that the U1e110r'a office had levied the Greenheart Property as 
irriptc:d pound.. That fact should have put Jay Brown on notice that IOmetbJ:na had caused tho 
use110r11 oftlce to comid• the Greenheart Property u irrigated sround. In the exercise of due 
diligence, Jay Brown could have discovered that something could be wrons with the Warranty 
Deed at that time. This timehm.e apjn ii beyond the 3 year statute of limitations. · 
ID.Quul Ettoppel 
This doctrine of quasi estoppel applies when: (1) the oft'ending party took a diftirent 
position than his or her original position and (2) either (a) the offendina party pined an 
advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party wu induced to chanae 
positions; or (o) it would be unconscionable to permit the offendina party to maintain an 
inconsistent position tom one he or she has already derived a benefit or acquiesced in. .Atwood v. 
Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 114, 138 P.3d 310, 314 (2006). 
In this cue, there is no evidence that duting the sale of the Onenheart Property that show 
Ms. Greenbeart dfd anything to induce the Browns to execute the Purchase and Sale Agreement 
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that clearly stated water wu beins 1e>ld with the Oreeahmt Property. Likewise, there ii no 
ovldonce that Oreenheart took any action d\lrins the sale that would have induced the Browm to 
execute the Warranty Deed that clearly lacked 1aquaae reaervina the pound water riahta tom 
the transfer. 
The evidence ahow8 that Greenbeart never penonally met or communicated with the 
Browm durlna the purd1ue and sale tramaction. The evidence a1eo shows that Greenheart did 
not prepare tbl Warranty Deed or the typcwrittm Janguqo in the Purohue and Sile Aafeement. 
She WU not presem f.n the room when the Browm siped the Warranty Deed. Then ii limply DO 
avidcmco that Orec:mhmt made the Browm chanp positiom. 
IV.Promlts0ry Ettoppel 
Tc prevail on a promissory estoppel olafm, a party must prove the existcmco of all four 
elements of promissory estoppel: (1) reliance upon a sped!c promise; (2) substantial economie 
1011 to the promisce as a result of such reliance; (3) the loo to the promisee wu or should have 
been fi>raeable by the promisor; and ( 4) the promisec'a reliance on tho promise must have been 
reasonable. Black Canyon Racqudtball Club, Inc. v. Idaho Flnt Nat'l Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171, 
182, 804P.2d 900, 911 (1991); Zolltnprv. Carrol, 137 Idaho 397, 399, 49 P.3d402, 404 
(2002). Promissory estoppel does not require a netirioua intent on the part of the promiaor to 
cauac hmm to the pmmisce. Rule Sala and Savtce, Inc. v. U.S. Bank Nat . .41.t'n, 133 Idaho 669. 
61!. 991P.2d857, 863 (Ct. App. 1999). With respect to the Promisor's atate of mind. the 
doctrine requires only thaf lfh ~le to the promiaor that the promilee would tab 10me 
action or ilrbearance m reliance upon the promise and would thereby ~· 1Ubstantial lo11 if 
the promise wen to be dishonored. Id. 
In this cue. the elements for promissory estoppel canmt be mlt. Then is no evidence 
that during the purchaso and sale phase, Grecmheart made a promise either oral or in writina to 
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the Browm that would have caused the Browm to tab aome action or tbrbcarance. At stated 
above, Oreesahemt did not prepare tho Warranty Deed or the typewritten languap in the 
Purcbue al2d Salo Aareement- Tbarc ii no eri4onco that Greenhoart prevented the Browm hm 
readfDa the Warranty Deed bd)re they *'led it either. The elemenb tbr promillOl')' estoppe1 
cannot be met in thit cue ml therei>re pmmisaory estoppel does aot apply. 
V. Equitable Eltoppel 
The Verifted Complaint do• not raise 1 claim tbr equitable atoppcL Theretbre punulDt to 
thfl Court'• pftvioua mlysfl in its Orr.le /Anytng Summary Jud"""" on Count I and Granting 
Jn Plll't Summary J""'7nat For Dtfendant on Count JI, tho Court will not comider or apply 
equitable estoppel in this cue. 
VI. Rde£ 
Without waivina itl objectiom raised in its motion in limine al2d motion for reeomidation 
that mistake waa not plead, Defendant Oremhcart ukl this Court to conclude that the Brown's 
lawsuit on the iuuc of mutual mistake is untimely and therefure enter an order and judgment 
dism!ains the lawauit. 
If thia matter fl not dWmi•aed on statuto of limitatiom aroundl. Oreenheart alb thil Court to 
enter an order ftndins that the Browm have not prove11 the element• of mutual mistake or the 
application of any equitable theories of promillory and quui eatoppel. 
DATED this 25t1s day of Fe'brumy, 2013. 
BORTON LAKEY LAW OPPICES 
By )1W;'. 
Victorv· 
A.ttomeya for Defouiant 
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CIBTIQCA,D or SEBYJCI 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that OD this 2s• day of February. 2013, a true and correct copy ot 
tho fbreaoina documeAt WU served by flrtt•CWI mail, poltl.p prepaid, and addreaed to; by fax 
trllllmibion to; by overnight delivery to; or by pcnonally deliverina to or leaviq with a person 
in charge of the ofBce u indicated below: 
Michael c. Creamer 
Thomu B. Dvorak 
GIVENS PtnlSLEY UP 
P .o. Box 2720 
Dolle, m 83701-2720 
Telephone: (208) 388-1200 
PacaimiJe: (208) 388-1300 
Honorable L)'DD. 0. Norton 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
150 S. 4th B, Ste. 5 
Mountain Home, m 83641 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[X] Fax 
[ ] Ovcmisht Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivwy 
lnorton@adawe'b.net 
hf\nt@elmorccounty.ora 
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BORTON LADY LAW OPPICBS 
141 B. Carlton Ave. 
Maidian. ID 83642 
Boile, Idaho 13702 
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IN THI DISTRICT COtTRT 01' nm FOtTRTB JDDICIA.L DISTRICT or 
THI STATE or mABo, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY or ELMORE 
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON· 
BROWN. Huaband and Wife, 
v. 
AUGUSTA SA YOKO MIMOTO 
ORBENHBART. an individual, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CV 2012-353 
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL 
WITNESS UST 
COMBS NOW the Defendant Augusta Sayoko Mimoto ar.nbcart, by and throup her 
counsel of record Victor Villeps of Borton Lakey Law Offices. and hereby disclosa the 
followina u witneae1 who may be called at trial in this aetion. 
1. Aup.sta Sayoko Mimoto Oreenhc:art 
2. Kenneth Brush 
3. Andy Enrico 
4. Daryl Rhead 
476 Paplof2 
st Carlton Ave No. 5231 P. 316 
Defendant ream:vn the riaht to call ID)' witnea identifted by Plaintift's, without waivina 
ID)' objection to Plaintiffa' witDetses. Defendant ia.teadl this diloJoSUfl to include witneuet . 
who have been pmioualy identified by any party. or any witnel• who ii needed to Jay a 
tbundation tbr ID)' exhibit, u well 11 any witnell tbr the parpo• of lmpeaehment or rebuttal. 
DATBD thfa 25* day of Pe'bruary, 2013. 
BORTON LAKBY LAW OFFICES 
By 
A.ttomq1/or Defimdant 
CEBTR'ICAD OF SIBYJCI 
I HBR.BBY CBllTlPY that OD thU 25* day of February, 2013. a true and c:oMCt copy of 
the fbresaina doc:mnut WU .vecS by ffnt-clul mail. poltqe prepaid, and addressed to; by fax 
transmisllon to; by ovemiaht delivery to; or by penonally delivering to or leavina with a penon 
m charp of the ofllco 11 indicated below: 
Michael c. Creamer 
Thom8I !. Dvorak 
OMNS Puut!Y ll.P 
P .0. Box 2720 
Boise, m 83701·2720 
Telephone: (208)388-1200 
FIClimile: (208) ~88-1300 
Honorable Lynn O. Norton 
Fourth Judicial Diltrict Court 
ISO S. 4th B, Ste. ! 
Mountain Home, m 83647 
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[ ] U.S. Mail 
[X] Pax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
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Vbor Vlllepa [ISi No. 5860] 
BOR.TON LAKEY LA w omcBS 
141 B. CarJton Aw. 
Mlridian, m 13642 
Boill, Idaho 13702 
otace: (208) 908-4415 
Pax: (208) 493-4610 
Email: victor@borton•llkey.oom 
.A.ttomq1 for Dt(ndtmt 
No. 5231 P. 4/6 
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IN TBB DISTRICT COtJR.T OJ TD i'OVRTB JVDICIAL DISTRlcr or 
nm STATE or mABO, IN AND POR THE COUNTY or ELMORE 
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINB HOPSON-
BROWN, Husband and Wife. 
Plaintifti, 
v. 
AUGUSTA SAYOK.O MIMOTO 
O.RBENHBART, an imividual. 
De1iod&nt. 
CASE NO. CV 2012-353 
DDENDANT'S TRIAL 
EXBJBrr LIST 
COMES NOW the Defendant Auaust& Sayoko Mimoto Greenheart, by and through bar 
counsel of record Victor Villogu of Borton Lakey Law Oftlcea, and disc1oae1 her anticipated 




l/W'/ U-24 VICBI LIDd Riil lltlte 
PmobalD and .. Ap-- ml RE-13 
Coum.oft'lr (Ba. Nol. BK OOl·BJt 007) 
Ml.S#97281069 dated 12118/06 (Bltell No. EK 
()()4.4) 
Paael of3 
.. .Feb. 25. 20 13 4:27PM :ut Culton Ave No. 5231 P. 5/6 
' . . 
' .. : 
~ . 
1/3CW7 , .. Amlriclll Tilll Compusy'1 
4 S...,,.,, of SectJlrmd k Sellll'I (Bata No. 
BROWN0037) 
l/30t'07 mt AmlrJaa Tide Co~· 
s s··--ofldtlamed l>r Parabum (Bltcl 
No. BROWN0037) 
6/9/07 Ltk tom Jay Btuwn to Jo OrkUly, 
6 mmor. Coaaty AJl•Dr --d.c thl 
J'l'OIMlt1 fl .... • lmaated 
7 Wltlr lllabt 61.Q2111 dlted 1 Ol'l6IOO 
• Wu llfabt 61-07151 dad 1 Ot'26IOO 
'J/23112 IAtta' hmDIDli ~ ~ 
9 ofWa llelourom. to ADP* Orembmrt re: Corrected chap of owmnhlp IJr watlr riabta 
61-12272 A 61-122'73 
Defendant raervea the risht to uae my exlu'bitl dilcloled ml/or \lied by the Plaintiff in 
tlDI action. De&ndant flHl'Vll the right to amend, supplement, or modify this list of cxhibitl 
with notice to the other partiet in this action. 
DATED this 2st11 day of February. 2013. 
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CEBmJCAD OF DRYJCE 
I HEREBY CBR.TIPY that on t1Us 25* day otFebnuary, 2013, a true and correct oopy of 
the tbrqoirJa docmnent WU .-Ved by ftrst·olul mail. poltap prepaid. IJld addressed to; by fax 
tnm'"'i•lion to; by overniaht delivery to: or by penonally delivering to or leavina with a pmon 
in obarse of the oftlce u tndlcated below: 
Miohle! c. er--
Tbomu B. Dvorak 
OJvsNs PUasLiY w 
P.O. Box 2'720 
Boile, m 83101-2120 
Telephone: (208)388-1200 
FIClilnilo: (208)388-1300 
Honorable Lynn a. Norton 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
150 S. 4th E, Ste. S 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
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[ ] U.S. Mail 
[X] Pax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 




". , " ,,.. F~27. 2013 4:37PM · ut Car l ton Ave No. 524 7 P. 2/4 
Joe Borton [ISB No. 5552] 
Victor VilllP' [ISB No. 5860] 
BOllTON LADY LAW OPPICBS 
141 B. ClrltonAve. 
Meridian, ID 83642 
Boile, Idlbo 83102 
Oi!ol:(208)901-4415 
Pax: (208) 493-4610 
Smail! viotor@borton-lakey.com 
.4ttonwy1 for Dlfadant 
•· 
FILED 
ZOil FEB 27 PM a.a ftO 
:BARBARA S~E 
CLERK Of THE RT 
DEPUT 
IN THE DISTRICT COt11lT or THE FOURTH JVDICIAL DJSTRicr or 
TBE STA.Tl 01' mABO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY or ILMORI 
JAY BllOWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON· 
BROWN, Husband and W"ife, 
Plaintim, 
v. 
AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO 
ORBENHBART, an individual, 
Det.mdant. 
CASE NO. CV 2012-353 
Dll'ENDANT'S AMENDED 
TRIAL EXBIBIT LIST 
COMBS NOW the Defendant Augusta Sa)'Oko Mimoto Oremheart, by and throu&h her 
co\llllel of record Victor Ville111 of Borton Lakay Law Of!ce1, and dilclo1e1 her anticipated 




1/IJ071lE·24 VIClllt Lal Real Estate 
Purcbue and Sale Aareement ad 0.13 
Counteroffer (Bates Noa. EK 001-BK007) 
MLS#97211069 dmd t2/11/06(BnNo. Bit 
0044) 




' Ill' . . )' \ 
~ f ~·V.27. 20 13 4:37PM st Car l ton Ave No. 5247 P. 3/4 
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' 
,. , . 
L J ' ....... " . ' .. ~ 1_, ' ... -...... ': ~. . ~ ' ... ' ' . , . -· - -.. ' ' . '' .. 
1/30J07 Pint Alllfta Tldl Complllf'1 
D Stat.,.. otStttlemem tbr StDln (Bm• No. 
UOWN0031) 
1130/07 Pint AmlrlolD Ti&l9 Coq»llly'1 
B .,...., otSettJmnmt IJr P\Rbua (Ba 
No. DOWN0037) 
6l9lf1'I LeUs hm Jay Blown tD Jo Orldlly, 
p B1mon Coamy Am111or ltltiq t!llt the 
. . llunmdu' · ~ _. .. -·-
0 Wltlr JU1bt 81.ollll dUI lOl26/00 
H Wmr JUab161-0'7U1 dal lOl26IOO 
3123/12 Liits hm Danni Smith, Dtpll1ma 
I ofWltlr a-=-. tD Aupeta OrelDbelrt re: Camctld dwnp of ownmbip l>r Wltlr ria1D 
61·12272 A 61-12273 
Defendant reserva the risbt to uso any exlu'bita disclosed and/or used by the PJaintift' in 
tlUa action. Defendant l"ll8l'Vtl the ri&ht to amend, supplement. or modify this list of exhibitl 
with notice to the other parties in this action. 
DATED this 27* day of February, 2013. 
BORTON LAI<EY LA w omCES 
By 
482 Pap2of3 
' v .. • 
F'eb~ 27. 2013 4: 38PM ast Carlton Ave No. 524 7 P. 4/4 
(;ATilJCAD or 111yic1 
I HEUBY CER.TIFY that on tbil 27* day of February, 2013, a true and comet copy or 
the fbrqoq doomnmt wa ICl'VCd by h-dan mail. poltap prepaid. and addreued to; by fax 
tnmsmi81ion to; by ovaf&ht dllivery to; or by penonally delivaing to or laviq with a penon 
in cbarp of the oflb u indicated below: 
Michael C. Creaam' 
Thoma B. Dvorak 
OIVSNS PU1t.SLBY W 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boile, m 83701-2720 
Telephone: (208) 388-1200 
Faoshnfle: (208) 388-1300 
Honorable Lynn G. Norton 
Pouzth Judicial District Court 
150 S. 4th E, Ste. 5 
Mountain. Home, m 83647 
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[ ] U.S. Mail 
[XJ Fax 
[ ] Ovemigbt Delivery 
[ ] HIDd Delivery 
PapJol3 
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Michael C. Creamer (lcWao .._a. mt 4030) 
lbomaa B. Dvorak (ldlbo Stata B• ID t 5041) 
OIVBNS PURSLBY w 
601 Wost JJntw:k. Stzeot 
Pott OfBce Box 2720 
Boile, Idaho 83701·2720 
Telephono: 201-381-1200 
Feoeimilet 201-388-1300 
17UllG'U (1 IMM) 
.Attomcyt for Plaintiffs Jay and Christine Brown 
FILED 




JN nm DJSTlUcr COUR.T OP nm FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTIUcr FOR nm 
STA'IB OP mAHO, IN AND FOR THB COUN1Y OF BLMORB 
JAY BR.OWN end CHRISTINE HOPSON· 
BROWN, husband and wife. 
Plain1Ufs. 
v. 
AUGUSTA SAYOK.O MIMOTO 
GREENHBAR.T. an individual, 
Defendmt. 
Case No. CV-2012-353 
PRB-T.RIAL BRIBP RE: POST 
CONVEY ANCB BVIDBNCE OP 
MU'IUAL MISTAKB AND 
PURCHASE AGRBBMENT AS 
EVIDBNCB OP MISTAKB 
COMB NOW, Plaintifti. Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown (hereinafter the 
"Browm"), by and throuah their attomoya of record, Qfvem Pursley UP, and hereby submit this 
pre-trial memorandum to address cmtain legal iuues that may arise at the trial of thia matter: 
P1a1mift'I should be allowed (a) to ofter post-conveyance course of subsequent performance and 
sublequent statements to prove mutual mistake at the time of contracting; and (b) evidence of the 
terms ot the Pmcbue and Sale Agreement, despite its merger into the Deed, in order to prove 
that the terms of the Deed by reason of mistake do not reflect the true intent of tho parties. 
A. EVID&NCI OP POn-CONVB\'ANCI STATDU.NTS IS ULBV ANT TO WBBTBIR OR NOT TBB 
PARTIU 'WID MISTAKEN AT THI TJMB Oll' CONTllACl'INO. 
Al a tbn:ahold issue, to be admiaaiblc. all ovidence must be relevant. Idaho R. Bvid. 402. 
Relevance ia defined u "evidence havina gy teadgsy to mate the existence of any fact that ls 
PRE-TRIAL BRIEF RB: MUTUAL MISTAKE· 1 
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of ccmsequenoe to the determination of the action more probable or leas probable than it would 
be without the evidence." Idaho R. Bvid. 401 (cmphaaia added). "The standard of rclcvanoy ii 
not atrici." Untttd Statu ,,, Mb-ant/a, 649 P.2d 1345, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981). Ju noted by the 
United States Supieme Court. Rule 401 'a "buic standard of relevance 1hua ia a liberal one." 
DfJllbut Y. M1"1ll Dow Pltannaaadlcall, Inc .• 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993). 
Havbia the basic rulcs of relevant evidence in mind, it is now appropriate to focus on 
what is allowable and appropriate proof of a mutual mistake at 1he time of contract. It goes 
almoat without aayina that to be entitled to one of tho equitable remedies afforded under tho 
doctrino of mutual mistake, the mistake in question must be shared and exist .. at the time of 
contracting." Hughu v. Fllher, 142 Idaho 474, 482, 129 P.3d 1223, 1231 (2006). In other 
words, a nUstab or fact that OQ;Ur1 8i\er an agrcemmt wu signed is not a mistake to which tho 
law will provide redrca. Id. 
Of C01llle. there is a difference between a mistake of fact that occurs post~ and 
post-contrlct evidence that has .. any tendency" 1o show that the party harbored a mistake at tho 
time of the agreement. While Idaho appellate courts have not dimct1x ac:ldn:med tho matter rub 
.Judlu, other juriadictiona expressly allow post-contract extrinsic evidence to prove mistaken 
intmt at the timo of execution. Those juriadlctions rcuon that coune of perlonmmce after 
contracting, but "before it comes to be tho subject of controveny, is deemed of snat, if 11ot 
contnrua1 blflaace." F1dllral l1'.ftll'ance Company v. A.mllrical Imwance Company, 2S8 
A.D.2d 39, 44 (N.Y.1999) (emphasis added) (quoting Old Colony Trust Co. v. Omaha, 230 U.S. 
100. 118 (1913)). As noted in the Restatement, "The parties to an agreement know best what 
they meant rm their intended agreement]. and their action under it ia often the strongest evidence 
of their meaning.., Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 202, comment g (cited with approval in 
Clvtstenaen v. RaMom, 123 Idaho 99, 844 P.2d 1349 (Ct. App. 1992)). 
PRB-TIUAL BRliF RB: MUTUAL MISTAKE· 2 
485 
,, 
03/04/2013 KOR t•3• rAX w.1004/007 
1 
G'4/ /n.nrtmc• Colfl/KllJ1 "· 'J'l'ansatlan1lc .bin.nlrana. Company, 69 A.D.3d 71. 886 
N.Y.S.2d 133 (2009). contains an excellent summation of why post-contract extrinsic evidence is 
not only relevant but '1ll8hly probative" of tbe parties• intent at the time of contl'lotina: 
Aa Supreme Comt com:ctly recopized, to support a claim tor 
refbrmadoo. a "mutual mimke Dl1lll exilt at the time the agreement 
is slped." Supnme Court errect. however, In cond•dla1 that 
thll •...,..f-perlormaaee evkl•ee ii not probative of a bellet 
bf G.iba• wlaea tile 199' ad 2880 JAL coatnetl were 
1lped, that Ha perceata1• partldpatloa wu a ,...... .... of 
Gaits entire aponn tor ffl RVI bualn•· Bow tile partl• 
perlorlll a collfnet ••••rlly fl mulfelted after e1:eaadoa of 
tile coatnct, bat their pertormu.ce 11 Jdahlr probative of their 
date of mhad 1t th• Chae tile contraet wu 1lped. 
69 A.2d at 85, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 143 (emphuia added); F1dmll /"""'1nCt1, 258 A.D. at 4.5, 691 
N.Y.S.2d at 513 ~'Pederal'a evidence unequivocally showa that, both durina tho underwrithlg 
Procell and after tho underlying accident, the parties acted consistetJtly with their understanding 
that Pyramid's automobiles were not covered under the BAPj; J.P. Morgan Chan "· Wlng1t, 
2012 WL 53:42412 at •1.s (B.D.Mich. 2012) ("Although a 'mutual mistake muat exist at the time 
the agreement is siped,' the parties' course of porformance under the contract is considered to 
be tho most persuasive evidence of tho agreed intention oftbc parties"). 
Plaintifti should be permitted to introduce extdnaic evidence in the form of oourse of 
performance and subsoquent statements to prove a mutual mistake that neither party believed 
water riahts were being tnnsfened u part of the sale at the time of con1nctini. For example, 
then are key written post-conveyance statements by tbe Defendant acknowledging her. intent, 
e.g .• "(A)t tbe time of tlae pvehue, I also WU very aware that the parcel is dry arums only 
due to lack of an hrlption system and no water riahts." Plah>dft's Exhibit 24, 11/08/09 :Email 
from Dcftmdant Gtee.nheart to Kristina Schindele. Another example is Defcndant•s July 18, 
2999 Notiee ef Appeal Eel~ •89). Pilimi89 ~ 13 mcl 14, .,Mg 'Yd the time of 
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purchuo, I was told that the land is dry • . • ... Another example of probative course of 
perfonnance evidence ii tho absence of conduct by <Jreonheert to assen any claim to these water 
rlgbta fiom the date of the deed, JantllrY 29. 2007 until February 17, 2012. Which wu the ftnt 
time lhe contacted the Idaho Department of Water Reao\JICeS to effect a transfer of these water 
ript1.' 
First, the standard at iasue tor admiaaion of such evidence ii liberal and not strict. There 
fs no jury in this cae, so there ii little dqer of the court being confused or not beina able to put 
the evidence in its proper context. It mdcnoo bu .. any tendency" to make it more probable that 
a Riven &ct occurred, it is relcvmt and lhou1d be admitted unleu there is some other reason. in 
law tor acluaion. Here, evidence of Dofendant's post-contract, prc-laWBUit atatementa that 
Defendant never acquirccl water rights undw the purchase and sale aa;reement with Plaintiffs. that 
the property she acquired was "dry," and Defendant's actions or lack thereof that would appear 
consistent with sur.h a belief certainly bu a ~· to make it more libly than not that 
Defendant harbored this same belief at the time of contracting. Thia it especially the case since 
the content of the contract is conaiatent with Defendant'• subsequent oommcmtl reprdina the 
ripts that aha thought were, or \Wft not, conveyed at the time of contracting. 
Second, the above authorities specilically permit the evidence souabt to be offered by 
Plaintiffs in this matter. Aa wu the case in Gulf lnnrrance Company, how Defendant viowed the 
contract and the sentiment she expressed to others regarding her understanding of the agreement 
with Plaintiffs before any lawauit came to fruitloa, is not only relevant but "hiply probative of 
[her] state of mind at the time the contract waa signed.,. Gulf htnlrant:e Company, 69 A.2d at SS, 
886 N.Y.S.2d at 143. In short, what wm said after the contract and the actions that occur.red 
1 After the iuue wu bmugbt to her llttention by Plalotlt'ft. 
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followina the same, la reJmmt md probative In deutnnining Dofendaut'1 likely Intent at the time 
of comractina- Al ruch. Defeadant'a poat-contraGt statemellll are relevant and admillible. 
B. Evm.INCS '11'I'll&CONTBNTI0. TRI tulCHAD .AND 1.41.& .A.GUDIBNT, AL1110VGR 
THAT DOCUMSNT 18 MDGSD INTO TR& DS&D, A.RB PROBAnv& OM TU l8SW Ot 
WDTIDR TID PARTlll' INTINT II NOT RDUCTBD IN THI OllO ~NDlll TRB DOCTalN& 
O'Ml8TAKL 
Thil Court noted that "[l]f miatlb ii not pmven by competent evidence, the Court 
cannot tbrther OODlider pre-convcyanoo extrinsic evideace 88 to the water ripm. The c.ontract 
was merpd with the deed and can no longer be oonsidered." Order at p. 11. TM COJWel'IO of 
the Court'• comment hnplia that the lanauage of the purchase and Ille contract can be 
considered 88 potential probative evidence of mistlb. This proposition was stated expressly by 
1he Court of Appeala of Texas in the case of Hal'dy v. B~cld. 368 S.W.3d 643 (Ct. App. Tex. 
2012). In that cuo, the contract stated "all min.erlla will be reserved by acllcr... However, the 
key deed in the cue did not nave the minenlL 1n rejecting the arpmcnt that the deed should 
be considered and nothing else. the HOl'dy court noted: 
When tho perdea mistakenly believe minerals were resaved in an instrument, 
equity will grant relief by way of reformation if the cimumstances otherwise 
warrant an excrciae of its power. A person who, because of a mistake of law a to 
the effect of wonts used in a conveyance, bu transferred to another more than she 
intendocl and more 1ban the parties mutually agreed ahe should do, ii cmtitled to 
restitution of the excess. An instmmcnt based on a mutually mistalam 
undmtandina of O'M1etlbip of mal property can bo set aside by a court of equity. 
. . . The expteSI wonting of the contract here was that "all mincrall will be 
reserved by tba seller." Although the real estate comract normally mera• With 
the subsequent deed, foreclosing it 88 evidence in cxmstruina the deed, we may 
eoulder tlae coatnet when analyzing an allegation or mutual mistake not 
otherwise evidenced OD the face of the deed. 
Id at 650 (citations omitted)(emphuia added). 
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Likewise. m the present ouc. there is probativo evidence on the issue of mistake in the 
languago employed in tho RB-24 VACANT LAND RBAL BSTATB PURCHASE AND SALB 
AGR.BEMENT, Plaintiffa Exhibit 6. For example. in paraaraph 16, the following lanpase 
appears: 
16. WA TBR RIGHl"S. Description of water rights. water syatems, wella. 
springs, water, ditches, ditch rights. eto. if any. that are appurtenant thereto that 
aro now on. or used in connection with the premises and abal1 be included in the 
sale unless otherwile provided herein: [None]." 
And in paragraph 21, "Not Applicable" is checked next to the box. for "Water Riahts Transfer 
Fee." Thia infonnadon is highly probative on the shared intent of the partiu vt.r a vl.r water 
rights at tho time of the deed at issue. 
DATED 1bla y r'f day of March, 2013. 
CER.TmCATB 01' SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this£ day of Match. 2013, I causc:d to be served a true and 
oorrect copy of the forogoing docmnent to the per80DI listed below the method indicated: 
Victor Villegu 
Borton & Lakey 
141 B. Carlton Avenue 
Meridian. m 83642 
Pacaimile: 493-4610 
PRE-TRIAL BR.IBP RB: MUTUAL MIS'J'AI<.B-6 
Hand Delivery 
:5l FIC'imile 
- Overnight Courier 
U.S. Mail 
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Mfcbael C. Creamer (ldlbo Sllte S. JD t 4030) 
Thoma B. Dvorak (ldlho S. I• ID I 5043) 
GIVBNS PURSLBY UP 
601 West Bannock S1reet 
Poat Office Box mo 
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BARUARA~ SL£ CLERK OF TH 
DEPUT 
JN nm DISTR.Icr COURT OP nm POUR.TH JUDICIAL DISTR.Icr FOR. nm 
STATE OP IDAHO, IN AND FOR. mB COUNTY OP Bl.MORE 
JAY Bl.OWN Ind CHRISTINE HOPSON· 
BR.OWN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffi, 
v. 
AUGUSTA SAYOIC.O MIMOTO 
OREENHBAR.T, en IAdividual, 
C. No. CV-2012-353 
MOTION IN LIMINJ& 
COMB NOW, Plaintiffs, Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown (hereinafter tho 
"Browm"). by end through their attomeys of record, Givens Punley w, and hereby move this 
Court for an Older proluotting testimony: 
(a) Of'.Mr. Andy Bmico regarding the intent of the parties in using the purohuc and 
sale qreement and of how real estate apnts are taught to fill out such an agreement, as aucb 
testimony, ii apcoulation and lnvadea the province of the court as finder of fact. 
(b) As to value, to the extent such testimony is based on documents and methodology 
not disclosed in discovery in this case. 
MonON IN LJMINB • I 
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This motion ia made and based upon l.R.C.P. 602, 701, 705, the Memorandum in Support 
of Motion in Unrine filed contemporaneously herewith, the pleacffnp and documents ftled and 
lodaecl in this caee du tar and which may 1?e cited bc=aftcr. 
DATBD tbia--1:!:. day of March. 2013. 
OIVBNS PUR.SLBY LU 
Attorneya for Jay and Christine Brown 
CERTUICATE OJ' SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ~Y of March, 2013, I caused to be served a true and 
,-~ coneot copy of the foregoing document to the persona listed below the method indicated: 
vtctor Villegu 
Borton & Lakey 
141 B. Carlton Avenue 
Meridian. ID 83642 
Facsimile: 493-4610 
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_Hand Delivery 
1Facsimilo 
__..:. Ovemiabt Courier 
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Micbael C. Creamer OdlbG Stata a.mt 4030) 
'lbomu B. Dvorak (Jdlllo SlllfD k ID I 5043) 
OIVBNS PTJR.SLBY w 
601 West Bmmock: S1reet 
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BARBARA SH.ELE 
CLERK Of THE ca:vtT 
DEPUTY U'--
IN THB DISTRICT COURT OP THBPOUR'm JUDICIAL DISTRICT POR. nm 
STATS OF mAHO, IN AND FOR. nm COUNTY OP BLMORB 
JAY BR.OWN and CHIUSTINB HOPSON· 
BR.OWN, husband ml wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
AUGUSTA SA YOKO MIMOTO 
OREBNHB.ART, 111 individual. 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV ·2012-353 
:MEMORANDUM JN SUPPORT OJI' 
M0110N IN LIMINE 
COMB NOW, PJ.aintifti, Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown (hereinafter the 
14Browns"), by and tbrouah theit attomeya of record, OiVIDI Pursley w, 8lld hereby submit this 
Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine. 
A. ML ANDY EM.UCO'• onum TUTIMONY JS IN nm N.ATVU or snctJLA'nON AND 
INTD.PRITATION OJ' TBB LANGUAGS USID IN TR& COM'l'RACT, TIDRDY 
IMPDMJSllBLY 1NV ADING nu PR.oVINC& Oll'TID mm:n.oir J'Acr. 
Defendant has diacloacd Andy Bmieo ("Bnricoj u an expert witness. There is no 
contention that he bu any factual knowledge .about these particular cinnunstances that would 
make him a lay witness. In Defendant,• Di.sclosun: of Bxpat Witnessea, he ts described u a 
MBMORANDUM IN StJPPOR.T OF MOTION JN LIMINB • 1 
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Real Estate Commiuioner for the State of Idaho and u "an 8"1'Cditecl real estate instructor 
ICCleditcd by the Idaho Real &tate Commiuion teechina ccmtinuina education claaes au.ch u 
teldJing apnca how to me and fl1l out YlrioU1 Raltore forms." It ii proffered 1bat Bmico .._ 
expert:iac in how reel estate forms developed by the Idaho Auociation of Realtorse me to be 
filled out. Mt • .Bmico will testify that it water rlahta were intended to be excluded fi:om tho sale 
in thil cue. then the RB-24 Vacant Land Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement or an 
Addendum to the RB-24 would have identified the water riahta beina ox.eluded." Defendant's 
Diaclosure or Expert Witnessa at p. 4. This of&red testimony ia speculation on the intent or the 
patties and also appears to be legal concluaion. As sudl, it ii not proper and any testimony by 
which Bmico dempta to prove and/or show legal conclusions about the cft'=t of the documonta 
or what the patties intended in their purchuc and sale agreemcrnt lhould not be admitted. 
LR..B. 602 am 701 ii buio to any testimony and requires that no witness be allowed to 
testify ~- l'Vi.dcnce is introduced sutBcient to aupport a finding that the witness has personal 
knowledge of the matter" and that such testimony bo "rationally based on the perception of the 
witness." Jn addition to prohibitina testimony that amounts to speculation. the Rules of Bvidence 
require that the evidoDce not invade the provjnco of the finder of fact I.R..B. 702 and 703 •. &1 
also e.g., State v. Ellington. 151 Jdabo 53, 253 P.3d 727 (201 l)(acoidmt reconstruction expert's 
testimony that deftmdant acted with intmticnal state of mind was inadmiuible because "[c]xpert 
teltfmony that ccncems conclmiom or opinions that tho averap juror is qualified to draw ftom 
the facts utilizing the juror's eommon _,. and normal experience is inadmissible."); Howard v. 
Orlgon Mutual bv. Co •• 137 Idaho 214, 219, 46 P.3d SJO, SIS (2002) ("Because the issues 
related to ambipity before the 1ria1 judp were matters of law, the offered expert opinion wu 
irrelevant, and there was no abuse of discretion in excluding the testimony."); Summus v. J..L 
MBMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINB • 2 
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Gllbut Co., ti al .• 69 Cal. App. 4th 1155, 1179 (1999) ('*the admiuibility of opinion evidence 
that embw an ultimate iuue in a al80 does not bestow upon an expert carte blm:hc to expreu 
any opinion hi or a wiahel. There are limitl to expert teatimony. not the lout of which ii the 
prolu"bition apinat edmiuion of an expert's opinion on a question oflaw"). 
Here, to the extent Bmico seek.I to ofter testimony that bean on the pmtiea' intent ml the 
meaning of the putt.hue and Ille qrecmeat. such testimony is lnadnUISi.ble and should be 
excluded. 
B. Nman ML ENalCO NOR TD A.PPRAISR KINNITll BRUSll SHOULD •• nnrmn 
TO TIS'llW UCAUR Du&NDAMT'I DllCOV&RY DJICLOIUUI UN AJ'OUL 01' R.llLS 705 
or TD IDABO R.uLSI or Evmua: AND Rm.a 26 01' TD IDABO RUL&S or Qvu. 
Plloa:DURli AND TJIBY BAVB ONLY GIVDf A OZIURAL 8TA'l'IMINT OP 'l'Blllt Ol'INION 
OPV.AL1JI. 
Aa to both Mr. Enrico and KcmJl&rtb Brush. Defendant dlsclosee simpl)' that they are 
"cxpeotcd to rebut the testimony of Plaintifrs expert u well u tutif.y that the purcbue price 
Defendant paid for the property is commensurate with property with m appurtenant water' riabt-" 
Defendant's Disoloauro of Expert Witnaaes at p. 3 and 4. Both are claimed u "Pact and Data 
Relied Upon" to rely on cmremly available documentary evidence. including. but not limited to. 
the Bxhibita to tho Complain1, documenta produced by the parties in discovmy and docum.enta oa 
file with the Idaho Department of Wat/J/l resources." In Discovery served in this matter, the 
Plain1ift't asked that the Defendant for each such expert witness "set forth specifically and in 
detail the underlying facts and data upon which such person's opinion and tutimony is baaed; 
and the manner in which such person became &miliar with the allcptions, facts, events, and/or 
individuals rclatlna to this matter." Plaintiffs' First Set of Inteirogatoriea, Requests for 
Production of Documents and Requests for Admission, p. 8, dated May 21, 2012. Plaintiffs 
served a Request for Supplomentatio.n of Discove:ry Responses on February 13. 2013. but have 
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iecelved no responso thereto. Accordingly, Plaintiff's would ask that an order in limine be 
entered preveoting thae cxpa1a from aivina Ill)' tcatimony that is DOt substantiated and based 
upon underlyiq doomnorats that are not in the record, such u comparable properties. 
IRB 705 stat.es: 
The expmts may testify in tezma of opinion or lnferenu and give 
the n1MOD1 therefor without prior disclosure of the undcrlyina facts 
or data, provided that tho court may require othenriae, and 
provided f\Jrther that, jf requested pmunt to the rules of 
discovery the undslyiq facts or data were ctiacloaed. The expert 
fDMY ha any event be required to disclose tho underlying flctl or 
data OD croas-eumination. 
Idaho R. Bvid. 70S; 11• ol.ro Idaho R. Civ. Proo 26(b)(4)(A)(i) f'Discovery of facts known and 
opinions held by experts expected ~-~, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of 
subdivision (bXl) of this rule and acqui:rod or developed in anticipation of litiption or for trial. 
may be obtained by intcnoptory ad/or depoai1ion. including: (AXi) A complete ltatemeat of 
all opiulou to be expnued 1pd Sh• bull gd rwom thtnftn; tJae dag or othv 
lpfgpadop cpntidmsl bz the wbgg lg forminl tin• pnlnlmy; ay a•lbffl to bt ued u a 
nmma&')' of or mpport for the oplnlom") (emphasis added). 
Here, the buia of the appraiser's flJstlmony and the information consJdeted in forming an 
opinion bas not been dilcloaed. Accordingly. Defendant baa nm afoul of the basic nlles of 
discovory and evidence. Dofen.dant has only disclosed the seneral subject matter on which 
Defendamts cxped9 will testify. This may be appropriate in instances in which we are dealing 
with lay witne111 disclosures. It is not, however, appoprlate when. 'we are in the realm of 
witnessea who will provide spcoiali7.ed and technical opinions for the fact finder to consider. A 
contrary view would tum f'IVer/ trial into a gucssin1 1ame reprdins the speciftc opinion to bo 
provided by one another's expert witnesses. If Defendant's apprais&r is permitted to testify, 
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Plaintift'I will be UDdul;y prejudiced since such testimony would be offered notwitbstanding 
Defendant' a decision t.o provide the expert's opinion. but omit the basil for that opinion. 
DATED this i_ f'1 day ofMaroh. 2013. , 
OIVBNS PURSLEY lJ.P 
Thomu B. Dvorak 
Atto.meys tor Jay and Christine Brown 
CERTIFICATE OJ' SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this _day of March, 2013, I caused to be 88l'Ved a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document t.o tbs pcnona listed below the method indicated: 
Victor Villegas 
Borton & Lakey 
141 B. Carlton Avenue 
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ZOl3 MAR -4 PH I:"' 
!..~C/}£~~1 
IN 11iB DISTRICf COURT OP THB FOUR.'ni JUDICIAL DIST!Ucr POR. THB 
STATE OP mAHo, JN AND FOR. nm COUNTY OP PJ...MOR.B 
JAY BROWN ml CHRJSTINB HOPSON· 
BR.OWN, husband and wif'e, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
AUGUSTA SAYOICO MIMOO'O 
GRBENHBAR.T, an individual, 
Defendant. 
Cue No. cv .. 2012--353 
MOTION TO SBORTBN TIME TO 
BEAR MOTION JN LIMINZ 
COMB NOW. Plaindff'a, Jay Brown and ChriJtine Hopsan-Brown (hereinafter the 
"Browns"), by and tbroup their attom~ of record; Oivem Pursley Wt. and hereby move this 
Court punwmt to Ruic 6(b) of the Idaho R.ulet of Civil Procedure and the inhenmt '9'JWfSf of tho 
Court to control its docket tor ,ntry of an order shol1enina time to hear their Motion in Lirrrine, 
DATBD this __!L!_ day of March, 2013. . . 
=~ Attorneys tot lay ana Cliriitine BiOwn 
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Victor Villepl 
. Borton & Lakey 
141 B. Carlton Avenue 
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Joe Borton [ISB No. 5552] 
Victor Villegu [ISB No. 5860) 
BOllTON LADY LAW OPPICES 
141 B. Clrlton Ave. 
Maidian, ID 83642 
Bofla, Idaho 83102 
Oi!co:(208)908-4415 
Fu: (208) 493-4610 
Email: victor@borton-lakey.com 
.A.ttomqa for Df(""1ant 
No. 5357 P. 2/12 (o 7 
FILED 
2013 APR -8 PH 4: tO 
BARBARA STEELE
1 CLERK Of TH\..f~ 
DEPUT~ 
IN TBI DISTRICT COURT or TD FOVRTB JlJDICL\L DISTRICT or 
THE STATE or mABO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY or ELMORE 
IAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON· 
BR.OWN, Husbaml and Wife. 
Plaintitta, 
v. 
AUGUSTA SAYOK.O MIMOTO 
ORBBNH!AR.T, m individual, 
O.&adant. 
CASE NO. CV 2012-353 
DBnNDANT•s PDlST AMENDED 
PR.OPOSBD FINDINGS OP PACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OP LAW 
Defendant. Auausta Sa)'Oko Mimoto Oreenheart, by and throuah her attomeYs of record, 
Borton Lakey Law Offices, submits Detendant's Proposed Pfndin.11 of Pact and Conclusions of 
Law punuant to this Court'• schcduq order. Some of the proposed fbldhtp of fAct or 
conclusiom may be uaod interchaqeably or considered mmd tlndinp of fict md law. 
Dtfendant reqaestS that this Court to apply them aeeordingly reprdlea of their label 
FINDINGS or l'ACl' 
1. On or about February S, 1988 Plaintiff' Iay Brown acquired approximately 320 
acne of land situated in the But~ of Section 24, T4S, R.SB, B.M., h1 BJmore County ("Oriainal 
Brown Propc:rty"). 
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2. The Snake R.ivs Buin Adjudication ("SRBA ") Court h1 Twhl Falll. Idaho, 
decreed Wat• Righta Nos. 61·2188 and 61·7Ul to Platnti!' Jay Brown on October 26,2000, 
autborizfna the UM of aroumwater to the 320 &Cl'el comprisiq the Original Brown Property. 
3. On Jumary of 9, 2007, Defendant Oteeaheart and Jay Brown entad into a 
written contract to purchue approximately sixty (60) aa:ea of the Origina1 Brown Property (the 
"Oreenbeut Property") !om the Browns. 1eavfq the Browm with approximately 260 acres (the 
"Oment Brown Property'). The two writtm doouments comprisiq the contract between the 
parties includes an llB-24 Vacant Land Real Bltate Purchase and Salo Agreement ("Purchaae 
and Sale Aareemont"> ml an RE-13 Counteroffer (Counterofter"). 
4. The tm of the Purchase and Sale Agreement include the transfer of any and all 
water rishta that appurtenant to the real property beiq sold. Paragraph 16 of the Purchue and 
Sale Aareement reads: 
"16. WATER. RIGHTS: Description of water rights, water syatems. wells 
aprinp. water, ditcbcs, ditch rights, etc. i£ any, that are appurtenant the.retO 
that are now on or used m connocdon with the premises and lhal1 be included 
in the sale unlea otherwise provided herein: [blank] " 
$. Greenheart did not prepare the type written language in the Purchue and Sale 
Aafeement or the Countaoffer. 
6. Durma the purchaae of the Oreenheart Property, Ms. Ommheart never personally 
met or bad my convenations with either Plaintiff Jay Brown or Chriltino Hopson-Brown. 
7. Orecmheart bad previously purchased real property in Emmett Idaho ("Emmett 
Property") prior to the purchue of the Gremb.eart Property. 
8. The Emmett Property that Orec:nheart purchued bad a ditch runmna across the 
property that had water nmnfn1 throuah it. 
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9. Al part of the purchue of the Emmett Property, Oreenheart received shares of 
water throuah en krlption distriot. 
10. Baled on her prior purchue experience of the Bmmett Property, Oreenheart 
bt1itved tbat that a purcm. of real piopmty obtained a "water right" by virtue of aurface water 
traveq aaroa the property. 
11. Until this lawsuit wu Sled, Oreeaheart did not know that a "watcr right" could 
COVIi' "sround" wat• or that a comt of law could dea:ee a specific amount of around water to a 
particular piece of real property. 
12. 
13. At DO time durlnl the transaction wu Greenheart told orally or in writing that 
there WU an adjudicated and decreed lfOuM water ri;ht by the Snake Riv• Buin Adjudication 
mociated with the 320 acre property. 
14. At DO time duriJls the 1.l'mUlaction wu Oremheart told orally or in writma that 
Water Rights Nos. 61·2188 and 61-7151 mated and that it wu excluded from tho sale of the 
15. Greenheart wu led to believe that sbe could dig a well to aet water. 
16. Oreenheart understood that there wu nothlna at all being excluded itom the sale 
of the Greenheart Property. 
17. Plaintiff Jay Brown testified that tho Purchase and Salo Ap'eement did 110t 
exclude water rights itom the sale not the Purcbue and Sale Aareement include water riahts. 
(Tr. Pio 99, L 22 tbru pa. 1 OCJ L 9). 
18. Greeaheart expeeted that upon the purchue of the Oreenheart Property, lhe 
would receive evarything that would normally be included in a purchase of real property. 
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19. Jay and Christine Brown had a fl111 opportunity to nrviow the terms of the 
Purdwe Ind Sale Apement Ind m partioular Parqraph 16, prior to oblipdq themaelvea 
eontn=al1y to sell the Greenheart Property. 
20. The parc:lwe price tbr the Greeaheart Property WU $ 1,333.33 per acre. 
21. Jay and Qriattm Brown executed a Warranty Deed dated January 29, 2007 
tramfinins the Oreenheart Property to Ms. Oreenhelrt. 
22. ne Wmnnty Deed wa recorded in the real property reoordl of BJmore County 
on January 30, 2007 u ~ # 384017. 
23. The lanauap in the Warranty Deed makes no mention of reservins water riahts 
and recitel that the premisea are conveyed Mwith their appurtenances unto said Orantoe and to the 
Onmtee's hein and usipa tbrever." 
24. Grecmbeart did not prepare the lamguap in the Wmanty Deed or give directions 
u to how the Warranty Deed should be prepared. 
25. Oreenhmt wu not preunt in the room when tho Browm sfanod the Warranty 
Deed nor did Oreenheart aoo or have possession of the Wamnty Deed until after the Browm 
1fped the Wmanty Deed. 
26. Jay and Christfno Brown had a Ml opportunity to read the language of the 
Wmmty Deed and make my chanpa they deemed necoaary prior to sipin1 it. 
27. 1ay and Christine Brown were negligent in ravining the Warranty Deed. 
28. Tho Browm mistakenly believed that by placing the water in the Idaho Water 
Bank, the water wu leplly severed tom the portions of land that were not irrlpted. 
29. Aler the sale, Plaintiff' Jay Brown knew that u of Jun 9, 2007, either the Elmore 
County Aaamor had useued the Oreenheart Property II irrigated. srom>d or that Ms. 
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Gteeaheart at least believed that the Orecnheart Propcty was befnp taxed aa irripted around. 
(Tr. pg. 84, 1110-25). 
30. During that June 9, 2007 timehme Plaintiff Jay Brown did nothiq to ucertain 
why either the !lmore County Asteaor and/or Ml. Greenbeart would believe that the OreenbHrt 
Property WU being taxed 18 frripted around (Tr. pg. 106). 
31. After Plaintiff Jay Brown authored the June 9, 2007 letts, he did not call anybody 
to inquire whether or not water rfahta hid actually transferred to Ms. Oreenheart. (Tr. Pl· 107). 
32. After Plaintiff Jay Brown authored the June 9, 2007 letter, he did not call or go 
speak to any govcnment oftlcer to determine whether or not the Oreenheart Property could be 
inipted back in lune of2007. Id. 
33. Plaintiff Jay Brown testified u of June 9, 2007, he did not take any action to 
investipte whether a mistake had beea made. Id. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I. Mutual MDtab 
A. "mistake is an unintentional act or omission ariains tom ignorance, surprise, or 
misplaced confidence." Batlq 11. Ewing, 105 Idaho 636, 639, 671 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Ct.App. 
1983). A mutual mistake occurs when both parties share a misconception about a vital fact upon 
which they based their barpin at the time of contracting. Id. The mistake must be material or, 
in other words, ao substantial and &ndamental 11 to defeat the objeet of the partiet. Id. 
'1'ho assumption or ii.ct must be tho same; otherwiae two unilateral mistakes, instead of 
one mutual mistake. would result." Ballq v. Ewing. 105 Idaho 636, 639-640, 671 P.2d 1099, 
1102 • 1103 (Ct.App. 1983). Befbre relief will be snmted, it must appear that the mistake wu 
mutual. Udslavttz 11. Ketchen, 33 Idaho 16.5, 190, 191P.1029, 1030 (1920). 
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"Tha bmdm of proof ii on the party 11Jeain1 mutual mistake." Udelavttz v. Kltch.n. 33 
Idaho 165, 190 P. 1029 (1920). "The tvidence m\llt be clear and lltiar.atory, leaviq but little:, 
if any, doubt of the miltake. It must be made out by the c1elrest ml most satis&ctory testimony 
.m u to leave no &tr ud reuonable doubt on the mind that the writina doe1 not conectly 
embody the real intention of the parties. A mere preponderance of the evidence will not 
suffice •• , " Id. 
R.eacialion ii an equitable remedy which ideally brinp the partiea to their pre-contract 
1tatu1 quo. O'Connor v. Harpr Con.rt., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008). 
Relciasion ii the proper rct.mdy whc:ro there ia a mutual miatake of fact that is material or 
ftmdamental to the oontract. Id. "[M]utual mistake permits a party to reteind or modify a 
contract u loq u the mistake ls so subttantlal and Amdamental u to detiat the object of that 
party." Id. fJMOtlltJ Primary Health N1twork, Inc. v. Stat1, ])q't of .4.dmln., 137 Idaho 663, 668, 
.52 P.3d 307, 312 (2002). Mutual mistaka may also be UICld to modify or reform a contract to . . 
reflect the true inta ot the parties. .. A court acts properly 'in re:tbnning an instn1ment when it 
appean tom tho evidence ••. that the fmtrument does not reflect the intentions of the parties .. • 
because of the mutual mistake. Ballq v. Ewtnr, lOS Idaho 636, 641, 671 P.ld 1099, 1104 
(Ct.App. 19~3) quoting Exum v. Port1n'l/-Manh Yalll)' lrrlgatlon Co., 38 Idaho 155, 220 P. 112 
(1923). 
· uaumption of fact abated by the parties. Greenheart wu never told that a sround water riaht 
existed let alone that decreecl Wat• R1ahta NOL 61·2188 and 61·7151 w .. ac1uded tom the 
sale of the Oreenheart Property. Onenheut wu led to believe that she could dia a well to pt 
water if she deaimi The Purchue am Salo Asreement makes no mention that any around water 
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riahts were a.eluded tom the sale of the Grecmheart Property. The Wmanty Deed likewiae 
does not reaerve water tom tho transfer of the Oreemheart Pxoperty. 
D. Statute of LJmltatlom (Mlltab) 
The statute oflimitatiom on the around of hud or mistake must be commenced within three 
(3) )'WI. I.C. f 5·218. Section 5-218 states that a cauae of action tbr taud or mistake docs not 
accrue until "until discovery, by the agricved party, of the facts comtitutins the taud or 
mistake." Id. In the context of tauct. "our Supzeme Court hu held that 'actual kmwledp of 
the hud will be infimd if the allegedly agricved party oould have diaooverecl it by the exercise 
of due dilfaence.'" .4ttlam v. Gill, 108 Idaho 900, 901, 702 P.2d 1360, 1361 (Ct. App. 1985) 
(quotfna Nancy IA• Mtna, Inc. v. Harrison, 95 Idaho 546. 547, 511P.2d828, 829 (1973)). The 
.A.ltln &Xlmt held that this wne principle applicl to caUICI of action based upon mistake: 
We believe the same principle logically applies to cauacs of action bued upon 
mistake. Acc:ontinaly, we ho]d that an actipn wJdn1 relief ftom mfeteko will 
be tfmt:lwred un4« I.C. I S-218(4\ imJw It is filed within three yom •fttr 
tbt milt• Hglcl hm bag 41govr14 m d!•·mrw gf dge dW•ct. 
A party'• negligence may preclude a fin.dins of due diligence necessary to find that an action wu 
timelybroup.t. A.ttlcdn v. Gill, 108 ldabo 900, 902, 702P.2d1360, 1362 (Ct. App. 1985) 
In this cue, umming the Browns can prove that both parties intended to exclude a 
proportionate share of Water Rfahts Nos. 61-2188 and 61·7151 tom the sale of the Oreenheart 
Property, the Browm in an exercise of due dili1ence could have and should have discovered the 
alleged "mistake" on three separate occuiom; at the time of contracting and once apin at the 
time of closing. 
First. upon exercise of due dilipnce, the Browm could have and should have noticed that 
the tmm of the Purchase and Sale Agreement and in particular Paragraph 16, clearly stated that 
water wu included in the sale of the property. The Counteroft'er incorporates all the terms of the 
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Purehase and Sale Apement except the purcbuc price. The· Countcioffer wu sfaned ml 
create a b!ndJna contract on January 9, 2007 which it more than 3 yean ttom the date of tbe 
filina of the Complaint in this action. 
Secondt the Browm could have and should have &covered tbe mistake when each of 
them signed the Warranty Deed. Idaho law recopizea that "a water riaht is an appurtenance to 
the land on which it has been and will pau by conveyance of the Im.t ... Ru.rnll v. lrllh, 118 P. 
!01, !02 (1911). "A division of a ~ of land ·to which water it appurtenant. without 
Mareaatina Or reservbla the Wit« riaht. workl I division. Of sacb Wit« zilht in proportion U the 
land fa divided." Hunt v. B,..,,,.,. 276 P. 964, 965 (1929). "Unleu [water rfahts] ere expre11ly 
reserved in the deed or it is clearly shown that the parties Intended that the srantor would reurve 
them. appurtei1ant water riahts pass with the 1and oven thouah they aro mt mentioned in the deed 
ml the clced does not mention 'appurtenancn.• "Bagl.y v. Tho1n01on, 149 Idaho 799, 803, 241. 
It it undisputed that tba Wammty Deed does not contain languap reservina Water Rishts 
Nos. 61·2188 and 61-7151. Greenhwt did.not pnmmt the Browm tom reading the language of 
the Warranty Deed. Oreeahelrt did not prepare the languap of the Warranty Deed or have 
control how the deed would have been prepared. The Browm could have and should have 
discovered the mistake when each of them lianed the Warrant Deed on Ianuary 29, 2007, which 
is more than 3 years tom the date of filing tho Com.plaint. 
Lastly, when Jay Brown wrote his June 9, 2007 letter to EJmore County Asleuor, Jo 
Oridley, lay Brown knew that the UM110r'1 oftlce had levied the Oreenheart Property u 
inipted around. Additionally, Jay Brown tettifled that he believed. it wu Ms. Oreenheart who 
told him the Greenheart Property WU befna taxed U inipted sn>und. 
the Oreenheart Property wu sold without water. Those ficts should have put Jay Brown on 
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notice that somethUla hid caused the u•sor's oftlce to consider the Oreenheart Property 11 
inipted lfOUDd. In the exercise of due dilipnce. Jay Brown could have disoovered that 
aomethina could be wrong with the Wmanty Deed at that time. The June 9. 2007 timellme 
upon which Jay Brown could have dilcovered the mistake II be)'ond the 3 year statute of 
limitations. 
m.Qaul Ettoppel 
Thia doctrine of quui estoppt1 applies when: (1) the offendins party took a dift'enmt 
position than bil or her original position and (2) either (a) the offendfna party phled an 
advmtap or caused a disadvantqe to the other party; (b) the other party wu induced to chanp 
poaitiona; or (c) it would be uncomcionablo to permit the oftending party to maintain an 
incomiatmt position fi'om one he or lhe has already derived a benefit or acquiesced in. .4.twoad v. 
Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 114, 138 P.3d 310, 314 (2006). 
In this cue, there is no evidence that during the sale of the Greenhcart Property that show 
Mt. Oreenheart did a.nythiq to induce the Browm to execute the Purchase and Sale Agreement 
that clearly atatcd water wu bcins aold with the Oreenheart Property. Likewise. there ii no 
evidence that Greeaheart took any action duriq the sale that would have induced the Browns to 
execute the Warranty Deed that clearly lacked language reservma the around water riahts tom 
the transfer. 
The evidence shows that Greenbeart never personally met or oommunicatcd with the 
Browns dming the purchase and sale transaction. The mdcnce also shows that Oreenheart did 
not prepare the Warranty Deed or the typewritten language in the Purchase and Salo Aareomont. 
She wu not present in the room when the Browns lianed the Wmramy Deed. There is simply no 
evidence that Oreenheart made the Browns ehange positk>m. 
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IV. Promluory Estoppel 
To prevail on a promissory ostoppel claim, a party must prove the existence of all tbm 
elem.ems ofpromisaory estoppc:l: (1) reliance upon a specific promise; (2) aubstmtial economic 
Ion to the promisee u a result of such reliance; (3) the lo11 to the promiaoe wu or should have 
been ft>reseeable by the promisor; and (4) the promiaec'a reliance on the promise must have been 
reasonable. Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat'I Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171, 
182, 804 P.2d 900, 911 (1991); Zollln,,,. v. Carrol, 137 Idaho 397, 399, 49 P.3d 402, 404 
(2002). Pmmisaory estoppel does not require a nefarious Uitent on the part of the promisor to 
cause harm to the promisee. Rull Sala and~. Inc. v. U.S. Bank Nat. All~. 133 Idaho 669, 
615, 991 P.2d 857, 863 (Ct. App. 1999). With respect to the promisor'I state of mind, the 
doctrino requires only that it be tbreseeable to the promilor that the promisee would take aome 
action or ibrbeanmcc in reliance upon the promise and would thereby suffer subltaZltial loss if 
the promise wen to be dishonored. Id. 
In this cue, the elements for promissory estoppel cannot be met. There ii no evidence 
that durina the purchase and sale phase, Greenhcart made a promise either oral or in writina to 
the Browns that would have caused the Browns to take aome action or forbearance. Al. ltatcd 
above, Oreenheart did not prepare the Warranty Deed or the typewritten language in the 
Purchase and Sale Aifeement. There is no evidence that Oramhcart prevented the Browns from 
reading the Wammty Deed betbre they aqed it either. 'The clements fbr promissory estoppol 
cannot be met in this case and thereibre promissory estoppel does not apply. 
v. Equitable Estoppel 
The V erifled Complaint does not raise a claim fbr equitable eatoppcL Therefore pursuant to 
this Court•a previous analyaia in its Ord,, Denying Summary Judgment on Count I and Granting 
DDENDANT'S F.olsT AMENDED PaolOllD FINDINGS or r~ 1fD CONCUJllONI OF LAW. 10 
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In Part Summary Jud,,,.,,.t For Df/endant on CIJunt 11, the Court will not consider or apply 
equitable estoppel in thil cue. 
VI. ReW. 
Without wafvina its objections raised m its motion m llmine and motion tbr reconsideration 
that mistake wu not plead, Defendant Greenheart uka this Court to conclude that the Brown's 
lawsuit on the issue of mutual mistake ii untimely and theretbre enter an order and judgment 
dismi•sin& the lawsuit. 
If this matter ii not dismissed on statute of limitations arounds, Oreenheart ub thia Court to 
enter an order Win& that the Browns have not proven. the clement& of mutual mistake or tho 
application of any equitable theories of promissory and quasi estoppel 
DATED this sm day of April. 2013. 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs Jay and Christine Brown 
IN nm DISTRICT COURT OP nm FOURTII JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THB 
STATB OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR. THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
. JAY BR.OWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON-
BR.OWN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
AUGUSTA SA YOKO MIMOTO 
OREENHEART, an individual, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-353 
(PLAINTIFFS'.AMENDED 
PROPOSED] J'JNDING 01' PACTS 
AND CONCLUSIONS OJ' LAW 
mIS MATTER. was heard as a court trial on March Sand 6, 2013. Thomes E. Dvorak 
appeared representina the Plaintiffs and the Defendant was represented by Joseph Borton and 
Victor Villegas. At the conclusion of the trial, the parties' counsel presented oral closing 
arguments, but the Court allowed the parties until April 8, 2013, to submit proposed findings of 
fad and conclusions of law so that, at the request of the parties. the parties could have the benefit 
of a written transcript of the proceedings to inoorpora.t.e into the proposed findinp of fact and 
conclusions of law. The Court now enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as 
follows. 1 
1 To the extent that any of the following Findings of Pact should be more appropriately labeled Concluaions of Law, 
and vice vern~ they are hereby deemed as such and treated as such regardtes1 ofthefr actual label. 
J'nto>JNO OJ' 11' 1'.CTS AND CONCLUSIONS 01' LA W-1 
510 
" ' . 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. Thia action wu initiated by Plaintiffs Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown 
(the "Browm") on April S, 2012. 
2. In tho Complaint, the Browns usert two causes 6f action against Defendant 
Augusta Sayoko Mimoto Oreenheart ("Dr. Orccnheart"). 
3. Dach of the causes of action are for Quiet Tide/Declarato.ry Judsment relating to 
two water rights owned by the Browns and that Dr. Oreenheart is now claiming were paased to 
her under the gcnoral appurtonancy cJauso of the Warranty Deed when she purchased the land 
ftom tho Browns. 
4. On May 9, 2012, Dr. Oreenheart filed an answer. 
S. The Browns' lawsuit seeks to clarify that: a) the water rights owned by the 
Browns did not ttansfer to Dr. Orecnheart when she purchased the land from the Browns; and 
b) Dr. Orccnheart was very aware that the land she purchased from the Browns did not have any 
water rights attached to it. 
6. On January 31, 2013, after hearing cross motions for summary judgment,. this 
Court issued an order that denied in part and granted Jn part those motions. Additionally, the 
Court ruled that ~e matters presented by both sides in support of the motions for summary 
judgment raise the issue of whether there was a mistake which is a question of f'act that precludes 
summary judgment." Order at p. l O. The C_ourt also noted that the issue of equitable estoppel 
had not been plead. 
7. On February IS, 2013, Defendant filed a Motion in Limine, as well as a Motion to 
Shorten Tbne. The Plaintiffs responded by filing a Motion to file an Amended Complaint. For 
the reasons verbally set forth by the Court, both at the pretrial conference on February 22, 2013, 
and during the trial of this matter, the Court denied these Motions. 
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8. On March 4, 2013, Plaintift's filed a Motion in Liminc in this matter, as well as a 
Motion to Shorten Time. For the reasons act forth on the written transcript of proceedings of 
trial, tho Court granted the Motion to Shorten Time and also granted the Motion in Limino. 
9. Testimony was offered at trial from Plaintiff Jay Brown, Defendant Augusta 
Oreenhcart, and from Plaintiff Christine Brown. Tho Court now enters its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
ftNDINGS OP PACT 
I 
On or about Pcbruary .S, 1988 Jay Brown acquired approximately 320 acres of land 
situated In the East ~ of Section 24, T4S, RSE, B.M, in Elmore County (''Original Brown 
Property,,). 
II 
The Snake River Basin Adjudication (''SRBA j Court in Twin Falls, Idaho, decreed 
Water Rights Nos. 61-2188 and 61-7151 (tho "Water Rights") to Jay Brown on October 26, 
2000, authorizing the use of groundwater and making the Wat« Rights appurtenant to a 
permissible place of use that encompassed tho 320 actes comprising the Original Brown 
Property. 
m 
The decreed Water Rights were limited to the irrigation of a total of 287 KreS in a single 
irrigation system, which water rights wexe also limited to being used on the combined total 
320-acre parcel owned by Brown. 
JV 
Water Right 61-2188 was decreed authorizing the irrigation of up to 164 acres ofla.nd 
wtth1JI a 320-BCit pemdssib!e ptaee of m-e wboHy within the Original Bfo'WB Pt'epeft)I. 
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v 
Water Right 61-7151 was decreed authorizlna the irrigation of up to 123 aciea of land 
within tho same 320-acre pennissible place of use authorized for 61-2188 and wholly within the 
Orialnal Brown Property. 
VI 
As decreed, the Water Riahts may be used together to iaigate no more than 287 aacs 
within tho 320-acre pennissible place of use. 
vu 
Neither of the Wrrter Rights haa been used to i1ripto any portion of the Oreenheart 
Property since at least 1986. 
vm 
On August 28, 2003, the Browns applied to the Idaho Department of Water Resources 
("Department'') to lease portions of the Water Rights appurtenant to 160 acres of the Original 
Brown Property to tho Idaho Water Resource Board ("IWRB") Water Supply Bank, and pursuant 
to that application, contracted with the IWRB to idle 160 acres of the 287 authorized acres from 
irrigation. The Water Supply Bank lease remains in effect as of the date of this trial. That lease 
continued until the filing of the Complaint in this lawsuit and to the present day. 
IX 
In January of2007, Dr. Oreenheart purchased approximately sixty (60) acres of the 
Original Brown Property (the ''Oreenhcart Property') from tho Browns, leaving the Browns with 
approximately 260 acres (the "Current Brown Property"). 
x 
Prior to the sale to Dr. Gteenheart, the Browns' real estate agent Daryl Rhead represented 
to Dr. Greenheart as buyer that the Greenheart Property was being sold without water rights and 
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they discussed that tho property was "dry." All communications between Plaintiffs Brown and 
Dr. Greenhcart at the time of the sale wore through the real estate agent, Mr. Rhead. 2 The phrase 
"water rights" was uacd in Dr. Greenhelrt'a diswssion with Mr. Rhead and when they spoke, 
they did not "differentiate'' between 81ll'face water and other water. 3 At the time of the 
conversation with Mr. Rhead in early 2007, prior to makin11 an offer on the property, Dr. 
Greonheart did not believe that in order to dig a well she needed to have a decreed water right.4 
Dr. Orccmheart admita during discussion with the rea1tor Rhead prior to her purchase of the 
property that she was told that the property wu dry, but that she could dig a well, although there 
· was no discussion about the volume of water that she might want to remove with the well. 5 
XI 
The written Multiple Listing Service listing at the time, which was prepared from 
information provided to Mr. Rhead by Mt. Brown. included blanks by "inigation." "iniption 
district" and "iaigation district name" because Mr. Brown said there was no iniption.' He alBo 
gave information that there wero no water shares or water delivery 'system available in order to 
fill out that form.7 
XII 
Mr. Brown testified that at the time of reviewing the Purchase and Salo Aareem.ent, he 
read paragraph 16, whioh read "Description of water rights, water systems, wells, springs, 
ditches, ditch rights, etc., if any, that are appurtenant thereto that are now on or used in 
connection with the premises and shall b& included in the sale unless otherwise provided herein:,, 
with nothing following the colon as ''there was nothing listed, so there was nothing that was - as 
2 nial Tramcript al pp. 72., 139-140. 
, Trial Transcript at p. 148. 
4 Trial Tramcript atp. ISS. 
9 ldii MD8cnpt It JJ. 131. 
6 Trial Transcript at pp. 67-68. 
1 Trial Transcript at pp. 67-68 and Exhibit S. 
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far as water rights go there wu no water rights going after the colon. "1 With respect to a 
different portion of the contract, which taJ.b about a water rights transfer fee and had an "X" in 
the box for not applicable, Mr. Brown testified that ho took the impression away from that part 
that there would be no water rights transfer fco because there were aotng t.o be no water riahts 
transferred.' 
XIII 
Dr. Greenhcmt cannot point to any portion of tho Purchase and Salo Aareement the 
parties cxe~tcd where it was promised or represented that she would have water rights.10 The 
Purchase and Salo Agreement executed by the Browns and Dr. Oreenheart was accompanied by 
a Seller's Property Disclosure fonn. Under the disclosure entitled "Irrigation water provided 
by:", the Browns indicated "N/A'' for not applicable, and Dr. Oreenheart thinks she probably saw 
this fonn prior to purchase.11 
XIV 
At the time of the conveyance of the Orcenheart Property to Dr. Oreenheart there was no 
system in place on the Greenheart Property t.o divert or distribute water to irrigate it 
Brown testified that he has never applied irrigation to any portion of the property other 
than that depicted in the dark areas on Exhibits 45 and 46 (which does not include the 80 acres 
sold to Dr. Oreenhcart) and that there was no apparatus or setup Jn 2007 at the time of the sale to 
Dr. Oreenheart that would have allowed water to be applied to her property nor has there been 
any such setup since he has owned the property since 1988. 11 
8 Trial Tnm8Cript at pp. 69-70. 
' Trial Transmpt at pp. 70-71 and Exhibit 6. 
1
• Trial triiiicnpt if p. 1 74. 
II Trial Transcript at pp. 179-180; Bx. 4. 
12 Trial Transcript at p. Sl-52. 
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xv 
After the closing of tho purcbue and sale of the Oreenheart Property, Dr. Oreenheart 
submitted a June 1 o, 2007 Notico of Appeal to tho Elmore County Board of Equalization 
c.uBoard") for the Oreenheart Property whcroin Dr. Oreenheart challenged tho clatsitication of 
the Orccnhcart Property as irrigated agriculture and souaht to have it reclassified as Cateaory 5 
Dry Ora.zing. On July 2, 2007, Dr. Oreenhcart wrote to the assessor's office sayina "1 purchased 
60 acres from Mt. Jay Brown on January 30, 2007. At the time of purchase, I was told that the 
land was dry and tho grass that powa is good for cattle, and that there is no structure of any kind; 
therefore the tax would be at minimum. I was very surprised when I received the year 2007 tax 
assessment. "13 
XVI 
On July 6, 2007, at Dr. Oreenheart's direction and upon her express written authorization, 
Jay Brown appeared before the Board and represented that the Oreenheart Property was dry land 
and had been purchased and conveyed as dry land without any inigation water ripts and would 
not be irrigated "unless ~ such time a water right is purchased for the property by Ms. 
Orcenhcart." Mr. Brown made that statement in a letter he drafted at Dr. Oreenheart•s request 
and copied to her and sent to the Elmore County Board of Tax Equalization.14 SpccificaJlY, he 
indicated: "The property referenced. hu no water right with the Idaho Water Resources. 1t was 
strictly for dry grazing. Ms. Oreenheart, s tax levy indicates that the property is inipted; 
however, the property is not and will not be irrigated unless at such time a water right is 
purchased for the property by Ms. Oreenheart. "15 Mr. Brown testified that when he made that 
.. l'flll namttlpt il£p. 111 mtd l!Xlaiblt 16. 
14 See Bxhlbit J 6. 
"Trial Transcript at p. 83. 
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statement he still had the same belief that no wator right had been transferred that informed his 
intent at the time of the orilinal deal. 16 
XVII 
Mr. Brown also signed a dry grazina lease at Dr. Greenheart' s request, in order to help 
her obtain this favorable tax status. Dr. Greenheart drafted this dry arazing lease by 
downloading a Word version of an apartment lease off the lntemet and then modifying it herself 
into a dry arazing Jcase.17 Jn drafting the lease, she specifically provided that lessee shall not use 
tho leased premised for any other pwpose other than dry grazing.11 
xvm 
On July 6, 2007, the Board granted Dr. Greenheart's request to reclassify the land and 
upheld the assessor's adjusted valuation of the Gteenhcart Property to reflect that it is, indeed, 
dry &razing land with no irrigation water. Dr. Orecnheart was appreciative of the help Mr. 
Brown gave her, as she said "[h]e took time out of his busy schedule and composed letters, went 
to appropriate plaus physically and helped me greatly, I am very appreeiative for it."19 
XIX 
Since July 6, 2007, Dr. Oreenheart has received a financial benefit of more favorable tax 
treatment from that reclassification of the Oreenheart Property as Category S '4dry grazing" and 
that tax savings has been in excess of $600 a year since that time. 
xx 
Sometime later, a dispute developed between the Browns and the County over the 
propriety of the original split of the Oreenheart Property. As part of the settlement of that 
dispute, Ehnore County offered to purchase the Greenheart Property. In a November 8, 2009 e-
16 Trial Transcript at p. 84. 
1' Tttal TiiliSCriPf af pp. 195· 195 8M EX111&ff I!. 
11 Trial Transcript at p. 197. 
" Trlal Transcript at p. 187. 
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mail to Ms. Schindele, an employco with Elmore County, conccmina Elmore County's offer to 
purohase the O.roooheart Propa ty, Dr. Orccmbeart stated, among other things, that "at the timo of 
the purcbuo, I a1ao was very aware that the parcel is dry grazing only due to lack of an irrigation 
s)'3fem and DO water righta."20 
In Februaty 2012, tho Browns were contemplating ono or more salm or transfers of 
Water Rights 61-2188 and 61-7151. 'llte Browns bad an offer from the City of Mountain Home 
to purcbue their water rightl for $2,000 por acre. The Browna spoke with attomey Michael 
Creamor iegarding the potential sale and it was in these discuuions that they first learned that the 
reference to "appurtenances" In a deed bad been interpreted by some Idaho case law to include 
wa1er riahts even if they were not expressly mentioned, althoup it was believed at that point that 
background ciIGumstances could be used to show the true intent of tho partiet. Shortly after 
teaming thia information, Jay Brown cont.acted Dr. Greenh.eart by telephone. 
UJI 
On February 8, 2012, Jay Brown contacted Dr. Greenheart by telephone and requested 
that sho confirm in writing that she' was aware she did not purchase the Oreonheart Property with 
water rights and did not object to any sale or transfer of the Water Rights by the Browns. Dr. 
Oreenheart alleges that during the telephone conversation in February 2012, that Jay Brown had 
indicated. to her that he had umistakenly sold the groundwater right to her." 
XXllI 
Dr. Grecnheart has nover attempted to apply any water to the land by any method or to 
file any paperwork with any govemmental agency regarding the allegedly conveyed water ~ahts 
20 Bxhlblt 28. 
FINDING OP li'AC111 AND CONCLtJSIONS OP LAW·' 
518 
liaO l 0 I 0 28 
ll'AX 
t •. 
from the 2007 deed until early 2012 after she received a phone call from Plaintiff Jay Brown 
regarding the groundwater right at issue. 
XXIV 
On February 17, 2012, evidently prompted by that phono call, and without notice to the 
Browns, Dr. Oreenheart flied with tho Idaho Department of Water Resources a Notice of Change 
of W lfl:ll Right Ownership ("Notice''). In tho Notice, Dr. Oreenheart represented among other 
things that the Water Rights were "divided proportionally based on the portion of their placo(s) 
of use acquired by the new owner." The.NoUce makes no mention of Dr. Greenheart's 
agreement with the Browns and admissions to the Elmore County Board of Equalization that she 
had pmchased tho Grecnheart Property without water rights. 
xxv 
On Marc;h 9, 2012. the Department revised its water right database to indicate Dr. 
Oreenheart as the current owner of portions of the Water Rights, and reduced the quantity of · 
water and irrigated acres authorized under the Water !lights decreed to the Browns 
ex>mmensuratcly. Due to certain technical errors in the Department•s revisions, the water rl&]lt 
database was subsequently revised by the Department on Marc~22, 2012. Those notices of 
revisions indicated that they do not recontbm the validity of ownership of the right. 
CONCLUSIONS 01 LAW 
Mutual.Mistake is Establlahed by Clear and Convincln1 Evideace 
AJ this Court noted in its decision on swnmary judgment, .. [p ]leadings in this case and 
the evidence submitted in support of the motion for summary judgment raise the issue of 
mistake, which would permit extrinsic evidence to be considered.,. Order on Cross Motions for 
Summary Judgment at p. 10. 
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Lepl Standards Appliable to Mutual..Miatake 
11lc party asserting mutual mistake bean the burden of proo£ Muw v. Sslag Corp., 113 
Idaho 773, 777, 747 P.2d 1302, 1306 (Ct. App. 1987). That burden is aignifioant-mutual 
mistake must bo proven by clear and convincing evidence.. Clint "· Hoyls ct Assoclatu, Ins., 
Inc., 108 ldaho 162, 164, 697 P.2d 1176, 1178 (1985). Bouuae mutual mistake is a question of 
fact, a trial court's finding thereof will not bo overturned unless it is clearly erroneous. Id. 
·A mutual mistake occurs when both parties, at tho time of con1ractina, share a 
misconception about a basic assumption or vital fact upon which they based their bargain. Balley 
v. Ewing, 105 Idaho 636, 639, 671 P .2d 1099, 1102 (Ct. App. 1983). To prove mutual mistake, a 
party must set forth proof of: (i) a mistake; (ii) commonality; and (Hi) materiality. i.e., that the 
mistake is so substantial and fundamental that it defeats the object of the party asserting mistake. 
O'Connor v. Hargtr Conatruction. ltu:., 14S Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008). 
A mistake is defined as an unintentional act or omission arising from ignorance, surprise 
or misplaced confidence. Bailey at 639, 671P.2dat1102. As stated, the mistake in question 
must bo shared among the parties. This is relatively straightforward. For example, in Balley, the 
Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether, to be entitled to relief under mutual mistake, 
the parties must have the same misconception as to the same assumption of fact. Some 
jurisdictions require this. The Court of appeals declined. Thus, as long as there is a different 
' 
belief as to the same assumption of fact, the mistake is mutual. This is true regardless of whether 
the different misconception as to the same mistake is in itself different. 
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B. 
All Unintentional Act or Oml11ion Occarred 
As to the fhst of tho elements, proof of a mistake-en unintentional act or omission 
arising from ignorance, surprise or misplaced confidence-is required. Ballq at 639. 671 P.2d 
at 1102. Here, tho mistake was a belief that no water rights were being transferred as part of the 
sale of the property when in fact 1he deed that 1ranlferred the property used language that 
effected just sueh a transfer. The facts supporting the existence of a mistake are Mr. Brown's 
testimony that (i) ho never intended to sell tho water rights, (ii) he has a sale pending of the water 
rights alone to a third party at this time for $1,400 an acre just for the water rights, (iii} Mr. 
Brown never used water rights on that portion of the property that was sold to Dr. Green.heart; 
(iv) tho Seller's Property Disclosure fonn (Ex. 4) has ''NIA" for not applicable next to the entry 
for irrigatlon water available; (v) the Multiple Listing Service Listing (Ex. 5) has a "blank" next 
to irrigation; and (vi) the Vacant Land Purchase and Sale Agreement (Bx. 6) in paragraph 16 
talks in terms of "Description of water rights ... if any ... included in the sale unless otherwise 
provided herein: __ .. and provides that the water rights transfer fee is "NIA", which is 
defined by contract to mean "evidence that the parties have contemplated certain facts and 
conditions and determined that such facts or conditions do not apply to this agreement or 
tranaaction.'' Further, Mr. Brown was asked that if he had known in 2007 at the time he signed 
the deed. the information that he had learned in early 2012 from Mr. Creamer, i.e., that the deed 
would work to effect a transfer of water rights, whether he would have signed the deed, and he 
responded no. because "the value of the water righU was actually worth more than the value of 
tho property itself',i1 Mr. Brown testified that he continued to hold the belief that Dr. 
Greenheart did not have any water rights for the property from the time he signed the deed up 
21 TrJal Transcript at p. 79. 
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until the time ho spoke with attomey Mika Creamer in early 2012.zz Mr. Brown testified on 
redirect that with respect to Bxhibit 6, tho Purchase and Sale Agreement, he did not personally 
havo any understanding of language that works a transfer of water rights in that document in the 
same way 1hat he now understands based on the Court's January decision, Bxbibit 8, the deed. 
and tho language "with their appurtenances" works a transfer of those water rigbts.23 
Christine Brown likewise testified that her understanding at the time sho signed Exhibit 8, 
tho Deed, was that no water rights were going to be included in the sale because the water rights 
were under contact to someone else and the sale was strictly for the land. 24 
Dr. Oteenheart made a number of admissions against interest that lead to the conclusion 
that she shared a belief that no water riahts were being conferred as part of the sale. In addition 
to her initial conversation with the realtor Rhead in which she admitted asking if there- were 
water rights and being told tho property was "dry," there was nothing in the Purchase and Salo 
Agreement that would have changed this assumption. Dr. Oreenheart testified that while she 
discussed a well, she did not discuss any volume of water she desired and that she did not think 
that she needed a water rigbt in order to have one. And in fact this accords with the law on 
point. 25 Six months after the sale, Dr. O:reenheart acted on he.r belief that this property was "dry" 
by asking Jay Brown to write to the county and in fact writing to the county herse)£ all to the 
effect that she undorstood at the time of the purchase OO:it the property 'WU dry and there would 
be no water rights unless she purchased such a right (see Ex. 16 and 18). Dr. Oreenb.eart herself 
drafted a Dry Grazing Lease Agreement to the end of the property being taxed as dry grazing and 
specifying that the property would be used for no other pw.pose than dry grazing. Ex. 11. Dr. 
22 Trial Transcript al pp. 84·8S. 
u Trim Transcript at p. I 13. 
111 IHii J ilUW!fiP't at p. 21:,. 
25 See Idaho Code §§ 42-227 and 42-111 (providing that no water right it necessary to operate a well for broadly 
defined "domestic pwposes"). 
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Oreenheart later confinncd this belief on November SJ 2009, more than two years after the sale, 
when in n:sponding to an otter to purchase the property fiom her, Dr. Oieenheart drafted au e-
mail without ulistance and selected all the words that were used that stated: "Apin, at the time 
of the pmchase, I was also very awaie that the parcel is dry grazing only due to the lack of an 
irrigation system and no water ript. .. 26 Dr. Oreenheart's failure to act to have tho Idaho 
Department of Water Resources recoplze the transfer until five years after the sale, after Jay 
Brown told her he believed a "mistake" had occurred, speaks volumes in terms of this lack of 
any beliof' that water ripts had transfer.red at the time of the sale. 
ThUI, the mistake in this caac ia that both parties believed no water ri&hts were to be 
transfcned with sale of land, but that the Deed in fact has language on its face that transferred 
water rights. The evidenco in the case at band supports the concl~on that at the time of . 
contradina and of tendering tho Deed at issue, tho parties here shared a fundamental mutual 
assumption, that the G:reenheart Property was being sold as chy ground without water rights. The 
language in the Deect"is a situation that is referred to by the public as a "legal technicality" in that 
it doot not reference "water rights" as being transferredJ and instead uses an ~e term 
"appurtenances," which this Court has held is given the legal effect when employed in a deed of 
transferring water rights in the absence of fraud or mistake. Mr. Brown and Mrs. Brown have 
testified to their understanding that no water riahts were being transferred. Dr. Green.heart's 
actions subsequent to 1he Deed with respect to taxes and her response to the county attempting to 
buy hot out are fbrther clear and convincing proof that she shared this m.isasswnption of fact. 
Although Dr. Gree.ohcart now says that she had a misconception at the time of what water rights 
were. this does not change the fact that she employed this term and ultimately believed at the 
time that whatever water rights were, she was not obtaining any. Just as was the case in Bailey, 
28 Trial Tramcript at p. 203 and Exhibit 28. 
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there was no event or action where Dr. Orccnhcart claimed a water right had been transfcaed 
until she wu called by Plaintiff Jay Brown, who disclosed to her that there was a potential 
"'mistake,, that he bad teamed of in the Deed and he asked her to confinn tho contrary intent. 
c. 
The Mistake wu Common to Botll Partlu , 
Dr. Oreenheart takes the position however that the mistake in the present case does not 
nieet the second element of mistake, commonality, primarily because she claims to have in 2007 
only thought of "water rights" as comprising surface water. Even if her .testimony that sbe 
believed water rights only related to surface rights is credited, applicable law indicates that the 
parties do not have to make tho exact same mistake, so long as they share the same basic 
misassumption of fact. Further, the Court finds Dr. Grccnheart's testimony in this regard 
incredible and non-:believable. 
C.A. 
The Parties Shared the A11umption that No Water Ripa Were Tranlferred 
Even if her testimony is taken at face value in this regard, such a belief does not prevent 
the clement of commonality from beina satisfied in these circumstances. A "mutual mistake also 
has been defined to include situations in which the parties labor under differing misconceptions 
as to the same basic assumption or vital fact. 0 Bail'Y v. Ewing, 105 Idaho 636, 639, 671 P .2d 
1099, l 102 (Ct App. 1983). According to the Restatement ofComracta, Section 152 cmt. H, 
.. [t]he rule stated in this Secti~n applies only where both parties arc mistaken as to the same basic 
assumption. Their mistakes need not be, and often they will not be, identical.,, Both parties in 
this case shared tho same basic misassumption on a vital fact, i.e., that no water rights were being 
transferred. The Browns knew what water rights were precisely. Dr. Oreenheart testified that 
she did not have any belief that she had acquired any water rights until the 2012 conversation 
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with Mr. Brown. 27 Dr. Oroenheart thouaht she knew what water rights were (right to get surface 
water), but most importandy did not think she was getting any water rlahts, i.e., she thouaht the 
property wu dry, and said she was not &ottlng water rightl. Her desire to have a well at the time 
included a belief that she did not need to have 1 water right for a well, which is cuctly in accord 
with Idaho law. S•• Idaho Code § § 42-227 and 42-111 (providing that no water right is 
n«ossary to opc.rato a well for broadly defined "domestic purposes."). Th.us, there was a 
commonality of mistake as to the same basic assumption, that no "water rights" were being 
transferred. 
CJL 
Dr. Gneaheart Knew What Water Rlpta Were 
Alternatively, on the element of commonality, this Court does not credit Dr. Oreenheart's 
claim that she had such a limited understanding of the phrase "water rights" at the time of the 
sale. It is common sense that 
A person necessarily intends the probable, natural consequences of his own 
voluntary acts. In tho absence of an admitted intent, the only yardstick by which 
one'• intent cu be determined 11 hit external acta and conduct, what he does 
and what he •Y•, and one cannot excuse the probable conseqaeneea of one's 
owa vohaatary act hr daimln1 that he bad • mental raervatlon and 
performed the act or acts voluntarily done without an in1ent. 
State v. Missenberger, 86 Idaho 321, 386 P.2d 559 (1963)(quotingState v. Johnson, 74 ldaho 
269, 261 P.2d 638 (1953))(emphasis added). The Court finds that Dr. Greenhcart's claimed 
explanation that she believed the phrase "water ri&hts" only included sutface water and not 
ground water to be an artificially pinched and narrow definition, and to have the characteristic.s 
of an after-the-fact rationalization or justification. It is most likely that Dr. Oreenheart believed 
that there was no water available on the property short of a well, as this is consistent with her 
asking tho realtor about '\vater rights:• the rea!tor telling her that the property was "dry" and her 
21 Trial Transcript at p. 20s. 
l'INDJlllG OP J'ACT! AND CONCLUSIONS 01' LAW-16 
525 
II.JO l7 I 0 28 
04/08/2013 KON 15:05 PAX 
belief that she did not need water rights to put in a well. Her story appears to be still evolving, as 
evidenced by the fact that during trial, Dr. Oreenheart offered testimony to the effect that her 
belief that water rights only in.eluded surface water had to do with experience she had with 
property she owned in Emmett, ldaho.21 However, during summary judgment in this case, she 
offered an Affidavit executed on December 17, 2012, explaining in detail her beliefin .this regard 
(Exhibit 41) and yet made no reference to her experience with the Emmett property somehow 
informing that belief.19 It appears the first time that any reference was made to tho Emmett 
property wu shortly before trial in Dr. Greenheart's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. This has the hallmarks of an after-the-fact justification or rationalization, not a 
contemporaneous, honestly-held belief. Dr. Greenheart is a highly educated and intelligent 
person, having started college before finishing high school, and going on to obtain no less than 
four separate degrees, an associate degree in drafting, bachelor of fine arts in interior design, 
master of arts in teaching, and a doctorate in education.30 The separate words of the phrase 
"water rights" are not complicated to decode-"water" is self explanatory and .. rights" meaning 
an ability to demand or expect something. ·Dr. Oreenheart bad seen crop pivot irrigation systems 
from the air prior to 2007 and understood that they ran on mechanical apparatus and that the 
water was pressurized with a pump and she understands the pump can be hooked into an open 
surface waterway or to a well to pump water. 31 She also drafted a lease agreement, transforming 
an apartment lease into a dry grazing lease (Ex.. 11). These actions and background imply that 
she understood "water rights" to mean exactly what that phrase does in fact mean, a property 
right describing both surface and ground water, and that this understanding informed her intent 
21 'lrhd Transcript at pp. 141-148. 
:u See Ellbibit 41, Affidavit sipJed on December 17, 2012. 
30 Inabil to eak. or comprehend English has not kept Dr. Oreenheart from writing a dissertation in order to 
o a octorale egree l1l uca on, · · 
her inability to communicate in English. Trial Transcript at pp. 121, 126. 
" Trial Transcript at pp. l S0..152. 
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and thinking at the timo of tho Deed when she acknowledges discussing "water ripts" and being 
told tho property was "dry ... 
D. 
The Mistake wu Material 
The third element of mutual mistake, materiality, meam essentially that the mistake is so 
substantial and fundamental that it defeats the object of the party asserting mistake. 0 'Connor v. 
Harger Construction, Jnc., 14.S Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 8S1 (2008)(quotina.Pnmary 
Health N•twork, Inc. v. StaJe, Dep't of .A.dmln., 137 Idaho 663. 668, 52 P .3d 301, 312 (2002)). 
Mr. Brown testified as to his understanding of the value of the water rights and how he would 
not have gono forward with the transaction bad he known that they were being included. Mr. 
Brown testified that he always viewed water rights as a separate, extremely valuable right, going 
back to when ho was a child and his father would always tell him that the farm ground out there 
might not be the best, but they had an extremely valuable right to pump water separate and apart 
from the land. 31 After purchasina the property in 1988, Mr. Brown initiated the adjudication 
process to pedect water rights on the property.33 Mr. Brown testified the priority date for Water 
Right 61-02188 was an ex1remely old priority date and more valuable as a consequence. 34 He 
further testified that both the 1966 and 1973 priority dates were relatively senior water rights out 
in that area.3' 
Mr. Brown testified that by mid-2006 he had put a major portion of the water rights, i.e., 
272 acres of the water rights, associated with all of the property, including the 80 acres that was 
eventually sold to Dr. Oreenheart, under contr~ct to Idaho Water Company or Del Coates and 
n Trial Tnmsc:ript at p. 47. 
,, trlil 'fiiiiSCriPl if pp. 48-49. 
3~ Trial Transcript at pp. 48-49. 
" TriaJ nanscript at p. ,o. 
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had mivod at a price of S 1,4SO per ac;re and that tho water rights were under contract at the same 
timo as the sale to Dr. Greenhcart. Ultimately that water rights contract fell through in 2009.36 
Mr. Brown testified that at tho time of the sale ho told the realtor, Mr. Rhead, that in 
coming up with a price, it was "for the dry ground, and then would be no water rights to go with 
it. •tl7 He testified that in coming up with that price, he had a friend who sold property to the 
north of this proporty by two miles and that the friend sold an 80-acre parcel for Sl.500 an acre 
without water rights whereas another friend sold development property for around $3,000 an acre 
with water rishts.31 Mr. Brown testified that it was not his inteDt to transfer water rights at the 
~o of the sale.39 
The price of the water rights standing alone as separate property ho testified to, especially 
the offer at Sl,500 at the time on the water rights alone, and later the $2000 an acre price offered 
by the city 1 are strong evidence that conoborates the material nature of this assumption. Both of 
the Browns testified they would not have utilized the deed had they known that it was in fact 
transferring the water rights at issue. 
E. 
The Statute ofLbnitation1 Does Not Bar a Claim ofMutaalMi.ltake 
The argument that the statute of limitations has rnn for a claim of mistake is without 
merit. As this Court held in the context of the cross motions for summary judgment: 
Applying the plain lanauage of Idaho Code Section 6-401, the applicable statute 
of limitations did not begin to run w>.til Greenheart asserted an adverse 'Claim 
against the water rights by filing with l.D. W.R. There is no evidence in the 
record that Gteenh.eart made any claims in any form or degree to any alleged 
water rights for the land she purchased ftom January 29, 2007, until February 17, 
2012. So, filing with the I.D.W.R. was the first instance Greenheart asserted any 
ownership in tho water rights adverse to Plaintiffs. Therefore, this quiet title 
"Trial Transcript at .PP· 56-61. 
" filil 1i'ans&ipt if p. 62. 
"Trial Transcript at pp. 62-63. 
3
' Trial Transcript at p. 63. 
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action filed on April S, 2012, is well within all the statute oflimitations asserted 
by the parties. 
Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment at p. 7. The Defendant araues that Idaho Code § 
S-218(4) applies and that the three-year statute oflimitations for a c:laim based on mistake has 
passed. Based upon the following analysis, the Court c:onc:ludea that the statute oflimitations 
under§ 5-218(4) did not start nmnina based on discovery witil Febnwy 17, 2012. when the 
Defendant first assorted a claim to the water rights that were allegedly transferred by means of 
the deed and its reference to appurtenances. 
Idaho Code Section 5·218(4) provides a plaintiff bas three years to flle auit for: 
[a]n action fot relief on the growid of fraud or mistake. The cause of action in 
such oase not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery. by the aggrieved 
party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake. 
Idaho Code§ 5·218(4). The language itself focuses on discovery of"facts constituting the ... 
mistake." The Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs should have discovered the mistake at three 
points, each of wbioh would have been more than three years prior to the filing of the Complaint 
in the instant action: (1) at the time of the execution of the Purchase and Sale Agreement; (2) at 
the time of the execution of the warranty deed; and (3) when Jay Brown authored a letter to the 
tax authorities on June 9, 2007, and indicated that the property was assessed as inigated. 
As to the argument that the Purchase and Sale Agreement gave notice of facts 
constituting the mistake, this Court is hesitant to find that somethina within the Purchase and 
Sale Agreement could have operated to put the Browns on notice when the deed at issue, the 
document about which the parties were in fact mistaken, had not yet even been executed. But 
even it if could, this Court has found that said Purchase and Sale Agreement is ambiguous as to 
whether water rights were transferred. This Court now finds that there is no portion of such 
Pw&Aue a Sale Apeenwnt that would have imputed such ngtice, 
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Turning ahead to tho June 9, 2007 letter, this Court finds as a factual matter that 
regardlesa of how Mr. Brown bcoame apprised of the fact that the County was asscssin1 the 
property as irrigated, novortheless Dr. Oreenhoart's confirmation to him at tho time that she still 
understood she had not received any water rights aa a function of the sale overrode any 
conolusion he might have drawn to the oontrary. In other words, when Jay Brown was having 
discussions with Dr. Oreenheart in June of 2007, it is clear that both were proceeding from tho 
mistaken assumption that no water rights had transferred as part of the earlier January sale and 
thatthe property was eligible to be assessed as dry grazina. 
This leaves Defendant's argument that the deed itself and its reference to appurtenances 
somehow imparted the requisite notice to the Browns. The argument urged by the Defendant is 
essentially a legal interpretation of the meaning of the word "appurtenances." The Deed itself 
does not use the words "water rights" or anything else that would excite the attention of a 
reasonable person to the fact that a transfer of those rights had accrued, unless theyr were a legal 
scholar who was able to divine the framework of the relevant Idaho case law. An argument very 
similar to that made by Defendant was made and rejected by the Idaho Court of Appeals in the 
case of A.Itkin v. Gill, 108 Idaho 900, 702 P .2d 1360 (198S). In that case, the seller, Aitken, had 
sold certain land near Riggins. Idaho, to tho buyer, Gill, in 1962. At that time, Gill believed that 
approximately 17 acres of land known as Rocky Flat were supposed to be included with the 
}1IOperty to bo described in the deed. However, Aitken thought otherwise. The deed in 1962, in 
fact. did not include Rocky Flat in the actual legal description. In 1975, the assessor's office 
advised all parties that the land description in the deed was defective for reasons unrelated to the 
Rocky Flat issue. To correct that defect, the parties executed and delivered two more deeds, one 
in 1976 and one in 1978. Each deed was recorded shortly after delivery, but both contained 
descriptions that. unlike the 1962 deed, included Rocky Flat. In 1981, Aitken, the seller, became 
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awaro of the mistake In the 1976 and 1978 deeds and brouaJtt suit in 1982 sceldng reformation 
based on mutual mistake. On appeal, the timeliness of the bringina of suit was challenged. The 
Altken court noted that: 
[i]n applying the statute of fraud caao, our Supreme Court baa held that "actual 
knowledge of tho fraud will bo inforred if the allegedly agrieved party could 
have disco'Vered it by the exercise of due diligcnco." We believe the same 
principle logically applies to causes of action based upon mistake. According1y, 
we hold that an action seeking relief from mistake will be time barred under LC. § 
5~218(4) unless it is filed within three years after the mistake could have been 
discovered in the exercise of due diligence. 
In this case, it is uncontrovertcd that seller sued within three years after the 
mistake was discovered in 1981, but more than three years after the mistake first 
occurred in 1976 and later reoccurred in 1978. The district judae made no 
detonnination u to whether the mistalco could have been discovered by the 
exercise of due diligence before 1981. An issue of due diligence is one of fact, to 
be addressed in the first instance by the trial court. Whereas here, no finding has 
been made upon a material issue, the case must be remanded unless the record is 
clear "yields an obvious answer to the relevant question." 
Our examination of the record dlsdotu no "obvious annver" to the question 
of due dillgence. On the one hand, the 1976 deed clearly refers to land in 
"section 21 ... lying east of the Little Salmon River,'' which undisput.edly is 
Rocky Flat. On the other hand, it is also clear that the 1976-78 deeds were 
intended to remedy an apparent defect unrelated to Rocky Flat. Moreover, the 
circumstances surrounding the procurement of property descriptions and the 
incorporation of those descriptions in the 1976-78 deeds arc obscure. Whether 
tho sellers failed to exercise due diligence in examining the descriptions is a 
question ill suited to appellate fact finding on this record. A remand is required. 
For guidance on remand, we note that the reeordatlon of the 197'-78 deeds hu 
DO bearinl OD the quutiOD of due dililence. When deeds arc recorded, 
constructive knowledge of their contents is imparted to "subsequent purchasers or 
encumbrancers.,, I.C. § 55-811. In any event, such constructive lmowledae 
can be no greater than the seller's actual knowled1e when they oped and 
delivered th• deeds. 
Id at 901, 702 P.2d at 1361 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). 
In the present case, both parties were laboring under the shared assumption that no water 
rights were passed. Indeed, the Defendant herein seems not to have understood the legal 
technical meaning of"appurtenances" until 2012. The fact that a technical nuance of the Deed 
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improperly included the word "appurtenances" and had the legal effect of passing sw;h water 
riahta is not a faot that is readily within common understanding and not something that could 
have easily been discovered by the sellers. Tho teaching of A.ltun is that in a deed mistake 
situation, tho focus should be on what tho seller's actual knowledge wu at the time. Further in 
this case. tho conduct of tho Defendant in not asserting such rights until February 17, 2012, after 
being contacted by the Plaintiffs. corroborates that no one lcnew of the effcet of the Deed as beina 
contrary to tho original intent of the parties until much, much la1er than the original delivery of 
the Deed. Accordingly, this Court finds that date wu the date that Plaintiffs first knew that tho 
Defendant was assertina an adverse interest and claiming that she had indeed received water 
rights as a result of the Deed oonveyance. 
XXVll 
Quul Eltoppel 
Quasi-estoppel ''prevents a party from asserting a right, to the detriment of another party, 
which is inconsistent with a position previously taken.,, C &: G, Inc. "'· Canyon Highway Dist. 
No. 4, 139 ldaho 140, 144, 75 P.3d 194, 198 (2003). The doctrine applies when: 1) Tho 
offending party took a different position than his or her original position. and 2) either tho 
offending party gained an advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other party, tho other party 
was induced to change positions, or it would be uncon9cionable to permit the off anding party to 
maintain an inconsistent position from one from which he or she has already derived a benefit or 
in whioh ho or she bas acquiesced. A.ll1n v. Rcynoltb, 145 Idaho 807. 812, 186 P.3d 663. 668 
(2008). 
Somo cases have interjected an additional requirement of unconscionability with regard 
to the advantage or detriment portion of the doctrine. This does not appear to be required by the 
phrasing of the doctrine, though this issue is not settled. In.Atwoodv. Smith, 143 ldaho 110, 138 
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P .3d 31 O (2006), tho court stated that ''to prove quasi-estoppel, it is not necessary to show 
detrimental reliance; instead there must be evidence that it would be unconscionable to pcsnnit 
the offending party to assert allogedly contrary positions." 143 Idaho at 114, 138 P.3d at 314. 
This suggests that unoo~ionability must be proven to apply quasi-estoppel. However, when we 
go to the A.twood decision, the citation to the above-quoted portion tabs us to Thomas v. 
A.rlcoosh Produu, 137 Idaho 3S2, 4& P.3d 1241 (2002). This is significant because of a subtle, 
but significant, addition to quasi-estoppel law that is not contained in more recent decisions. 
Indeed, the Court in A.rlcoosh begins its analysis with the standard blmb on the law 
regarding advantap, disadvantage or unc:onscionabiJity. However, instead of employing the 
disjunctive "or',,A.r'koosh uses the conjunctive "and." Thus, to prove quasi-estoppcl under 
Ar'koosh, a party mWit prove an inconsistency, advantage, disadvantage, awl unconscionability. 
More reoent statements on quasi-estoppel use the disjunctive "or," (See e.g. Washington Ftderal 
v. Vim Enge/en. 153 Idaho 648, 289 P.3d SO (2012) (most recent quasi-estoppel case, stating that 
to prove the same you must satisfy advantage, disadvantqe or unconscionabillty, but not all 
three). Based on the more recent cases, .A.rkoosh contains an inaccurate statement of quasi-
cstoppel. Thus, a party does not have to prove unconscionability, just an advantage, 
disadvantage or unconscionability. 
AU of these elements me met here: (1) Dr. Greenheart is now taking a different position 
than her original position wherein she disclaimed any interest in water rights in 2007 and 2009, 
and (2)(a) Dr. Greenheart gained a substantial tax advantage over the years by doina so; and/or 
(b) Dr. Orcenheart' s actions in confirming the mistaken mutual assumption caused a 
disadvantage to the Browns in that the Browns believed they had the water rights to sell and 
incutred legal expenses and took other efforts to sell the water rights, thereby inducing them to 
change positions; and/or (c) it would be unconscionable to permit Dr. Greenheart, having 
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received tho tax benefit and taken the position she bu, especially in light of tho value of the 
water rights, to essentially mako off with a windfall that was never intended by the parties at the 
time of their contract, and the Court would be doing so by now allowing her to maintain that the 
"appurtenances" language operates in a technical fashion to transfer water ripts, an inconsistent 
position from one from which Dr. Oreenheart has previously derived a benefit; and/ or in which 
she bas acquiesced. A quasi estoppel arises against Dr. Greenhcart now maintaining that tho 
"appurtCnances" language has the effect for which she argues and entry of an order to this effect 
is appropriate. 
Dr. Greenheart is now taking a different position than her original position wherein she 
disclaimed any interest in water rights in 2007 and 2009. Dr. Oreenheart gained a substantial tax 
advantage over the years by doing so and by having the property reclassified as "dry grazing" as 
a consequence, and her property taxes dropped from $628 to SI 7.90 per year.40 Alternatively, 
Dr. Greenheart' s actions. in confirming the mistaken mutual assumption of both parties caused a 
disadvantage to the Browns in that the Browns believed they had the water rights to sell and 
incurred leaal expenses and took other efforts to sell the water rights, thereby inducina them to 
change positions. Finally, it would be unconscionable to permit Dr. Greenheart, having received 
the tax benefit and taken the position she bas, especially in light of the valu~ of the water rights, 
to essentially make off with a windfall that was never intended by the parties at the time or their 
contract, and the Court would be doing so by now allowing her to maintain that the 
"appurtenances" language operates in a technical fashion to transfer water rights, an inconsistent 
position from one from which Dr. Oreenheart has previously derived a benefit; and one in which 
she bas acquiesced. A quasi estoppel arises against Dr. ~eart now maintaining that tlio 
40 Trial Transcript at p. 199 and Exhibits 19, 22 and 25. 
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Mutual mistake may bo employed to modify or refonn a document so as to reflect tho 
parties' true intent. Primary Health Network, Inc., "· Stat•, Dq 't of A.dmtn., 137 Idaho 663, 668, 
52 P.3d 307, 312 (2002). Reformation has been employed as a remedy even where not souaJit as 
part of the original complaint. Se1 e.g. Collins v. Parkinson, 96 Idaho 294, 527 P .ld 1252 
(1974X"The remedy of reformation was properly utilized by the trial court because tho finaJ 
judgment in an action is to afford the prevailing party the relief to which it is entitled, even if that 
relief ls not demanded in the pleadings."). 
In tbia case, mutual mistake and the doctrine of quasi estoppol justify the Court refonning 
the deed to become the deed that the parties would have made but for the mistake. Based on the 
forgoing, it is hereby ordered that judgment consistent with the foregoing be entered on Counts I 
and II of tho Amended Complaint in favor of the Browns. Counsel for the Browns to submit a 
proposed form of judgment suitable for recording in the real property records that decrees that 
the deed from the Browns to Dr. Oreenheart is refonned effective as of the date of that original 
deed so that the reference to "appurtenances" is refonned to read: '*appurtenances (excluding 
and reserving unto gnmtor any irrigatiQn water rights, including all of its right, title and interest 
in Water Right Noa. 61-2188 and 61-7151)." 
FINJ>ING OJI' J'Acrs AND CONCLUllOllfS OJ' LAW- 26 
535 
1410 27 / 028 
04/08/2013 KON 1510S FAX 
' . 
DATED thiJ 31.b day of April, 2013. 
OIVBNS PURSLEY LIJJ 
Thomas B. Dvorak 
Attomcys for Jay and Christine Brown 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 8111 day of April, 2013, I caused to be served a true and correct 
copy of tho foregoing document to the persons listed below the method indicated: 
Victor Villeaas .. 
Borton & Lakey 
141 B. Carlton Avenue 
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